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ABSTRACT 
Globally, public management underwent substantial reforms over the past three decades. 
Known as new public management (NPM), reforms have sought to redefine the role of 
politicians and public managers, redesign public organisations for enhanced autonomy and 
effectiveness, and restructure service delivery by integrating private organisations to ensure 
competition believed as necessary for efficiency. Premised on tensional forces of public choice' 
and `managerialism' the NPM model potentially creates conflicts between managers and 
professionals. Developed in OECD countries, and applied to less developed countries (LCDs) 
with generally ineffective public sectors; and admittedly an engrained corruption culture, NPM 
reforms are typified by increased bureaucratic centralisation, which restricts professionals' 
discretion. Using semi-structured interviews and a range of qualitative analytic devices, this 
thesis examines the challenges professional managers encounter under senior managers, when 
some support functions were privately outsourced, in line with NPM, in two corporatised 
hospitals in Ghana. 
Findings suggest professionals feel by-passed, their discretion restricted, and their expertise 
ignored by senior managers, generating clashes over mediating the conflicting dualities of 
cost/quality, results/procedures, and output/outcome. Conceptualised as resistance strategies, 
professionals' response(s) to the encountered issues portrayed appreciable unconventionality 
and non-deviance, coming close to individualised version of work to rule, and professionalised 
version of weapons of the weak. Such professionals' resistance strategies elucidate the 
complexities of Ghana's embedded political, economic and socio-cultural context. The 
findings suggest the true outcomes of NPM reforms within this and similar contexts are 
masked, distorted by the refracting effects of corruption, producing a type of bureaucracy that 
encourages reduced devolution, tending to inhibit rather than aid effective delivery of public 
services 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NPM Reforms: Public Sector managerialism and Professionalism and the 
Research Context 
1.0. Introduction 
This thesis investigates the experiences of professional middle managers (PMMs) with new 
public management (NPM) reforms in two corporatised health institutions in Ghana. It 
examines the challenges that NPM, as a bundle of public sector reform practices, presents 
to PMMs [particularly in a less developed country (LDC)] whose work has been brought 
under [contract] senior managers in recent times. In this thesis, I employ NPM as a label 
that encapsulates the ideologies and reforms strategies understood by a number of 
commentators as prescriptions for improving public management globally. In that sense, 
NPM-type reform is generally viewed as a paradigm shift in public administration and it 
values, a point I return to later in chapter two. 
But the question of what there is that is uniquely different about NPM, which distinguishes 
it from traditional public administration has to be answered in order to give the former a 
shape and form. In answering this question, it is fair to state that emphasis on the crucial 
role of managers in effective public service delivery, the supremacy of private management 
models over public management, and increased collaboration between the public and the 
private sector are core to the NPM model. These, together with the commonly cited seven 
doctrinal areas (Hood, 1991), constitute the fundamental building blocks of NPM. It is 
these ideals that NPM architects who saw NPM-type reforms as the global solution to the 
public sector problem (Hood, 1991) have vigorously promoted. Indeed an over- 
1 
deterministic view of NPM has been projected by the NPM architects, which Manning 
(2001: 300) vividly conveyed: 
NPM carried overtones of the end of history [in public management], suggesting that we 
were lucky to be in public management at a time when the truth [about public management] 
has been discovered. 
This over-deterministic viewpoint projects the era of NPM as a climaxing of public 
management practice, and NPM as the new found solution [panacea] for public sector ills. 
This rapid popularity of NPM was underlain by two major factors: (i) ideological factors 
such as the rise in Right-wing politicians in Western countries who saw the State as the 
problem due its scope, size and methods (Whitfield, 2001; Olowu, 2002) and; (ii) economic 
and fiscal crises of the welfare state, drawing attention to the importance of economic 
theories such as public choice and new institutional economics including managerialism 
(Minogue et al, 1998; Olowu, 2002). Indeed, while not implying any direct causality, I 
suggest the period of NPM, oriented towards private sector managerialism, also parallels an 
era where the activities of public managers including public sector professionals received 
increasing attention from analysts and commentators. Questions the above emerge from 
that context include, for instance, what are some of the challenges that professional middle 
managers face? What strategies do they engage in coping with the identified challenges? 
What lessons can we learn from all this to enrich our understanding of professional middle 
managers in the context of NPM? These and other related issues form the core of this 
research. 
2 
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to introduce the broad issues that constitute the 
background and context of this research, and present the major theoretical issues and 
debates germane to this thesis. This is accomplished as follows. In the next section, a 
summary of issues central to managerial-professional relationships in the public sector is 
presented, followed by a brief discussion of the major challenges with respect to NPM 
reforms in LDCs. Some space is devoted to setting the background to the contextual 
environment of the research. This is accomplished in three ways: tracing the historical 
antecedent of the political economy of Ghana from the early post-independence years up 
to the era of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which ended in 2008; presenting a succession 
of public sector reforms within that era and relating how these tend to shape public sector 
management practice; and summarising the social, economic and cultural orientation of 
Ghana, which present a lens through which to interpret and understand the reactions and 
interactions that occur between managers and professionals in this study. A brief 
introduction to the research, drawing attention to the main and supporting research 
questions follows, and the chapter ends with a presentation of the order of the chapters in 
the rest of this thesis. 
1.1. NPM reforms and managerial-professional relationships 
At the core of the NPM agenda is the drive for public sector organisations to attain 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy (3E's) in the delivery of public services. Indeed, 
attaining this objective has called for emphasis on the centrality of managers, the 
emphasis on the supremacy of private business practice, and the increased integration of 
private enterprises in providing public services (Hood, 1991; Aucoin, 1990). Consequent to 
this, professionalism, typified by professional autonomy has come to be subsumed in 
3 
managerial objectives, has been re-evaluated to reflect these developments. Indeed, NPM 
reform practices have introduced a number of issues into the relationships between [senior] 
public managers-whose main preoccupation is ensuring the achievement of efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness (3E's) in the public sector, and professional middle managers- 
who are generally believed to be committed to ensuring equity and quality in public service 
delivery (Hutton and Massey, 2006). A central these in these analyses has been whether and 
the extent to which public service provision can be designed to ensure the attainment of 
the 3E's whilst ensuring professional standards are neither compromised nor professional 
autonomy sacrificed or jeopardised. Ensuring the attainment of both these objectives has 
remained a significant source of conflicts under NPM. 
Essentially, the extent to which NPM reforms become successful would be largely 
influenced by how effectively and realistically the managerial objectives and professional 
autonomy dilemma is reconciled. Research has suggested that managerial-professional 
relationships have assumed various dimensions. On the one hand, they have been 
characterised by antagonism and conflicts, while on the other, by collaboration and 
compromise (Exworthy and Halford, 1999). Moreover, professionalism under NPM has 
become a much complex and continuously negotiated subject due at least to two basic 
reasons. First, the NPM agenda represents the recognition of the need to increase 
managers' power to manage in ways that lead to improved efficiency and to address the real 
public sector challenge confronting the welfare states, once dominated by professionals. In 
that sense, the NPM agenda might unavoidably involve curbing professional autonomy 
where necessary as suggested by analysts such as Clarke and Newman (1995) and Clarke et 
al (2000). Second, professionals are generally believed to advocate equity and fairness in the 
delivery of public services by maintaining an ethos consistent with public service values, 
4 
and opposed to private sector values in various ways. Professionals are believed to insist 
professional values are not sacrificed for management-inspired efficiency objectives by 
demanding professional autonomy, which ensures they perform their duties with restricted 
managerial control. 
Admittedly, neither the argument promoting increased managerial authority over 
professionals nor that advocating professional autonomy could be sustained to any 
appreciable degree. On the one hand, professionals' commitment to protecting the public 
interest cannot always be guaranteed (Le. Bianic, 2003). On the other, there are truly 
concrete accounts establishing a necessary connection between the increase in managers' 
power [combined with truncated professional autonomy and discretion] and improved 
services at lower costs (Dixon, et al, 1998; Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; 2002). In fact, 
some analysts have argued that strengthening managerial authority, leading to the 
jettisoning or truncation of professional autonomy has led to the promotion of corporate 
welfare rather than improving public services and citizens' wellbeing (Whitfield, 2001). It is 
how these two (managerial control/authority and professional autonomy) interact in public 
organisations implementing NPM-type reforms, where some functions are outsourced to 
private sector organisations, and the implications for managerial-professional relationships 
of the issues arising from such interactions that this thesis project aims in part to 
investigate and elucidate. 
When examined in the context of LDCs such as Ghana where this research was based, 
these issues become much more complex than might initially appear. Admittedly, while the 
harmonisation of managerial authority and professional autonomy does present substantial 
conceptual and practical challenges-tending to inhibit reform success-these are rendered 
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even more complicated, further compounded by a range of factors with respect to socio- 
cultural, political and economic organisation of the local context. These local factors also 
tend to evolve public sectors with certain characteristic features (discussed in latter part of 
this chapter), which set the limit to NPM reform success. There seems to be a missing link 
in much analysis of NPM-type reform outcomes in LDCs in the sense that analysts have 
often failed to take on board these local factors in their critique of NPM reforms in these 
countries. The magnitude of this oversight is brought to a sharp relief when viewed against 
the backdrop that bundles of reforms labelled NPM were first introduced to public sectors 
of developed OECD countries whose social, economic, cultural and political contexts 
remain significantly different from those of LDCs (Hood, 1991; Bale and Dale, 1998). 
Ignoring these contextual differences, endowed with a ubiquitous features and viewed as a 
global panacea for all public sector ills, NPM ideas were quickly transported to many parts 
of the developing world through the activities of international consultants (Hood, 1995) 
principally via the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Whitfield, 
2001; Stevens and Teggemann, 2003). In consequence NPM-type reforms in LDCs have 
suffered a number of setbacks (see chapter two). As I suggest in the conclusion chapter, 
the institutional response [from the international community] to failed NPM reform 
projects and the ensuing analyses have often placed corruption and inefficiency at the 
centre of project failures. While NPM reform failures can surely be explained by reference 
to the above factors, there seem to be other equally potential, yet hidden causes, which 
have not received much analysis. For instance, only few analysts have examined how 
particular local conditions such as culture, politics and social organisation could affect 
reform outcomes at the institutional level. There is greater need for the analysis of how the 
conflicts generated by the harmonisation of managerial objectives and professional values 
6 
under NPM reforms are managed at the institutional level, and how local factors could 
potentially shape such conflicts. This calls for the examination of managerial-professional 
relationships and interactions as NPM reforms are implemented at the institutional level. 
It is this shortfall in analysis that this thesis has partly attempted to address. In the section 
following, I briefly examine NPM reforms in developing countries in order to draw 
attention to both some of the pertinent issues which are central to LDCs NPM reform, and 
the challenging environments in which reforms have occurred (see chapter two for fuller 
analysis). 
1.2. NPM reforms in developing countries and associated issues 
As a set of reforms NPM was transported to many countries outside the OECD countries. 
Within a decade from its invention such reforms had spread into many parts of the 
developing world, where public sector-values, ethics and ethos, and socio-economic and 
cultural contexts are substantially diverse from those of OECD countries (Polidano, 1999; 
Condrey et al, 2001). Unsurprisingly, the transposition of such reforms to LDCs has 
introduced a range of problems, which invariably impacted reform outcomes negatively 
(McCourt, 2001). Available array of research evidences (Polidano, 1999; Condrey et al, 
2001; McCourt, 2001; Hope and Chikulo, 2001; Awortwi, 2002; Manning, 2001; Olowu, 
2002) suggest that with few exceptions NPM reforms have been far from successful. 
Fundamental to such failures is the uncritical way in which reforms were implemented. 
Manning (2001) vividly summarised this: 
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The pre-1990s debates on the generalised applicability of NPM reforms to developing 
countries in the early 1980s were surrounded by great enthusiasm', and devoid of 
scepticism and critical analysis. 
As Sutch (1999) observed, such an enthusiasm waned substantially however a decade after 
the introduction of reforms, giving way to more thoughtful scepticism about their 
generalised applicability and universality orientation. This led authors to argue that any 
consideration of NPM in LDCs must begin by developing their public sectors through 
strengthening their bureaucratic systems (Tengey, 2006) and with the assessment of the 
extent to which it achieved what it claimed to offer in its home territory of OECD 
countries (James and Manning, 1996). 
In applying NPM to LDCs two questions that seemed ignored by reformers include: 
whether and the extent to which NPM did in developed OECD countries what it was 
purported to do; and whether and the extent to which this objective could be achieved in 
LDCs. An assumption that seemed to have underpinned the NPM reform agenda in LDCs 
is that public sector problems remain fundamentally similar across countries; hence reform 
strategies that worked in OECD countries would work automatically in non-OECD 
countries. This assumption has been described as seriously flawed by authors such as 
Condrey et al (2001): 
In Western governments, NPM reforms are occurring in the milieu of economic and 
political stability in conjunction with a rich history of democratic traditions and institutions. 
Such is not the case of developing countries. The administrative reforms may fail to target 
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the civil service-which is the main agent in carrying out such reform policies, and so may 
fail to target and tackle the appropriate developmental needs of the people. 
Mainstream analyses of NPM reform failure in LDCs suggest there are many complex 
issues and systemic factors that tend to set a limit to NPM reform success. These include 
corruption (Condrey et al; 2001; Aworwti, 2002); frequent political interference and lack of 
clear distinction between the political, administrative and managerial functions of the 
public sector (Polidano, 1999; Larbi, 1998); and lack of capacity (Polidano, 1999). There is 
little, if at all, in these analyses that attempts to explain how local factors [cultural, social, 
political and economic practices] could affect reform outcomes, and gauging the effects of 
such local factors at the organisational level. Instead, most analysts draw attention to 
inefficiency on the part of reformers as though to suggest the governments in these 
countries have still not got it yet. In this thesis I suggest that explaining reform failures in 
terms of the incompatibility between the social, cultural, and political organisations of 
LDCs on the one hand, and prescribed [foreign] Western-type NPM reforms, on the other, 
would be a more robust and realistic approach to understanding and conceptualising NPM 
reform outcomes in LDCs. 
Having now set out the broad conceptual and contextual landscape of NPM reforms, it is 
important at this juncture, to take a critical look at the particular contextual environment 
germane to this research (Ghana). I achieve this by examining the political-economic 
developments in Ghana which have shaped the public sector and political action, which 
creates the political sphere within which the public sector is located and where public 
sector management occurs. 
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1.3. The Contextual Environment: Ghana's Political Economic Ideology. Public Sector 
Landscape and NPM Reforms 
In Ghana a complex set of systemic problems tends to compound NPM outcomes. As a 
background, I present, in this section, a brief summary of the development of Ghana's 
public sector from independence in 1957 to the era of the NPP government (2001-2008); 
the set of economic and social system that these gave rise to, and how all these in effect, 
shape public policy and interactions between the different categories of public sector 
managers. This is achieved by examining how political ideology did and continues to shape 
public policy but also people's attitudes, which shape public management practice in Ghana 
today. Specifically, this section links political ideology, public policy, and a succession of 
public sector reforms that followed within which NPM reforms are situated. Particular 
economic, social and cultural issues and challenges that emerged over the years are 
examined to the extent to which they gave rise to certain organisational restructuring and 
service delivery strategies such as corporatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
outsourcing of public services which followed. The aim of this section is to elucidate the 
complex contextual issues relating to Ghana and help focus and fine-tune the research 
questions posed in this study. 
Essentially, two political traditions have dominated Ghanaian's political landscape since 
independence (Carbone, 2003) (see Table 1.1 a few pages below). The first, Nkrumahist 
tradition underpinned by a body of ideas associated with social democratic politics and 
neo-Keynesian economic ideology of full employment and state intervention, is premised 
on the ideology of Dr Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president. The second, the 
Danquah-Busia tradition embodies a political economic ideology of neo-liberal market 
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economy, and private property ownership (Esseks, 1971; Williams, 1984; Carbone, 2003) 
and premised on the ideology of Dr JB Danquah and Dr KA Busia. At independence 
Ghana was more a capitalist and less socialist economy as Esseks (1971: 59) illustrated it: 
In 1957 when Ghana gained independence, over 90% of the country's import trade was in 
the hands of foreign firms; two British banks shared about 90% of all banking business; 
expatriate companies held 96% of total timber concessions; foreign investors owned all 
functioning gold mines...; general insurance was entirely in the hands of expatriate firms, 
and foreign companies earned the bulk of total receipts while the external market for cocoa 
had been a state monopoly since World War II. 
After independence government's role was to be redefined as a state-employer, in order to 
strengthen the hitherto weak State evolved by more than a century of colonialism under 
which political and economic organisation were designed and pursued to serve foreign 
interests. Nknunah's Convention People's Party (CPP) achieved this agenda by establishing 
a strong pro-socialist State that endorsed and privileged a state-controlled economy over 
Western capitalism. A well orchestrated agenda of nationalisation of private industries was 
consequently designed and pursued, which, continuing in earnest till CPP's overthrow in 
1966, culminated in the proliferation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Consequently 
with the State now becoming the major employer in the areas of policy, infrastructural 
development and direct provision of goods and services (Grundy, 1963), the economy 
from industry to commerce and other services came thus to be dominated by SOEs. 
Unfortunately, many such SOEs failed to support the direct provision of goods and 
services due to administrative and technical inefficiencies, becoming, instead a drain on the 
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national economy. As Adei (2006: 16) observed, by the 1980s when Ghana was 
undertaking its divestiture programme, SOEs: 
Provided 55% of formal sector employment (excluding the civil service) accounted for 
25% of domestic investment; were responsible for 31% domestic credit; and were 
subsidised to the tune of 9% of Government expenditure. 
In consequence, a general disillusionment with SOEs gradually evolved, engendering a 
heightened public agitation, which eventually triggered a coup d'etat that deposed the CPP 
government in 1966 and ushered in a Danquah-Busia-led government. After CPP the 
development of SOEs was pursued with varying degrees of emphasis by successive 
governments (Appiah-Kubi, 2001), each with different ramifications. Table 1.1 offers a 
summary of policy directions with associated policy outcomes by successive governments. 
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government, which entered the 
political arena with an avowed concern for the masses, began with a state-controlled, 
nationalization agenda, which after an initial success, could not sustain their agenda in the 
face of trying moments characterised by sustained, persistent fiscal imbalances. As Appiah- 
Kubi (2001: 201) observed, by the mid 1980s: 
The government of Ghana was engaged in all sectors of the economy at all levels. Apart 
from owning development corporations in all the ten regions, it wholly owned several 
enterprises in the manufacturing, mining and services sectors, and had gone into joint- 
ventures with many other firms and persons. It also owned several boards and 
commissions, which were providing services in competition with, or which could have 
been easily provided by the private sector. 
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Table 1.1 Politico-economic and public sector landscape of Ghana (1957-2008) 
Political 
Government Period Tradition 
Convention 
People's Pam 1957-1966 Nkrumahist 
(CPP) 
National 
Liberation 1966-1972 Danquah- 
Council/United Busia 
Party (NLC/UP) 
Policies 
State-ownership, 
Nationalization 
Increased/expanded SOEs, 
full employment, large state 
expenditure 
Private-ownership, 
divestiture 
Denationalization, outright 
sale 
Market economy, 
partnerships 
National 
Redemption 1972-1979 Nkrumahist 
Council 
(NRC) 
People's National 
Party 1979-1981 Nkrumahist 
(PNP) 
Provisional 
National Defence 1981-1992 Nkrumahist 
Council (PNDC) 
National 
Democratic 1992-2000 
Congress (NDC) 
New Patriotic 
Party 2001-2008 
(NPP) 
Hybrid 
Danquah- 
Busia 
State-ownership, 
Nationalization 
Increased & expanded 
SOEs, increased government 
shareholding 
State-ownership, 
Nationalization 
Increased SOEs, 
State-ownership, 
Nationalization 
Increased & expanded 
SOEs, increased government 
shareholding 
Mixed policies, Structural 
Adjustments, market 
reforms, Economic 
Recovery, NPM-related 
Private-ownership, 
divestiture, 
Denationalization, outright 
sale, : Market economy, 
partnerships 
Derived from Appiah-Kubi (2001); Adei (2006) 
Outcomes 
Inefficiency, large state 
expenditures, over- 
burdened government, 
shortage of basic 
necessities, economic 
hardships 
Reduced state-expenditure, 
prosperity of privileged 
capitalists, widened socio- 
economic gap 
Large 
government/increased state 
expenditure, fiscal 
imbalances, gross 
inefficiency, distressed 
government 
Large 
government/increased state 
expenditure, fiscal 
imbalances, gross 
inefficiency, distressed 
government 
Large 
government/increased state 
expenditure, fiscal 
imbalances, gross 
inefficiency, distressed 
government 
Reduced state-expenditure, 
prosperity of privileged 
capitalists, widened socio- 
economic gap 
Reduced state-expenditure, 
prosperity of privileged 
capitalists, widened socio- 
economic gap 
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The inefficiency within the SOEs occurred in the form of poor financial performance due 
to lack of managerial and technical competence; over-stretched bureaucracies; and 
conflicting and poorly defined social, economic and commercial objectives. Others include 
poor incentives; abuse of monopoly power, corruption; political interference, and heavy 
indebtedness (Killick, 1983; Jefferis, 1994). With these, the need for a vigorous, 
comprehensive public sector reform became apparent, compelling the then government to 
enter the World Bank, whose prescriptions resulted in a sudden shift in public economic 
policy and practice, which I discuss next. 
1.3.1 A sudden conceptual sbift in policy 
The pursuit of reforms meant that the PNDC government had to make a sudden turn in 
policy direction from social democracy to World Bank/IMF neo-liberal market economic 
ideals and later something that stands in between the two (Carbone, 2003). In 1987 a 
nationwide SOE Reform programme (SOERP) was launched. This required contracting 
foreign consultants to restructure SOEs considered sensitive and strategic which also saw 
the strengthening of the monitoring and supervisory capacities of government over SOEs 
(Baofo-Arthur, 1999; Adei, 2006). The first set of reforms - the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) - were targeted at restoring international confidence in Ghana's 
economy and attracting investors to viable areas of the economy. The second, the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), sought to alter the structure of the economy by 
redefining what constitutes the `public', and shrinking public organisations, resulting in 
massive cuts in both the scope and scale of the public sector. This led to the redeployment 
of a substantial number of public employees between 1987 and 1992. The third involves 
privatisation couched in the discourse of divestiture with many SOEs sold outright, turned 
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into joint-ventures, leased, liquidated or converted to public companies (see Paragon, 1995; 
Adei, 2006). 
In summary, such reforms included downsizing, retrenchment, divestiture, public financial 
administration reforms, rationalising government operations; outright privatisation or 
commercialising some government activity; decentralisation; capacity building, as well as 
public private partnerships (PPP) (IMF/World Bank, 1999; Aryetey and Fosu, 2002). Some 
positive (ISSER, 1995; Leechor, 1994) and some negative (Aryetey and Fosu, 2002; 
IMF/World Bank, 1999) results were recorded from reforms. What is at issue however is 
that in spite of initial problems encountered in previous reforms Government was still 
committed to divesting, privatising, diversifying and corporatising more public 
departments. An IMF /World Bank (1999) report indicates that the acceleration and 
expansion of the divestiture programme lies at the core of the government's efforts to 
establish a climate conducive to investment. Consequently, between 1996 and 2000,48 
State Owned enterprises were divested, privatised or contracted out to private contractors 
(Aryetey and Fosu, 2002; Oduro, 2003). 
The NDC government lost the 2000 general elections to Kuffour's NPP, a defeat that was 
widely attributed to the failing economic policies, and principally the sale of substantial 
proportion of the nation's assets to foreigners, which many argue, undermines national 
sovereignty (Adei, 2006). Surprisingly [judging from voter perceptions about privatisation 
but consistent with their economic philosophy] the NPP government began with a well 
worked-out privatisation agenda (Government of Ghana, 2001) with strong emphasis on 
structural adjustments of the economy. However, the existence of the two dominant 
political traditions has evolved a culture of consistent opposition to most public sector 
15 
reforms depending on which tradition forms a government, and has arguably incubated an 
attitude of political party orientation in which the nationalistic orientation came to be 
subsumed. 
1.3.2 NPP and Current Public Sector Reforms: the Policy framework 
According to Adei (2001), under the NPP government, Ghana has undergone a number of 
public sector reforms all attempting to redefine: (i) the role of government and the public 
sector; (ii) the scale and reach of the public sector; (iii) the means by which public services 
are delivered; and (iv) the strategies for ensuring improvement in delivering public services. 
As a matter of policy a separate government ministry (Ministry of Public Sector Reforms- 
MPSR) was created to oversee the implementation of reforms with objectives to ensure the 
State plays its key role as supervisor and `enabler' rather than competitor in the provision 
of goods and services. This role was also reduced to steering while leaving the rowing 
function to the public organisations working with contracted private sector firms. The 
main reform components of the function of MPSR include: (i) intensifying good 
governance and civil service reforms; (ii) reforming and rationalisation of sub-vented 
agencies, (iii) restructuring central management agencies; and (iv) reforming public financial 
management, pay and pensions. 
The size of the public sector was reduced considerably with some government departments 
converted to corporatised agencies, allowing effective collaboration between government 
and the private sector (Ministry of Public Sector Reforms, 2006). The policy allows an 
increasing number of private firms to be contracted to provide public services. For instance 
following the restructuring of Ghana's health and water systems a number of institutional 
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arrangements culminated in the use of PPPs in delivering urban water and healthcare 
services. This access to private capital and expertise is believed to facilitate community- 
controlled delivery in rural areas (World Bank, News Release No. 2005/55/AFR). All this 
resulted in increased private participation in public service delivery. Moreover, 
Government has employed legislation to legitimate outsourcing as a complement to public 
service provision (Awortwi, 2002), and this is gradually becoming the means by which an 
increasing number of government departments provide their services (Caulfield, 2006). 
Clearly there is systematic agenda to integrate the ideals of NPM in Ghana presently. What 
is quite unclear, however, is the range of reforms that can be classified precisely as NPM- 
type. For a clearer understanding of the issues identified in this thesis then it is important 
to ask, `what shapes and forms do NPM reforms take in Ghana; and conceptually, what 
areas of reforms occurring in Ghana can be pinned down to the NPM model; and what 
specific issues and challenges have emerged in pursuing such reforms? ' Although these 
questions are not my direct pre-occupation in conducting this research, answering them 
would surely provide a stronger basis for understanding the outcomes of this research. 
Thus in the section following, I provide a brief discussion of these questions. 
1.4 Public sector reforms and NPM in Ghana's context: contemporary issues 
Within the current reform agenda in Ghana there are visible signs of NPM but there are 
associated challenges most peculiar to Ghana's situation and context. A number of areas 
previously restricted to the public sector, and services previously provided by public bodies 
including local government, such as sanitation, for instance are increasingly being 
transferred to the private sector (Awortwi, 2002). The current policy framework thus 
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provides for reforms with considerable NPM underpinnings. Theoretically, it appears 
however that, of the seven doctrinal areas of NPM (Hood, 1991; 1995; Christensen and 
Laegreid, 1999; 2002) (see chapter two for detailed analysis) two of these [corporatisation 
and competition in public provision] have been more prevalent in Ghana than any other 
variant. Corporatisation is the fundamental philosophy that underpinned recent reforms 
targeting the rationalisation of sub-vented agencies in Ghana (see Ministry of Public Sector 
Reforms, 2006). In many public sector organisations including the education and health 
sectors, units have been reconstituted and restructured in ways that allow managers to 
manage them like private organisations. Competition, believed to be the solution to the 
public sector inefficiency challenge, is drawing a growing number of private sector bodies 
into the public equation through outsourcing arrangements. 
Within this broad framework of public-private collaborations, concern over the nature of 
awarding contracts in most outsourcing arrangements emerged as one of the central issues. 
Specifically, lack of transparency in outsourcing tender preparation, award and execution of 
contracts has emerged as a topical issue (Awortwi, 2002). From Awortwi's study, 
employees of a Metropolitan Assembly in Ghana expressed concerns over the manner in 
which the Chief Executive by-passed professionals with expertise in contract 
administration, to get contracts designed and signed by unqualified bureaucrats, and 
external consultants, all linked to the personal interests of the Chief Executive. A number 
of similar cases exist in Ghana as in most developing countries and represent a flaw in 
implementing public policies. As Polidano (1999) observed one endemic problem in most 
developing countries is the existence of the informal sector side-by-side the formal sector, 
and it is this fuels corruption. Additionally, the experience with the implementation of 
result-oriented public expenditure in Ghana suggests increased difficulty in attaining results 
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due largely to procedural inertia and a persistent culture of non-performance and non- 
accountability in the public sector (Oduro, 2003). Thus an interesting factor militating 
against reform success is the invisible hand of the informal system that tends to put most 
government efforts in near disarray. 
1.4.1 NPM, Outsourcing and the Legal framework in Ghana 
Outsourcing has been identified as a possible area for corrupt practices. Previous 
governments have embarked on several anti-corruption initiatives to fight corruption 
especially within the public sector. The NPP government's announcement of `zero 
tolerance for corruption' in 2001 was hailed as a good starting point, following which were 
several instances of prosecutions and jail terms for former and current government and 
public officials who either embezzled state funds or through whose fault the state suffered 
financial substantial losses. While such prosecutions at one level display government's 
commitment to fighting corruption, they have at another level been interpreted by others 
as `political witch-hunting' as all culprits are from political parties other than the party of 
incumbency. It is difficult to rule out the potential of this type of witch-hunting especially 
as the 2008 elections approached. It is plausible to speculate the organisational effects of 
interpersonal relationships subsumed in party politicking especially in a country believed to 
be characterised by political patronage (Egbue, 2006). Such party politicking could have the 
potential to play out in relationships at the workplace and affect public office holders' 
relationships with their peers and subordinates. There is potential danger that the extent to 
which public employees would cooperate or resist the implementation of public policies 
could become easily circumscribed in such party politics. These are admittedly, speculative 
issues but I am persuaded they are significant enough to warrant critical academic analysis. 
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Additionally, Ghana saw the promulgation the National Procurement Act (2003). The 
potential contradiction this has introduced in the era of NPM where managers require 
increased authority and devolution is the restriction of the extent of managers' autonomy 
and discretion in making decisions about public procurement. One obvious effect has been 
a return to greater centralisation of control in order to fight corruption (Public Agenda, 
Accra, 18th, June, 2007). As I have noted earlier, this increased centralisation is however 
antithetical to the country's current comprehensive decentralisation agenda which premises 
efficiency in delivering public services on devolved power to disaggregated units and their 
managers in line with broad NPM prescriptions. 
Thus while Ghana has an efficient legal framework that regulates the conduct of public 
managers and the delivery of public services, its use appeared to have suffered serious 
abuses. In effect, rather than leading to national unity, its use has and could continue to 
engender national disunity. This lack of unity at the national level could be cascaded down 
the organizational and institutional levels, and could seriously jeopardize relationships 
within public sector organizations. As a consequence, one could speculate that 
relationships and interactions between senior and middle managers in this study could be 
informed and influenced by party politics and the political affiliation of those involved. 
1.5 Economic. political and socio-cultural factors from Ghana's context 
The political, administrative and managerial context of Ghana within which public sector 
reforms take place could be shaped by a multiplicity of economic, social and cultural 
factors, which I briefly discuss below. This section is important in that it helps to situate 
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the study, specifically the issues and challenges that shape the interactions between senior 
managers and professionals in a peculiar context. These contextual factors are only now 
beginning to receive systematic academic analysis (see for example Egbue, 2006; Danso, 
2007). This neglect is rather unfortunate as such analysis could offer explanations for the 
nature and mode of interactions between managers and professionals as they occur in this 
study. 
Power distance: I draw on Hofstede's (1981) work on national cultures to explain power 
distance from Ghanaian context. According to Hofstede's Power Distance Index (PDI), 
Ghana is by many standards, a high power-distance society, rated as high (77) on the PDI. 
The (PDI) measures the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and 
institutions accept and expect that power is distributed asymmetrically. Power distance 
essentially represents inequality (social, economic, etc) but defined from below, not 
necessarily from above. It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the 
followers as much as by the leaders. Assimeng (1996) and Danso (2007) revealed that age 
and status are still to some extent regarded as a source of wisdom in Ghanaian society. In 
Ghanaian society judgment seems to be based more on titles and positions, and presumed 
status is based on appearances of class and less on personal competence and performance 
(Assimeng, 1996). 
Age-and-status-based respect Directly emanating from the notion of power distance dynamics 
is the need for respect for the more powerful from the less powerful. This calls for 
exercising circumspection, diplomacy and restraint in questioning the authority of more 
powerful societal members. Traditionally, in Ghana, age and status (political, economic, 
and religious) still remain to a great extent the fundamental determinants of respect. Thus 
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age-wise, traditional society was divided into elders, the mature, the youth and children and 
respect is ascribed in that order with elders attracting the highest level of respect (Danso, 
2007). In Ghana, as in most African societies, respect for elders and the elderly tends to be 
the key for harmony (Harris and Moran, 2000). With respect to status politicians, spiritual 
leaders and the rich still command considerable respect in Ghana. It then also becomes 
difficult to question their authority and actions. 
Chieftaincy and traditional authority: One other institution that has given impetus to the power 
distance concept in Ghana has been chieftaincy and traditional organisation and authority. 
Traditionally, beyond the family, the basic unit of authority in Ghana is the chief. Wherever 
people reside, be it a farming cottage, a small fishing community or even a cosmopolitan 
city the basic source of authority is the area chief. The chieftaincy institution is a 
monarchical one, with chiefs drawing their authority ostensibly from a supposed spiritual 
source. Whereas theoretically, chiefs could be dethroned [de-stooled] for gross misconduct, 
practically this seldom happens. When the chief goes wrong, it is normally the elders, [who 
enthrone him, not the subjects], who are authorised to criticise him. Open criticism of the 
king by ordinary subjects is generally unacceptable and frowned at, and criticism is thus 
subsumed in, and subordinated to and shaped by respect for the king. Gossip and 
backbiting thus tend to become the way subjects complain and criticise whenever the 
powerful go wrong. This assertion is based on the researcher's own experience as someone 
who was born, bred and worked in Ghana. It is possible that such king-subject 
relationships could be cascaded down to boss-subordinate relationships at the workplace 
where criticism of the former by the latter is least welcomed. Within this context, criticisms 
must take on new shapes and forms. Managerial-professional relationships studied in this 
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research could possibly be influenced by similar authority frameworks embedded in such a 
cultural context. 
The concept and practice of democracy. Arguably, the successful implementation of NPM reforms 
is to a large extent premised on the effective working of democracy in both polity and 
business enterprise (Condrey et al, 2001). This ensures democratic, collective and 
participatory decision-making. Additionally, effective democratisation is believed to be 
fundamental to curbing corruption (Agyeman-Duah, 2004), which is pivotal to effective 
implementation of NPM. This is due mainly to its (NPM) high-trust/low-cost relationships 
(Hood, 1995). In Western societies where NPM originated, democracy has for centuries, 
been a pervasive feature of both the body polity and business. In Ghana, as in most 
developing countries however, democracy, which is an implicit prerequisite for a fair and 
effective public service, is still struggling to gain ground in politics and business. This is 
against the backdrop that with few exceptions, democracy does little to go beyond the 
ballot box in most African and developing countries, and its use is employed more to 
legitimate and entrench rulers in power than to encourage the participation of civic society 
in the governing process. Clearly, Western democracy, of which constructive criticism is a 
vital component on the one hand, and the chieftaincy institution, where it is generally 
unacceptable for subjects to openly criticise the king, run counter to each other in several 
different ways. Moreover, the ascription of a spiritual dimension to the chief's [leader's] 
authority makes their authority not easily questionable by everybody. Superior-subordinate 
relationships at the workplace could become easily subsumed in such chief-subject 
relationships, where both people in authority and the ruled agree that the former have 
authentic right to rule and the latter an obligation to submit to, not question, the authority 
of the former. 
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Party Politics and political differences. - In Ghana party politics seems to pervade almost every 
aspect of people's national lives. Often, party politics and political affiliation triumph over 
reason and objectivity when crucial decisions are to be made especially those relating to 
subjects with considerable political underpinning. It is also a common feature in most 
developing African countries that often one's political affiliation, rather than qualification 
and personal competence significantly determines what [public] positions they could 
occupy (Egbue, 2006). It is not uncommon therefore to find in these countries that people 
lose their jobs or other `enviable positions' because they criticise a decision that has an 
inherent political underpinning. Criticising one's boss especially when the boss has a 
different political affiliation to the subordinate could be interpreted from a political 
standpoint. To relate peacefully to one's superiors in this type of environment, `being 
careful' and `circumspect' about what one says and how they say it would become the 
watchword if subordinates wish to express their opinions on issues and still maintain their 
job or position. 
Comrption: Corruption has been identified as one of the major problems confronting most 
developing economies (Transparency International Corruption Report, 2006). In Ghana 
while heightened levels of corruption have necessitated several government anti-corruption 
initiatives (Larbi, 1998), there still remains much concern about corruption. The magnitude 
of the challenge of corruption within the Ghanaian context is highlighted by the 
low levels 
of trust that is beginning to evolve among the citizenry. Surely, such a 
low level of trust 
could be responsible for management systems and strategies that resort to increased 
centralization. Increased centralisation tends to result in procedural inertia, which ultimately 
undermines the very objectives underpinning NPM reform initiatives. I must emphasize 
however that the challenge of corruption to outsourcing is a global problem, and as I make 
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clear in chapter two, even in the UK, for instance where public services ethics is fully 
developed, outsourcing was blamed for contributing to a number of corrupt practices 
(Greenaway, 1995). 
Trust/mistrust Within the context of LDCs, outsourcing could be described as a subject of 
considerable irony in the sense that it is believed to be both the cause and/or solution to 
corruption. From a political viewpoint outsourcing was seen as a means of building public 
trust because it was believed to encourage transparency by involving private organisations 
in delivering public services. Within the context of Ghana, trust is a rather slippery subject. 
On the one hand, Ghana is fundamentally a high trust country as observed by Danso 
(2007: 47): 
In Ghana relationships normally begin on the basis of a priori trust. This often creates 
confusion between personal and business trust. Written contracts are used only in formal 
situations and are unusual. People gain their trust based on personal references, common 
language and references as opposed to a database type credit system. It is called the 'who 
you know' system. 
Ghana thus has a past credited with high trust, as people were sure to keep their word. By 
and large, the indigenous Ghanaian interprets the use of detailed contracts and paper 
agreements in a relationship as constituting lack of trust. For instance, it is not uncommon 
to hear people ask, don't you trust me', or `don't you know me? ' when asked to commit 
themselves to a documented agreement. On the other hand, current developments 
regarding corruption are fast reducing this high level of trust. Whereas such a high trust 
system has advantages, including being pivotal to effective implementation of NPM 
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reforms, its shortcoming lay in the fact that it has often 
been abused and betrayed. Thus 
the high-trust system has a built-in mistrust interface, which makes 
it dangerous. 
Increasingly, growing scepticism about trust is negatively impacting personal and 
business 
relationships, and could partly explain the domination of Ghana's 
business landscape by 
sole proprietors as opposed to partnerships and cooperatives. 
I call this the African paradox, 
as Ghana's inherent collective orientation, which underpins 
its extended family system does 
not seem to be carried into the world of business. This 
is subject of further research and 
academic analysis. 
High unemployment rate: In spite of recent gains, which 
have placed her economy above most 
African countries, Ghana still grapples with unemployment rates considered unacceptably 
high by international standards. Economic theory holds that where labour supply 
outweighs the demand for it, there is said to be unemployment, and where this pattern 
becomes pervasive within the economy the rate of unemployment is said to be high. This 
condition can be described as employer sovereignty, as employers (and their surrogates) are 
highly likely to control and determine both the quantity of labour they employ and the 
personnel practices they adopt to managing the employment relationship. Under such 
conditions, employees would be less likely to critically engage with or overtly and directly 
criticise employers. They might either find their job as privileged position, which they 
might not be prepared to risk losing through criticising employers or managers. Whereas 
the notion that employees would find it difficult to openly criticise their employers is a 
universal phenomenon, it is fair to argue that its prevalence is more obvious in societies 
where democracy has not fully gained ground, and where labour laws are either non- 
existing or not vigorously enforced to forestall victimisation 
from employers. These 
foregoing issues have potential to influence and shape social interaction and workplace 
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dynamics in Ghana. They could thus help in explaining the nature of interaction between 
managers and professionals in this study. While these issues have been researched and 
documented in such areas as sociology and anthropology, they seem to have escaped much 
critical management scholarship even among African academics. This study attempts to 
draw attention to the need to fill this gap, at least partly. 
1.6 Inadequate NPM research on NPM in LDCs and the implications for research and 
public management practice 
In spite of the recent surge in developing countries' experimentation with NM reform 
relative to developed countries, there is little research on developing countries examining 
the relationships between managers and professionals and the potential of the local context 
to affect reform outcomes. Even where such research exists, they tend to focus little on 
how the professional function encounters and experiences the managerial function, and 
how local factors could condition this interaction. Although Oluwu (2002) has earlier 
observed that within the context of developing countries NPM is basically managerialism 
and privatisation, there is hardly any rigorous investigation into how the professional 
component of the managerial function in the public sector encounters managerialism and 
the associated value and belief system. In contemporary public organisations, although it 
can no longer be said the provision of services is exclusively in the hands of professionals, 
they [professionals] still occupy an important place in the current reform agenda. Such 
professionals are located in public organisations often in the capacity of middle managers. 
This means the managerial function has been problematised and complicated because we 
have managers who are also professionals. With the complicatedness of the managerial 
function it is appropriate to redefine, fine-tune, and redirect research agenda to focus on 
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how NPM reforms relate to and what consequences they deliver for the managerial 
function specifically at the middle level, where functionaries are fundamentally 
professionals. It is at the accomplishment of this, and the related issues discussed above 
that this piece of research is directed. 
All these politico-economic developments combined with the socio-cultural, political and 
economic features of Ghana as identified above could produce peculiar workplace 
dynamics that could have a number of implications for public management practice 
because they define and affect people's attitude to public institutions and public 
employment. To begin with, they could impact negatively on citizens' level of patriotism to 
the state. Popular debate holds that for many Ghanaians the several years of foreign 
(colonialists) control of local politics and economy in serving foreign interests had created a 
general dislike for government. Working for government thus came to be seen as working 
for a foreign, oppressive institution not deserving the commitment of the citizenry. 
Unfortunately this attitude changed little upon attainment of political independence. This 
lack of patriotism demonstrated through lax attitudes towards public sector work, gradually 
evolved a culture that does not cherish commitment to working for government, and could 
as well be a serious cause of corruption. Since, from independence, most formal 
employment occurred in the government sector, the formal sector gradually came to be 
equated with government and the concept of `foreignness' was imputed to government and 
government jobs. This possibly explains people's negative attitude towards government 
work (similar views are expressed by Haruna, 2004; Dibie, 2004 and Mhone, 2003). 
Moreover, according to popular view the evolution of the two dominant political traditions 
giving rise to two economic ideologies in Ghana has left the country economically 
polarised and politically divided with a major effect of eroding citizens' patriotism and 
nationalistic consciousness. It is possible that these complex intertwined issues, coupled 
with a strong politicking culture could find their way to the workplace, tending to affect 
superior-subordinate relationships. 
In summary, the political, economic, social and cultural ideologies, beliefs and values 
Ghana upheld since independence have indeed shaped and given direction to her practice 
of public management. Propelled principally by two ideological political-economic 
traditions, Ghana has evolved a public management paradigm that reflects the complex and 
conflicting realities of these ideologies. Most importantly, a number of significant policy 
shifts have metamorphosed a country that began as a pro-socialist, state-controlled 
economy to the current neo-liberal market economy. However, the success of the 
implementation of her current market policies are being influenced by the attitudes of the 
citizenry, informed by the collective outcome of her historic, economic and socio-cultural 
antecedents identified above. As in most developing countries, rather than resolve the 
negative outcomes of these ideological conflicts, current public sector reform strategies in 
Ghana seem to complicate and amplify them. 
The understanding and conceptualisation of what these complexities and conflicts mean, in 
terms of the lived experiences of senior managers and professional middle managers 
(PMMs), and how these in turn impact on their interaction and reaction to each other is at 
the very heart of this thesis. The importance of this section is appreciated against the 
backdrop that it presents a critical reference point for examining the questions posed in 
this research. By tracing the historical, political, ideological and economical antecedents of 
Ghana's public sector and its attitudes to general reforms the chapter presents a focal point 
for examining current issues arising in public management practice. The need for research 
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into these complex issues in dealing with the public sector challenge in Ghana as in other 
developing countries cannot be overemphasised. It is these interrelated, intertwined issues, 
and how they interact with the NPM model that both constitute and define the framework 
for this research. 
1.7 The Research 
Against the background provided above, this research project aims to answer the following 
questions: 
1. What issues and challenges (conflicts, contradictions, dilemmas and paradoxes) do 
professional middle managers (PMMs) encounter, working under senior managers 
in corporatised organisations in Ghana, outsourcing some of their functions? 
2. How can we conceptualise, in that context, professional middle managers' mode of 
response to the issues they encounter? 
3. What lessons can we learn from questions 1 and 2 above to move forward our 
understanding of the implication of the interaction between managerial authority 
and professional autonomy for NPM reform outcomes in a developing non- 
Western country context? 
In investigating these issues two cases of corporatised public healthcare institutions in 
Ghana that have outsourced some health support functions to private firms were selected. 
While other categories of managers are investigated, the central focus of this research is 
professionals (middle managers) in these hospitals who work directly under senior 
managers, serving as supervisors over the activities of private outsourcing service providing 
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firms as well as over those of other lower levels of management. Two cases 
(Installation/Maintenance and Cleaning) were selected from each research site, reflecting 
different levels of skills of functional areas (high-value/complex skills and low- 
value/simple skills). The objective is to explore whether and the extent to which 
differences in skill levels in functions outsourced impact on senior managers' style of 
contract administration and the mode of interaction between senior managers and 
professional middle managers in whose departments the outsourcing initiative occurs (see 
chapter four for full discussion of the impact of skill level). 
My assumption is that senior management's style of contract administration is likely to vary 
with level of skills of the functional area outsourced. In doing so they would be more 
inclined to exercise greater control over functional areas requiring complex, high-values 
skills than those requiring low-value skills. If this assumption holds I expect managerial- 
professional relationships to reflect these differences such that senior managers' 
relationship with professionals in charge of high-value skills functional areas 
(Installation/Maintenance) is likely to be more antagonistic, tensional and conflictual than 
with those in charge of simple, low-value skill functional areas (Cleaning). 
The theoretical framework of this assumption is Crozier's (1964) theory of expert power. 
According to Crozier, an area of considerable complexity is also an area where only those 
possessing relevant expertise and knowledge (expert power-professionals) are able to 
exercise control. This creates for the experts, a space, a territory and domain where they 
exercise a form of monopolistic power. Thus domain of complexity essentially constitutes a 
territory of power and control (Foucauld, 1977). From management and industrial 
sociology literatures, control is at the centre of much management activity. In the view of a 
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labour process theorist such as Braverman (1974) with his alienation and deskilling theses, 
modern production technology, which tends to simplify the work process, is a deliberate 
attempt by management to control workers by rendering them and their skills less and less 
indispensable in the production process. Although this research is not grounded in labour 
process theory (LPT), there are parallels that can be drawn from LPT to help predict 
possible areas as targets of management control, and to explain why this could be so in 
other different contexts. Against this backdrop, I expect professional managers responsible 
for the Installation/Maintenance cases to encounter more complex, tensional and 
conflictual issues, and to demonstrate more complexity and less straightforward strategies 
in responding to these issues than professionals in charge of the Cleaning cases. 
With respect to methods, a primarily qualitative approach similar to grounded theory was 
employed although apart from grounding the analysis in the data and allowing themes to 
emerge freely from it, grounded theory approach was not followed in a strictly technical 
sense. Semi-structured interview guides, together with some form of observation were used 
in generating and gathering data. Data organisation and analysis was carried out relying on a 
combination of qualitative data analysis frameworks but principally Miles and Huberman's 
(1994) framework for analysing qualitative data. 
1.8 Order of chapters 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. In chapter two, a detailed literature review 
on NPM as a basket of political, managerial, organisational and service delivery reforms 
packages that attempted to replace traditional public administration is presented. One of 
NPM's powerful thrusts is its challenge of bureaucracy as a system of organisation for 
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delivering public services. In order to ensure a clear conceptual and practical distinction 
between the two public management paradigms and draw attention to the functional areas 
of the new public management paradigm, NPM is contrasted with bureaucracy while public 
management is contrasted with private management. The major conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings of NPM (public choice from new institutional economics and managerialism 
from strategic management-which some commentators have described as rivals or 
opposites, and which underlines much of the criticisms of NPM) are presented and 
examined, following which a working definition of NPM is suggested. A section devoted to 
the managerial, organisational and service delivery reforms, which discusses the 
corporatisation of public organisations and outsourcing as both a theory and a system of 
public service delivery is followed by a summary review of practical cases of developed and 
developing nations' experiment with NPM reforms. Here, some pertinent issues and 
challenges that emerge from the implementation of NPM reforms not least in developing 
countries are brought to a sharp relief. The chapter ends with a section on why NPM 
reforms in developing countries generally tend to fail. 
Chapter three reviews literature on managerial-professional relationships. While the success 
of NPM has, as one of its prerequisites, increased power to public managers to 
commensurate with their new roles, so too is the need for increased autonomy and 
discretion for professionals directly engaged in both making decisions about, and in the 
direct provision of services. Research on managers and professionals is replete with 
evidence that suggests the exercise of professional autonomy and discretion on the one 
hand, and the use of managerial authority on the other in the same organisation presents a 
number of challenges and conflicts to managerial-professional relationships, which 
eventually impact negatively on the organisations' capacity to deliver quality services. In this 
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chapter, the concepts of managers, managerialism and managerial authority on the one 
hand, and the changing concepts professions, professionalism and professional autonomy 
as well as the changing role of professionals on the other, are examined in the context of 
NPM and the current public sector reorganisation. 
A summary of the interrelated issues that constitute the framework for this research as well 
as the design, methodology, and methods for collecting, organising, and analysing data for 
this research form the content of the fourth chapter. The analysis of research data is 
presented in chapter five where an attempt is made to understand the fundamental 
differences between the outsourcing of high-value/complex skills and low-value/simple 
skills functions in terms of rationales, contract management and general relationships and 
interactions between senior managers and professional middle managers. The chapter also 
attempts to examine whether and to what extent differences in skill levels of functional 
areas outsourced could shape managerial-professional relationships as well as the issues 
managers experienced in the two health institutions studied. Chapter six presents the 
discussions of the findings and the contribution of this research to the NPM framework. It 
does this in two fundamental ways: draws implications for understanding and 
conceptualising managerial-professional relationships in corporatised organisations under 
NPM, and drawing implications for understanding the complexities and failure of NPM 
reforms in LDCs. Chapter seven (final chapter) presents a summary of the findings, 
drawing general conclusions and implications for the future of NPM reforms in Africa and 
other LDCs. The chapter finally suggests the direction for further research on public sector 
reforms in LDCs, especially Africa. 
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1.9 Conclusion 
NPM is a loose label employed to encapsulate the range of private sector and market-based 
practices introduced and applied to the management of public sectors in a number of 
developed OECD countries over the past three decades. The transposition of these 
practices to the public sector became necessary as public sector reformers were concerned 
to find panaceas for addressing the range of challenges-principally fiscal imbalances and 
economic inefficiencies-confronting most public sectors. This search for better, more 
effective solutions led to questions about the efficacy of the State bureaucracy in delivering 
public services in the most efficient, effective, economic and fair way. One major 
conclusion drawn by reformers is that the state and the public sector were becoming 
excessively over-bureaucratized, suggesting that the reforming of the State bureaucracy was 
necessary to restore efficiency and effectiveness in delivering public services. It was also 
concluded that using private sector, market-based business practices, including effective 
management as benchmark could offer a solution to the public sector challenge. Hence the 
reforming mission of NPM in those OECD countries targeted de-bureaucratising, 
managerialising, privatising and marketising the state and the provision of public services. 
Arguably, the State bureaucracy was to some degree dominated by professionals of various 
categories, hence debureaucratising and managerialising the State led to the increase in the 
power and control of managers (senior) over the provision of public service. With 
professionals, this led to considerable marginalisation of their professional power and 
control over the delivery of public services. Thus intentionally or unintentionally, some 
form of brake on the power and control of professionals becomes necessary if the NPM 
mission of increased managerialisation is to succeed. Not only that, but professionals are in 
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some instances required to take on some managerial roles additional to their professional 
roles. This research is concerned to understand: (i) the nature of the likely tensions, 
conflicts and frictions arising from both the process of increasing managerialisation and the 
concomitant truncation of the professionals' power; and (ii) the capacity of professionals to 
manage and reconcile their professional roles within management-defined limits, with the 
added managerial responsibilities at the organisational level. The study seeks to understand 
and conceptualise ways these are contained and managed, especially strategies professional 
managers employ in surviving in such environment. 
Moreover, guided by Crozier's (1964) framework as presented above, I am concerned to 
understand whether the skill level in task areas performed by professionals has any effect 
on the presence or level of conflicts between professionals and managers. My selection of 
two different types of cases reflecting varying levels of skills is thus aimed to investigate 
possible differences in managerial-professional conflicts, which may be explained by 
reference to variations in skill levels. This, together with local factors discussed above, 
provides the context for this research. 
In a developing country context such as Ghana, these conflicts, tensions and 
frictions are 
likely to become more complicated, compounded by the range of social, cultural and 
economic factors of the local environment. The historical trajectory of the political 
economic landscape set out in this chapter thus aims partly to present a reference point for 
understanding the issues encountered in the relationships and interactions that unfolded in 
this research. This study in effect, aims to add to our understanding of how these local 
factors act in various ways to shape such tensions and conflicts in the interaction between 
managers and professionals at the organisational level in the broader context of NPM. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
NPM: a system of managerial, organisational and service delivery reforms 
2.0. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the interrelated issues, which constitute the critical literature on NPM. 
It examines the doctrinal areas and theoretical building blocks that constitute the NPM 
framework. This is achieved as follows. A brief review of the theories of public choice and 
managerialism is followed by a discussion of NPM broadly, pinning it down to its typical 
organisational framework [corporatisation], and service delivery strategy [outsourcing]. A 
discussion of the conceptual underpinnings and theoretical basis of outsourcing follows, 
and proceeds with an examination of the empirical evidence on NPM reforms in both 
developed and developing countries' experience of NPM reforms. The chapter ends with 
an elaboration of peculiar contextual features that tend to make NPM reforms in LDCs 
particularly challenging, tending to be generally unsuccessful. 
2.1 The building blocks of NPM (main doctrinal areas) 
In chapter one, it was made clear that NPM reforms are varied, substantially diverse and 
are best described as bundles of strategies from which reformers conveniently pick. In spite 
of this substantial diversity, analysts generally agree that NPM reforms are grounded in 
seven doctrinal areas (Hood, 1991) (Table 2.1 below). 
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Table 2.1 Summary of doctrinal arras of NPM 
Doctrine Meaning Typical justification 
Hands-on Active, visible, discretionary control of Accountability requires clear 
professional organisations from named persons at the assignment of responsibility for 
management in the top, `free to manage' action, not diffusion of power 
public sector 
Explicit standards Diffusion of goals, targets, indicators of Accountability requires clear 
and measures of success, preferably expressed in statement of goals; efficiency 
performance quantitative terms, especially for requires hard look at objectives 
professional services 
Greater emphasis Resource allocation and rewards linked to Need to stress results rather than 
on output controls measured performance; break-up of procedures 
centralised bureaucracy-wide personnel 
management 
Shift to Break up of formerly monolithic units, Need to create manageable units, 
disaggregation of unbundling of U-form management separate provision and 
units in the public systems into corporatised units around production interests, gain 
sector products, operating on decentralised one- efficiency advantages of use of 
line budgets and dealing with one another contacts or franchise 
on an arms length basis arrangements inside as well as 
outside the public sector 
Shift to greater Move to term contracts and public Rivalry as the key to lower costs 
competition in tendering procedures and better standards 
public sector 
stress on private Move away from military-style public Need to use proven private 
sector styles of service ethic, greater flexibility in hiring sector management tools in the 
management and rewards; greater use of PR techniques public sector 
practice 
Stress on greater Cutting direct costs, raising labour Need to check resource demands 
discipline/parsimo discipline, resisting unions demands, of public sector and do more 
ny in resource use limiting compliance costs to business with less 
Source: Hood (1991: 4-5) 
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I explain, in turn each of the seven popularly cited doctrinal areas of NPM below. 
Hands on professional management: Under-girded by the catchphrase `let managers manage' as 
opposed to `make managers manage', this element recognises the need for management at 
the very top of the organisation, endued with full substantive responsibility for 
management-working towards the achievement of clearly specified goals-rather than 
administrators merely administering rules, and working towards exogenously determined 
ends (Olowu, 2002). In return for their devolved authority, managers have their positions 
contractualised, becoming more accountable and answerable to politicians for specified 
results. This is based on the axiom that for people to be held accountable, they must first 
be given clear responsibility for their action in an environment where power is not diffused 
(Hood, 1991). According to Olowu (2002) the management role here is pre-eminent over 
the specialised nature of the department and ministry, thus putting an end to the specialist- 
generalist controversy in favour of professional management (this should be understood as 
senior management, and differentiated from professional middle management). This also 
has substantial implication for the management of human resources, which have in recent 
times been characterised by contracts of various kinds and to varying degrees. 
Explicit standards and measure of performance: Central to this element is a clear, unambiguous 
statement of objectives, goals and performance standards and criteria, often expressed in 
quantifiable terms from which the allocation of resources for which managers are 
accountable derives its legitimacy and justification. This focus on results and outcomes 
(accountability for outputs) is a clear departure from the focus on inputs (accountability for 
inputs) inherent in the traditional public administration. Once given the resources, 
managers have at their disposal a great deal of discretion in allocating them, mindful of 
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their accountability for their decisions and the implications of such decisions for whole 
units, departments and even whole ministries (Olowu, 2002). 
Emphasis on output controls and entrepreneurial management. - There is great orientation towards 
such control mechanisms as performance and programme budgeting in contrast to line 
item budgeting. While strategic management is still pursued, this focuses is on objectives 
that must be achieved in the shorted possible time in a rapidly changing environment, 
hence the increase in the application of SWOT analysis (Olowu, 2002). Here, the emphasis 
on results means that top management's focus is on meeting, preferably exceeding targets. 
Disaggmgation of units: Also known as coproratisation, this involves the breaking up of 
previously large monolithic organisations into small units designed and build around single 
products, with separate cost centre. This process both necessitates and facilitates the use of 
decentralised budgets, and allows personnel processes to be decentralised, making possible 
hiring and firing at the local level and also enhancing this process. In a sense, 
coproratisation attempts to address the agency problem, by giving stake to individuals, 
groups and communities in the organisation. 
Competition in public serrrice delivery: There is increased belief in competition-an application of 
market principles-as a means of ensuring efficiency in the delivery of public services. 
Coming in various forms, this sort of competition includes privatisation, commercialisation 
and marketisation (Olowu, 2002). This is made possible by the separation of provision 
(legal authority conferred on a named public organisation to provide a defined service) 
from production (the technical transformation of inputs into outputs). This separation 
means that a public organisation with legal responsibility for providing a given service can 
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delegate (contract out) the production of that service to another organisation in either the 
public or private sector. The ramifications of this separation include public-private 
partnerships (PPPs); private finance initiatives (PFIs); franchising; and outsourcing in its 
various forms. 
Emphasis on private sector styles of management: There is a conceptual shift away from what 
Olowu (2002) referred to as military-style public service ethics towards flexibility with 
respect to hiring, managing and compensating personnel. For instance, top positions in the 
public sector are no longer the preserve of longest serving public servants; the appointment 
process is subject to the rigour of open competition between internal and external 
applicants from both the public and private sectors. Remuneration is no longer based solely 
on length of service and seniority but partly on performance and merit. 
Greater stress on discipline and patrimony in resource use. Olowu (2002) summarised this as `raising 
labour discipline, resisting union demands, limiting compliance costs to businesses, and 
application of information and communication technology (ICT). The use of ICT ensures 
the making of more informed decisions to avoid waste, all underpinned by accounting logic 
(Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1995). All this, it is believed would result in achieving more with less. 
I now turn to two major issues arising from NPM reforms. The first encapsulates debates 
revolving around the efficacy of NPM reforms as well as their compatibility with public 
service ethos. The second relates to how the conflicts between the efficacy and public 
service ethos interfaces are producing different trajectories of relationships between 
different levels and categories of public managers-and the effects of these on public service 
delivery. I examine below, in specific how NPM reforms are reshaping relationships 
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between senior public managers and [professional] middle managers-important 
stakeholders in any public sector reform implementation agenda. Increased collaboration 
between public and private organisations and the juxtaposition of private management 
principles on public sector organisations are at the core of the NPM model. One such 
private sector practice is the adoption of flatter organisational structures, meaning public 
organisations can reduce their staff size while relying on a cadre of private organisations, 
through outsourcing arrangements, to provide a myriad of public services. This reasoning 
sounds plausible, especially to politicians desperately struggling with ever deteriorating 
fiscal imbalances, arising often from large number of . public employees. NPM thus has a 
special appeal [as a panacea for public management] for ambitious politicians as it promises 
rational and pragmatic solution to most systemic ills confronting public sector 
organisations (Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). 
Against this background, NPM can be described as fundamentally an economic concept, 
designed in response to recurring government and public sector challenges (Hood, 1991; 
Greenwood, Pyper and Wilson, 2002). However, the concept was popularized using 
ideological and political tools (Whitfield, 2001; Greenwood, Pyper and Wilson, 2002). In 
effect then the NPM initiative is a set of doctrines proposing solutions to the many public 
sector problems. Implementing NPM reforms thus calls for restructuring the management, 
organisation and provision of public services. 
NPM has been described as the last of several administrative paradigm shifts, the former 
necessitated by questions about the efficacy of traditional public administration to deliver 
public services (Aucoin, 1990). The late 1970s is believed to be the climax of the challenges 
of public administration, and an era that saw the deterioration in both the level and quality 
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of public service provision across the globe (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Rainey and 
Chun, 2005). Informing the debates in this period also was the re-emergence of two 
influential concepts, namely public choice and managerialism. The re-emergence of these 
two concepts, which I discuss in turn below, paved the way for the propagation of NPM 
doctrines (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991). 
2.2 Public Choice Theory 
From a historical perspective, public choice theory was first adumbrated in 1963, when 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock invited selected economists and social scientists to 
explore non-market decision-making. This culminated in a conference and subsequent 
animation of the Public Administration Review [Journal], the first article authored by Ostrom 
(1964). The theory gained currency during the 1970s when most public sectors experienced 
tremendous distressing fiscal challenges. Public choice theory is directed towards the study 
of politics based on economic principles; it is quintessentially an ideologically-laden, 
democratic political view derived from the principles of microeconomics. Public choice 
theorists were concerned about the potential of politicians, like other economically rational 
ordinary citizens, to be motivated by self interest in their decisions on behalf of and in their 
dealings with the public (Starr, 1988; Aucoin, 1991). The theorists discovered that whereas 
economic rationality in the form of self-interest leads to benign results in the market-place, 
in political decisions it tends to produce pathological patterns, displayed through a myriad 
of free-riding and rent-seeking behaviour by bureaucrats, politicians, and recipients of 
public funds. For instance there is probability that managers of bureaucratic firms may seek 
to maximize budgets, with the view to obtaining greater power, larger salaries, and other 
benefits. This budget maximization tendency produces higher overall government 
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spending, inefficient resource allocation among government agencies, and subsequently 
inefficient production of goods and delivery of services (Starr, 1988). 
Public choice theory is concerned thus to address the possible conflict of interest that can 
ensue when public officials are faced with making decisions in the public interest; it asks 
the questions whether public officials can always be trusted to make decisions to protect 
the public interest; `if public officials' altruism cannot be automatically guaranteed, what 
precautions can be taken to ensure such decision makers are held more accountable to 
those on whose behalf they make decisions? ' In short public choice theory attempts to 
examine the economic analysis of human behaviour as either rational utility-maximizing 
individuals or profit-maximising business firms and transfers this analysis to political 
science. It then provides a framework for preventing or minimizing individual interest from 
leading to inefficient resource allocation decisions that may culminate in government 
failure. As a result, one effect of public choice theory germane to NPM analysis has been 
the growth in advocacy for elected officials to be held directly accountable to the electorate 
[as opposed to appointed bureaucrats] (see Aucoin, 1990 for fuller analysis). The theory 
thus seeks to strengthen the position of politicians in both making public policies and 
ensuring their proper implementation. While reducing the influence of public bureaucrats 
relative to elected politicians, the theory advocates, as a balancing effect, increased political 
accountability to the electorate. 
2.3 Managerialism 
The main tenets of managerialism are clearly articulated in Peters and Waterman's (1982) 
influential `in search of excellence', but these have been significantly re-echoed elsewhere 
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(Pollift, 1990; Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991). The concept argues that proper managerial 
accountability and effective goal attainment require greater managerial mandate, discretion 
and power over organisational resources. It argues for de-bureaucratising organisational 
systems and, for viewing productivity as a function of effective management of 
organisations' mission, personnel, and customers/clients. The central argument of 
managerialism is that private sector practices would solve the public sector's inadequate 
performance problem; managerialism fosters the proposition that "good government and 
good organization result from deliberate intentions, detailed plans and consistent 
decisions" (Prasser, 1990, p. 194). From that ideological perspective, flows a whole series.. 
of seldom-tested propositions that culminate in the commercializing, corporatising and 
privatizing public services-rationales often accepted as axiomatically true (Dixon, Kouzmin, 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 1998). 
In the context of the public sector, managerialism maintains that compared to private 
organisations, public sector organisations are weak, inferior, less efficient and less effective, 
and that when rid of bureaucratic red tape, the public sector can be as effective as private 
organisations (Aucoin, 1990; Rainey and Chun, 2005). Several weaknesses in public 
organisations have been identified (Rainey and Chun, 2005) including, vague, multiple, 
conflicting goals; conflicting political and managerial objectives; and administrative 
authority restricted in decision making power by lack of autonomy (Lynn, 1981; Warwick, 
1975; Rainey and Chun, 2005). Others include highly bureaucratized organisational 
structures leading to procedural delays (Light, 2002), and structural constraints such as 
those related to personnel management and procurement; and incentive structures not 
directly linked to performance (see Atwater and Wright, 1996; Kurland and Egan, 1999; 
Rainey and Bozeman, 2000 for full analysis). All these made analysts such as Kaufman 
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(1979: 35) to describe public organisations as `making their marks in inches, and achieving 
modest results at best'. 
The effect of managerialism on the public sector is marked by a sharp increase in the strict 
application of such practices as strategic planning, commitment to cost-effectiveness, 
customer service, performance management, and outsourcing to a similar degree as is 
practiced in the private sector. While these practices are not new to the public sector per se, 
there is a renewed vigour with which their implementation is pursued. In incorporating 
these practices, public managers are expected to improve efficiency, reduce burdensome 
costs and enhance organizational performance in a competitive stakeholder fashion. The 
concept of managerialism largely ignores the administrative-political environment which 
rewards risk-averse behaviour; on the contrary, it rewards managerial initiatives (Dixon, 
Kouzmin, and Korac-Kakabadse, 1998). Additionally, managerialism views [professional] 
management as portable and transferable; paramount over technical expertise and as 
requiring high discretionary power to achieve results (free to manage); and indispensable to 
better organisational performance (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Martin, 1983). Taken 
together, managerialism represents a fundamental critique of bureaucracy as a model of 
organisational design- a machinery for realising government's policy objectives. Following 
from these analyses then, NPM can be said to be a critique of state bureaucracy. 
Analysts such as (Aucoin, 1990 and Christensen ana Laegreid, 2002) argue that to the 
extent that NPM combines public choice and managerialism it would struggle to harmonise 
three sets of profoundly conflicting administrative and management values and practices in 
respect of politicians and public managers. These values are centralisation of political 
power, and decentralisation of organisational and managerial power; coordination of 
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government activities and deregulation of these at the organisational/managerial level; and 
control of the bureaucratic state and related activities and delegation of organisational and 
managerial powers. It has consequently been argued that the potential difficulty introduced 
by NPM is to be found in the uncertainties in the proportions in which political control 
and managerial devolution are to be combined, and the associated paradoxes (Aucoin, 
1990) that governments invariably encounter. Given this combination `(marriage of 
opposites)' (Hood, 1991), NPM has been described as inherently conflictual, contradictory 
and paradoxical, a point that is central to this research, and to which I return later in this 
chapter. It is these two concepts, backed by strong ideological discourses, which have 
sought increasingly to influence and deface public management and public service delivery 
across the globe that we refer to as NPM. A discussion of the distinctiveness of NPM 
follows next. 
2.4 The distinctiveness of NPM: Bureaucracy. Traditional Public Administration and 
NPM 
For a true appreciation of NPM, it is imperative to examine to determine whether and the 
extent to which it is distinct from other models of public management. A useful starting 
point for conceptualising and examining the distinctiveness of NPM would be Hood's 
(1991) observation that `its distinctiveness lay in reversing the cardinal doctrines of public 
administration (PA)' and Olowu's (2002) observation that `the entry point of NPM is its 
critique that public sector bureaucracy has either been overstretched or outlived its 
usefulness'. The cardinal features of NPM Hood refers to are essentially keeping the public 
distinct from the private, and reducing the discretion of public officials so as to forestall any form of 
rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour by public officials. By maintaining that the public and 
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private can collaborate in many ways, and for insisting public officials require greater levels 
of discretion and autonomy to be effective, NPM advocates quite the opposite. Table 2.2 
below taken from Hood (1991) helps glean the distinguishing features of traditional PA. 
Table 2.2 Three sets of core values in public administration 
Sigma-type values 
Keep it lean & 
purposeful 
Standard of success Frugality 
(Matching of resources 
to tasks for given goals) 
Standard of failure Waste 
(muddle, confusion 
Inefficiency) 
Theta-type values 
keep it honest & fair 
Rectitude 
(Achieving fairness, 
mutuality, proper 
discharge) 
Malversation 
(unfairness, bias 
abuse of office) 
Lambda-type values 
keep it robust & 
resilient 
Resilience 
(Achievement, 
reliability, 
adaptability, 
robustness) 
Catastrophe 
(risk, breakdown, 
collapse) 
Currency of success Money and Time Trust and Entitlement Security and Survival 
and failure 
(resource costs of (consent, legitimacy, (confidence, life and 
Producers & consumers) due process, political limb) 
entitlement) 
Control emphasis Output Process Input 
Slack Low Medium High 
Goals 
Information 
Coupling 
Source: Hood (1991) 
Fixed/Single Incompatible/Double Emergent/Multiple 
bind 
Costed, segmented, Structured Rich Exchange 
Commercial asset Collective asset 
Tight Medium Loose 
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Traditional public administration was designed on strong bureaucratic principles of 
meritocracy, objectivity and neutrality (Olowu, 2002). In Weber's ideal type bureaucracy, 
there must be `an elaborate hierarchical division of labour directed by explicit rules 
impersonally applied, staffed by full-time, life-time, professionals'. Such professionals do 
not own the 'means of administration', or their jobs, or the sources of their funds, and live 
off a salary, not from income derived directly from the performance of their job (Kilcullen, 
1996 and Lefort, 1986)'. On the basis of Max Weber's concept of bureaucracy, the 
following fundamental features are discernible: (i) The duties of functionaries are officially 
fixed by laws, rules, or administrative dispositions; (ii) The functions are hierarchical and 
integrated into a tall system of command; (iii) Administrative activity, which requires a 
professional apprenticeship is spelled out in written documents; (iv) The work of 
functionaries demands complete devotion to the office; (v) Access to the profession is at 
the same time access to a particular technology and jurisprudence. 
From this analysis some conclusions have been drawn concerning the bureaucrat (see for 
example, Lefort, 1986): (i) They treat their office as the exercise of a profession, requiring a 
form of esoteric knowledge; attached to the office is the assurance of a suitable standard of 
living; (ii) The bureaucrat is in the service of an objective and impersonal goal, inherent in 
the enterprise to which they are attached-state, commune, party or capitalist enterprise, not 
of a person. (iii) They enjoy a certain prestige usually guaranteed by a special status which 
confers on them certain legal rights; (iv) They are normally appointed by a superior 
authority, not elected from below, as the election of bureaucrats undermines hierarchical 
discipline; (v) While there is often assurance of stability of employment this precludes 
exclusive possession over the office held; (vi) Promotions are often mechanical and 
wholesale while salary is determined by the nature of employment if often by seniority, 
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meaning remuneration reflects hierarchy; (vii) The development of a capitalist economy 
and the effective working of democracy are necessary and 
fundamental to the effective 
operation of bureaucracy. 
The foregoing summary is no wise exhaustive; nonetheless I believe it plays three 
important functions. First, it is these values and principles upon which PA systems of 
Western OECD public sectors are animated. Second, it presents a cogent reference point 
for understanding the distinctiveness of NPM reforms from traditional PA. Third, against 
the backdrop of the level of bureaucratisation of the public sectors of most LDCs, it 
presents the basis for arguing whether and to what extent Western-type NPM reforms are 
suitable solutions for public sector problems in these countries. 
In this section I briefly review PA systems of Western democracies animated on 
administrative values grounded in the concept of bureaucracy summarised above. The aim 
is to glean the distinctive features of NPM, and highlight why its implementation is likely to 
encounter both conceptual and practical administrative difficulties in general and in LDCs 
in particular. In doing so, I employ Hood's (1991) classification of PA values, and Peters' 
(1996) concept of public administrative chestnuts, re-echoed, if slightly modified, in Oluwu 
(2002). This helps to assess whether and the extent to which it can be claimed that NPM 
seeks to replace the bureaucracy-dominated PA. To begin, I turn to Hood's (1991) 
examination of the three such administrative values as: 
(i) Sigma-type values focus on results and outputs, matching resources to goals; and 
exercising extreme parsimony in resource use; 
(ii) (ii) Theta-we values stress strict adherence to rules and procedures with little 
attention to outcomes and equity; and 
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(iii) (iii) Lambda-we values place emphasis on resilience, robustness, reliability, 
avoidance of mistakes and adaptability to change. 
From the above, public administration is designed as a system with multi-dimensional 
values, a system that attempts to harmonise three apparently contradictory principles. 
Clearly, all three sets of values as shown above must be pursued concurrently if the public 
interest is to be pursued. It is unclear however how and the degree to which each of these 
values could be pursued without stumbling at the other. 
Peters (1996) refers to six administrative principles that he called the chestnuts of the PA, 
which he contrasts with NPM. This is illustrated on Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Old Public Administration Chestnuts compared with New Public Management 
Old Public Administration New Public Management 
Apolitical Civil Service Political and Accountable Management 
Hierarchy and Rules Markets superior to hierarchies; emphasis on contracts, 
not rules 
Permanence and Stability Contractual Management 
Institutionalised Civil Service Only small service and strategic centre required 
Internal Regulation Internal Regulation only for the rump of the service, not 
privatised or decentralised 
Equality of Outcomes Differential Outcomes 
Taken from Olowu (2002: 65) originally extracted from Peters (1996) 
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From the above, one distinctive feature of NPM can be clearly discerned as its one- 
dimensional emphasis on sigma-type values to the neglect of theta-type and lambda-type 
values ('Table 2.2) (see also Hood, 1991). It is clearly this feature which underpins the 
stress the NPM model places on setting fixed, realistic and checkable goals, managing for 
results as well as greater parsimony and frugality in public resource use (Hood, 1991). If 
NPM represents a reform or paradigm shift as suggested by this analysis, one fundamental 
question remains, `what precisely is being reformed', a question I now turn to. 
2.5 What is being reformed? 
It is difficult to pin down precisely what the substance of NPM is without first grasping 
what it attempts to transform or replace. This is what I have attempted in the preceding 
section. Flowing from the above, NPM reforms should be understood as quintessentially 
attempts to achieve political, managerial, and organisational changes with the ultimate view 
to effecting permanent changes to traditional public administration. I have already 
explained the political and managerial reforms (Table 2.1), so they would not be repeated 
here; instead, I discuss the organisational reforms below. NPM assumes a rational approach 
to organisations (Kolberg, 2004), suggesting that organisations type plays a central role in 
its model. The need to redefine organisational boundaries (reach) has given birth to 
corporatisation, a means by which organisations are structured in ways that encourage and 
support effective public-private cooperation (Mulgan, 2004). This corporatised design of 
public organisations also implies a redefinition of the scale and reach of public 
organisations (Clarke et al, 2000). Additionally, corporatising an organisation allows such an 
organisation to be managed differently to traditional public organisations. I explore 
corporatisation in greater detail in the sections that follow. 
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2.6 The Benefits of Corporatisation 
I use considerable space in this section explaining corporatisation because it is emerging as 
the commonest organisational form in many LDCs pursuing NPM reforms (Polidano, 
1999). 1 believe this would give the reader a firm basis of understanding and examining the 
issues coming up in this research, conducted in a LDC context. Corporatisation refers 
fundamentally to the process of breaking public service organisations into free-standing 
semi-autonomous units designed around specific products or services (Hood, 1991). A 
design that ensures convenience and flexible management, corporatisation also encourages 
effective collaboration between public and private organisations, as it permits the operation 
on decentralised one-line budgets, allowing similar organisations to deal with one another 
on an arms length basis" (Hood, 1991). An important objective of corporatisation is the 
transfer of certain functions from bureaucratic control to separate autonomous, 
management units, a process normally requiring a legislative instrument to authenticate 
(Yuen, 1994; Wei, 2002). This design represents the ideal-type organisational structure 
required for mediating the conflicting doctrines of public choice and managerialism (see 
Aucoin, 1990; Yuen, 1994; Christensen and Laegreid, 1999). 
First, corporatisation increases politicians' control of government agencies, allowing the 
former to exercise greater, direct control over government agencies and other public 
organisations. Politicians' control over public organisations becomes consolidated by use of 
contracts, which sets the boundary for what public managers can do (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2002). 
Second, it offers managers greater discretion over organisational decision-making and 
increased use of private management models. Moreover, as an organisational restructuring 
strategy, corporatisation paves way for the exercise of active, visible, discretionary control 
of organisations by chief executives (Hood, 1991). Corporatisation allows increased 
flexibility in employment practices; managers can switch between permanent core and 
temporary peripheral staffs. It also fosters increased public-private collaboration in 
delivering public services (Martin, 1983; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Aucoin, 1990). 
Corporatisation thus provides the most effective vehicle for carrying forward the 
prescriptions of public choice. and managerialism, on which NPM is modelled. 
Third, corporatisation is believed to address the agency problem, which underlies the 
inefficiency of public organisations under traditional PA (Yuen, 1994; Wei, 2002; Zhang, 
2004). The agency (principal-agent) problem stems from the separation of ownership from 
control of modern corporations. The agency problem is explained by the following 
argumentation, which is a mere summary (full analyses are provided in Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook and Fischet, 1991; Wei, 2002; Zhang, 2004). In a contractual 
relationship involving an owner (principal) and a hired manager (agent), the latter cannot 
be expected to act in the best interest of the former as they both have different and often 
conflicting interests. To reduce this risk the principal employs strategies such as bonding 
(aligning principal/agent interests); and monitoring (increasing surveillance). There is a 
dilemma here because intensifying such strategies increases costs but reduces the risk of the 
agent pursuing extra personal benefits from the business, and the reverse is also true. It is 
the principal's personal commitment to the business, driven by the profit motive (or 
property rights) that accounts for its success (Wei, 2002; Zhang, 2004). 
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In public enterprises however, the agency problem becomes more acute due to lack of 
well-defined property rights (ownership) in its equity and for the fact that ownership 
(principal) resides in government (agent) who have no actual property rights. This lack of 
direct stake weakens the incentive for efficiency. It is fundamentally this lack of incentive 
for efficiency that is believed to be one of the problems that corporatisation is meant to 
resolve since it invites individuals and communities to be direct stakeholders in public 
organisations. Moreover, compared to private organisations the corporate structure of 
most public organisations is arguably more adept in increasing the agency costs (Wei, 2002) 
and hence the renewed interest in corporatising public institutions, which allows the 
adoption of private corporate business structures. 
In the context of corporatised organisations, those who might come close to the principal 
might be senior managers hired on performance-related pay contracts. That said, analysts 
have argued that much of the agency problem still remains even after corporatisation, 
hence the (paradoxical) solution lies in translating corporatised bodies, to privatised 
organisations, which would see ownership totally transferred to private individuals (Wei, 
2002; Aivazian et al, 2005). There are competing trade-offs between maintaining 
corporatised organisation as public entities and converting them into private organisations. 
The former option implies increased expenditure on bonding, etc, and the latter implies 
losing control and exposing the public to the risks of market failure. For instance the 
possibility of there being negative externalities has dominated most debates over recent 
public sector reforms. There is in effect, a paradox of values here for politicians between 
keeping corporatised organisations overly public or private. As Wei (2002) argues unless 
the state only keeps a passive ownership, it is not clear how the government can be truly 
separated from the enterprises. On the other hand if the state indeed withdraws its 
ownership and control over its corporatised enterprises then what mechanisms will the 
State put in place to prevent enterprise managers from abusing their newly acquired power? 
This remains a serious dilemma and one of the central issues of concern over NPM 
reforms. Next I examine the reasons why governments are increasingly resorting to 
corporatisatton. 
2.6.1 Contemporary Issues in Corporatisation 
A number of issues have arisen from the arguments that have been advanced in favour of 
corporatising public organisations. Firstly, there is the issue of economic efficiency, which 
has underlain much government effort to corporatise public organisations. This has been 
sought through such flexible arrangements as outsourcing and privatisation (Yuen, 1994; 
Yamamoto; 2004; Aivazian et al, 2005; Mulgan, 2004). However the fact that many 
corporatisation projects have yielded mixed results (Polidano, 1999; Dodoo, 1997; 
Bissessar, 1998; Greenaway, 1995; Doig, 1997) opens the claim that `corporatisation 
guarantees economic efficiency' to debate. Firstly, corporatisation has delivered undesirable 
outcomes 
(Islam, 1993; Mallon, 1994); hence there is little evidence to establish a strong link between 
corporatisation and efficiency (Kolberg, 2004). In some cases corporatisation not only 
failed to deal with the agency problem; it had tended to increase it (Zhang, 2004). Secondly, 
in some cases, efficiency is achieved at the expense of equity and ethical considerations 
(Greenaway, 1995; Doig, 1997; Emery and Giauque, 2003; Noordhoek and Saner, 2004; 
Fawkner, 2000). Even with evidence of a strong causal link between corporatisation and 
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economic efficiency, the justification of corporatisation merely on its ability to deliver 
efficiency cannot be sustained since society has more than just economic dimensions. 
Second, corporatised organisations have been seen as networks of government action: as 
agents through which governments implement policies that are seemingly unpopular on 
grounds of political expediency (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Meier and Hill, 2005). Highly 
debatable economic efficiency-related policies such as downsizing, retrenchment and 
privatisation provide classic illustration especially in most developing countries where 
voting decisions are based largely on the micro-analysis of government short-term 
economic policies. For instance Yamomoto (2004) discovered about the corporatisation of 
Japanese universities that beyond the reforms, benignly projected as a revolution for 
effective governance, was the hidden agenda of downsizing and retrenchment of 
employees, which were all met with considerable resentment. In effect, governments are 
able, through corporatised organisations, to do what they are unable to do through 
traditional public organisations. In that sense, senior managers in such organisations might 
have lenses similar to those of politicians especially when it comes to dealing with issues 
relating to cost. For instance, the corporatisation agenda could be directed at providing 
greater flexibility especially in dealing with thorny personnel matters such as salary scales, 
and hiring and firing, as was the case with corporatising health in Hong Kong (Yuen, 
1994). This way, politicians are able to remove certain functions from the clutters of 
bureaucratic control in order to exercise greater control and influence over them (Polidano, 
1999). 
Third, corporatisation has been employed as a means to escape a myriad of organisational 
and managerial ills prevalent in most state bureaucracies (Polidano, 1999). Polidano (1999) 
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has argued that in many LDCs this organisation design is employed to ensure normal 
operational viability due to shortage of managerial and technical expertise, which often 
results from low remuneration (Cohen, 1995; Colclough, 1997a) in public organisations. 
Fourth, corporatising presents opportunities for greater collaboration with and 
participation by other stakeholders (voluntary, private, professional groups) in the 
provision of public services. It helps optimise the use of private expertise (Yuen, 1994), and 
it widens the participation of private stakeholders in delivering public services. This way, 
public organisations are both able to access private expertise and capital and to ensure 
competition, believed to be prerequisite for in delivering public services in the most 
effective way. 
Finally, corporatisation has been adopted as a tool for safeguarding corruption, since 
corporatised bodies operate flatter organisational structures and have greater transparency 
in the processes of procurement and the award of public contracts. However, this point is 
surrounded by contradictory injunctions. On the one hand, long bureaucratic procedures 
tend to create inertia in the delivery of public services. Corporatising public organisations 
becomes a means by which the constraints imposed by long bureaucratic procedures can 
be escaped (Polidano, 1999). In that sense, corporatisation may provide a form of 
convenience for politicians to be able to do things quickly and more flexibly. On the other 
hand, this `convenience' could and has been abused by public managers who engage in 
corrupt practices. Awortwi's work on the corporatisation of refuse collection in Ghana 
revealed a number of irregularities in the process of designing, tendering and awarding 
contracts. Examples of this abound even in developed countries (Greenaway, 1995) and so 
it should not be conceived as exclusively a developing country phenomenon. 
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2.6.2 Corporatisation: Functionaries, functions and procedures 
Corporatisation is a process, and often a precursor to outright privatisation (Aivazian et al, 
2005), and requires redesigning organisational structures, redefining organisational 
processes and reorganising managerial functions. Except in the area of finance (in most 
cases) the corporatised organisation and its management board have considerable 
autonomy (Cheung, 2002). Senior management are empowered to make most crucial 
decisions so long as they can effectively defend these on economic grounds (Cheung, 
2002). Within this framework, I discuss in the proceeding section, the special arrangements 
in corporatised organisations in relation to the managerial function as well as ways in which 
public service provision is organised and managed. 
Centrality of managers., Managers occupy a crucial position under the corporatisation agenda, 
and are better addressed Chief Executives. Arguably, the term Chief Executive, as against 
administrator or managing director, plays a rhetorical role in changing perceptions about 
the power and function of the top management. By illustration, Cheung's (2002) study of 
the corporatisation of China's public hospitals revealed the Chief Executive was required to 
possess overseas experience as effective chief executive, although surprisingly neither 
formal medical training nor experience in working in public sector was a prerequisite. 
Instead excellent general management skills and a sound understanding of medical activities 
were essential (Scott, 1985 section 6.4.6; Cheung, 2002). This was based on the realisation 
that NPM model's answer to the problem of inefficiency lies, in large part, in recruiting a 
professional generalist manager, and letting them negotiate the path to specified objectives, 
unencumbered by institutional obstacles (Hood, 1991; Appana, 2003). Moreover managers' 
devolution is balanced by accountability, achieved through the signing of short-term 
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performance contracts with the supervising government department (Zhang, 2004; Shirley 
and Xu, 2001; Awortwi, 2002). In effect the centrality of managers to NPM reforms 
becomes more evident in corporatised organisations, hence the growth in preference for 
corporatised, rather than traditional public organisations in the era of NPM. 
Mode of provision: The general inefficiency identified in public service provision can be 
explained, in part, on the basis of how service is provided. A fundamental axiom of NPM 
is that addressing how, and by whom services are provided is crucial to improving public 
services in general. Enterprise managers then have to decide whether to provide some or 
all of their services in-house or outsource them to external service providers with the latter 
option often dominating, thus placing contracting-out at the very heart of the 
corporatisation agenda. Essentially the legal framework stipulates the proportion of 
services that can be provided in house and those to be sourced externally (Awortwi, 2002). 
In summary corporatisation becomes the strategy for ensuring private participation in 
public provision, and from organisational theory perspective, could be conceptualised as a 
form of organisational rationalisation strategy. Additionally, corporatisation forms part of 
the corporate restructuring agenda of the 1980s and 1990s, underpinned by flexibility 
considerations (see Atkinson, 1984; Cappelii and Neumark, 2004), which also resonated 
with UK's Conservatives under Thatcher, Major, and later Blair. Part of this agenda has 
been a shift towards quasi-markets (Le Grant and Barlett, 1993), post-bureaucratic forms 
of organizations (Heydebrand, 1989) and government by contract (Carnaghan and 
Bracewell-Milnes, 1993). Within this framework contracting-out (outsourcing) has become 
a popular means of delivering public services. I discuss in the next section, outsourcing in 
the context of NPM reforms. 
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2.7 Outsourcing as NPM strategy 
I find it important to include a detailed section on outsourcing, essentially for two reasons. 
First, in the context of NPM reforms outsourcing is understood as part of government 
strategies for ensuring quality through competition in public service provision. In that 
sense outsourcing constitutes an important component of the substance of NPM. Second, 
the fundamental objective of this research is to understand how professional middle 
(public) managers respond to the issues they encounter under NPM in the environment of 
outsourcing, where public and private organisations collaborate. The field of outsourcing 
then becomes the arena where the activities and interactions of senior and middle managers 
occur. In such an environment, there is strict attention to cost issues especially because of 
the presence of private service managers, placing the outsourcing of public services at the 
very heart of my research. In this section, a brief iteration of the benefits of outsourcing is 
followed by the examination of its conceptual and theoretical underpinnings. 
2.8 The potential benefits of outsourcing: why organisation outsource 
Although outsourcing per se is not new in the history of government and business 
enterprise, the past two decades have witnessed a renewed interest in outsourcing. This era 
also parallels a spurt in the search for apparently more effective means of organizing 
production in business enterprise and providing services in the public sector. These 
developments (which include globalization-driven competition) occasioned, accelerated by 
the rapid developments in information and communication technology (Wirtz, 2001); and 
more demanding consumers and citizens (McIvor, 2005), have led to the adoption of more 
flexible methods of employment. The latter factor produced two interrelated outcomes, 
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which further accentuated the interest and growth in outsourcing. Firstly, there are 
evolving organisational structures that significantly abandon many features of traditional 
forms of [often large vertically integrated] organizations in preference for more organic 
structures and flattened hierarchies. This has been described as: the `network organisation' 
(Miles and Snow, 1986); the `shamrock organisation' (Handry, 1989); and the `extended 
enterprise' (Brown et al, 1995). Secondly, there is the assumption that best value is attained 
through the use of competitive market solutions for service provision (Mclvor, 2005). 
There have consequently been a series of public sector reforms targeting the restructuring 
of the provision and delivery of public services in ways that allow increased private 
participation. 
It is overwhelmingly accepted that one of the fundamental underlining motivations for 
outsourcing is cost considerations (Ford et al., 1993; Winkleman et al., 1993; Hiemstra and 
van Tilburg, 1993; Webster and Alder, 1997; Lankford and Parsa, 1999; Lonsdale and Cox, 
2000; Price Waterhouse Coopers, 1999; Fill and Visser, 2000; Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; 
Mclvor, 2000; 2005; Jennings, 2002). That said the cost argument is debatable, and there 
are various other reasons for outsourcing. These include improved access to expertise and 
specialist technology leading to improved quality, and competitive advantage (Webster and 
Alder, 1997; Lonsdale and Cox, 2000). Outsourcing also allows flexibility where 
organisations can maintain a lean staff of experts, and a large number of temporary 
employees on contract basis, deployed and redeployed in response to market demand 
fluctuations (Jennings, 2002). Organisations outsource also because they want to benefit 
from economies of scope Quma'h and Wood, 2000). 
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Besides the fact that outsourcing helps organisations to benefit from increased focus upon 
core activities leading to the design and development of new products it is also believed to 
be a strategic shift in the way organizations manage their businesses (Jennings, 2002). 
Knowledge and capacity considerations are also known to be strong drivers of outsourcing 
decisions (Hiemstra and van Tilburg, 1993). Organizations also outsource because they 
want to divorce their attention from production and quality problems thus avoiding direct 
responsibility for yield and quality as well as have `less sorrow' (Aarts et al., 1995). Mclvor 
(2000) discovered that outsourcing benefits the outsourcing organization in several ways 
including: sourcing from the most competent source; increased flexibility relating to when 
and how to employ labour and when to produce; reduced risk expenditure, and effective 
supply management. Finally, it is argued that by outsourcing, companies are able to reduce 
labour costs by pay for a service only as and when they need it (Fazakerley, 1996). Analysts 
have identified a number of risks associated with outsourcing but these will not be 
discussed here, and readers are referred to Mclvor, (2005: 23-6) and Cox and Lonsdale 
(2000) for details. Whether and to what extent these assertions about outsourcing are true, 
remains matters of intense, never-ending academic debate however. 
2.9 Theoretical basis of outsourcing 
Essentially a private sector business practice, outsourcing is the means by which an 
organization relies on another organization to provide some of its products or services. It is 
about deciding on whether to `make or buy' a product or service, and involves, in Mclvor's 
(2005: 1) words, `redrawing the boundaries between the organisation and its supply base'. 
Theoretically, like NPM, outsourcing is underlain by [new institutional] economic and 
[strategic] management theories (Lee et al, 2000; Cheon et al, 1995). From the strategic 
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management literature two theories have been identified as the resource-based theory 
(Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991) and the resource-dependence theory (Thompson, 1967; 
Aldrick and Pfeffer, 1976), while transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) 
and agency cost theory (Ross, 1973; Mitnick, 1975; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) have been 
identified from the economic theory literature. I discuss these in turn below. 
2.9.1 Resource-based theory (RBT) 
The RBT of outsourcing views a firm's growth as function of increased use of productive 
resources and emphasizes resources internal to the firm as the principal driver of its 
profitability and strategic advantage (Penrose, 1959). Such resources include physical capital 
resources; human capital resources and organizational capital resources (Thompson and 
Strickland, 1983; Hitt and Ireland, 1986; Barney, 1991). The RBT states that a firm's 
competitive advantage over another lay in two areas: the heterogeneity and immobility of 
all three resources, the former referring to how different resources are across firms, the 
latter the inability of competing firms to obtain the resources from other sources 
(Williamson, 1981; Cheon et al, 1995: 211). To have competitive advantage, a firm's 
resources must have: value (valuable to firms); rareness (unique or rare among the firm's 
current and potential competitors); imperfect immutability (impossible for competing firms 
to imitate the resources); and non-substitutability (cannot be substituted with another by 
competing firms) [see Barney, 1991 for detailed analysis]. 
The RBT in effect, posits that the firm's competitive advantage stems from its ability to 
harness and exploit existing resources as well as develop its potential resources (Grant, 
1996) and this might necessitate external acquisition of elementary resources and 
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capabilities. The process of acquiring external resources and capabilities equates with 
outsourcing and has been described as filling the gap of resources and capabilities (Cheon et al 
(1995) in strategic management literature. Thus outsourcing strategy should assist the firm 
in enhancing its capacity to maintain existing stock of resources and capabilities, argument 
external resources and capabilities in order to extend the firm's positions of competitive 
advantage and broaden its opportunity set (Grant, 1996). Precisely, outsourcing is a 
strategic device which can be used to fill gaps. Literally then, what a firm would outsource 
is the shortfall between its desired and actual resources and capabilities. 
2.9.2 The resource dependence theory (RDT) 
Focusing essentially on the external environment of the firm, the RDT argues that all 
organizations find themselves dependent, if to varying degrees, on some elements in their 
external environment (Thompson, 1967; Aldrick and Pfeffer, 1976). This is necessitated by 
the fact that some essential elements required for the firm's competitive advantage are 
located outside the firm and controlled by external forces (organizations). Such resources, 
including factors of production, specific information, products and services (see Kotter, 
1979) would have to be outsourced. Essentially, RDT emphasizes the centrality of 
organizations' ability to adapt to environmental uncertainty, coping with problematic 
interdependence and actively managing or controlling resource flows (Pfeffer and Salanick, 
1978). Dependence on a firm's external environment provides a useful perspective for 
examining relationships between an organisation's decision to outsource certain functions 
and the organisation's effectiveness. It also provides a robust framework for examining 
those dimensions of task environment that may determine the firm's dimension of resource 
(Cheon et al, 1995). There are costs either way (in-sourcing and outsourcing), and a 
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decision to outsource would thus be based among other things on cost-saving capacity of 
each alternative. In consequence an organisation's dependence on other organizations 
(outsourcing) is determined by the importance of the resource (outsourced) to the 
organization; the number of potential suppliers; and the cost of switching suppliers. 
Outsourcing strategy would thus be composed of different degrees of organizational 
interdependence for obtaining the critical resources unavailable in-house. Thus outsourcing 
decision would take into account how much the organisation's strategy depends on external 
elements and resources for implementation. 
2.9.3 Transaction cost theory (TCT) 
TCT is grounded in economic theory essentially in the work of Coase (1937). In this work, 
Coase argued that the size and scope of firms is limited by the problem of diseconomies of 
scale and scope due to decreasing returns to the entrepreneurial function as firms grow, 
thus pushing up marginal cost of production. In the process, Coase argued, a point is 
attained when the cost of organitiing an extra transaction within the firm is equal to the cost 
involved in carrying it out in the open market or by another entrepreneur. At this critical point the 
entrepreneur needs to make three strategic decisions: continue, discontinue or outsource 
the production of the product. Although the word outsourcing was not given an explicit 
expression in Coase, this was highly implicit in his analysis. In short the TCT maintains that 
the organization of an economic activity depends on balancing the production economics 
e. g., scale, against the cost of transacting it (Williamson, 1981). Transaction refers to the 
exchange of goods and services between technologically separate economic units within or 
outside the firm. TCT identifies two separate costs that need considering-prior to making 
decisions on in-house provision as production costs and transaction costs. While 
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outsourcing leads to a lower production cost due often to economies of scale it tends to 
lead generally to higher transaction costs arising from negotiating, monitoring, bonding and 
enforcing contracts. This is a potential source of conflict and dilemma. 
In evaluating an outsourcing option, therefore, there is need to focus on three factors 
influencing the magnitude of transaction costs: (i) asset specificity which measures the 
uniqueness or substitutability of assets; (ii) the degree of uncertainty in the environment with low 
uncertainty guaranteed through an elaborate, complicated and costly contractual agreement; 
and (iii) infrequency of contracting which measures the frequency with which the two parties 
contract together (for detailed analysis, see Williamson, 1985, Cheon et al, 1995: 213-4). 
There is a one-way causal relationship between asset specificity, degree of uncertainty and 
infrequency of transaction, on the one hand, and the cost of transaction on the other such 
that the more specific the asset, the more uncertain the environment, and the more 
infrequent the contracting, is the higher the transaction costs. From this analysis the 
decision to outsource would be based on transaction cost, further influenced by asset 
specificity, uncertainty of environment, and infrequency of contracting. 
2.9.4 Agency cost theory (ACT) 
Principal-agent relationships introduce fundamental difficulties, and it is these that the 
ACT examines. This analysis is based on the works of Ross (1973) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). TCT is concerned with determining the most efficient contract 
(outsourcing or in-sourcing) that governs the relationship between a principal and an agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1988). The choice between the two depends on the agency costs, including 
monitoring costs by the principal; the bonding costs by the agent, and the residual loss of 
the principal. Illuminating succinctly the factors that influence the magnitude of agency 
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costs, the ACT provides an excellent framework for evaluating the relative advantages of 
the different internal and external organization forms for handling contracts between an 
outsourcing service receiver and provider (Cheon et al, 1995). 
Five factors influencing the magnitude of agency costs have been identified (Cheon et al, 
1995) as: outcome uncertainty; risk aversion by the outsourcing receiver/provider; 
programmability or the degree to which appropriate behaviours by the outsourcing 
provider can be specified in advance; outcome measurability; and the length of the agency 
relationship. It is prudent for firms to concentrate on core activities and rely on 
subcontractors for peripheral activities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). In summary the 
decision of an organization to outsource some of its functions is determined by its internal 
resources, external environment, the relative cost of providing or transacting the functions 
as well as the ease or difficulty with which it is able to contract with other firms to provide 
the service and the associated costs. To this end, agency cost is high in outsourcing 
relationships where there is high uncertainty and risk aversion; low programmability and 
outcome measurability; and greater length of relationships. 
The importance of this summary of outsourcing theories lay in the fact that it helps to 
make better sense of the nature of interaction of senior and middle managers in this 
project. The theories of outsourcing examined above are fundamentally attempts to 
explain, on the one hand how organisations assess the relationships between the resources 
they possess and those they require in order to be effective, and on the other how they fill 
the identified resource gaps. The kind of resource gaps that need to be filled and the 
associated problems that the organisation expects to resolve would largely determine the 
rational for an outsourcing project. Although the rationale for outsourcing was not initially 
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very central to this research, understanding these would be useful in explaining the 
differences in the nature of interaction especially between projects of high-value and low- 
value skills (see chapter four for detailed discussion). Having now dealt with the theoretical 
issues (and other related concepts) of NPM; the organizational, managerial and structural 
arrangements that have become fundamental for effective NPM reforms (corporatisation); 
and the various modes of provision (particularly outsourcing) in this final part of the 
chapter I turn to empirical accounts of NPM reforms and associated issues. 
2.10 A working definition of NPM 
Having now examined some of the criticisms of and conceptual ambiguities surrounding 
NPM, it is essential I believe, to offer my personal definition of NPM. From all my 
readings so far, hardly any author attempts a concise definition of NPM. Commentators 
have at best enumerated the commonly-cited doctrinal areas of NPM; at worst, they 
assume their audience understand what NPM is all about and launch into arguments and 
debates straight away. This is not very helpful to new entrants to the NPM debate, and 
necessitates the need for a working definition. Thus taking on board all the features 
discussed so far, and for the purpose of this study, I define NPM as: 
a strategic, inclusive perspective on public sector management rooted in the belief that 
efficiency in delivering public services can be attained by there being a mutual cooperation 
in resource [human and non-human] sharing between the public and the private sectors, 
with public managers, like their private sector counterparts, offered enough authority to 
manage the public business in ways similar to private concerns and get held accountable 
for their discretionary actions. 
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From the foregoing it is fair to argue that NPM is distinctive from PA in various ways but 
particularly to the extent it proposes to increase the power of public managers and reduce 
bureaucratic controls that serve as a break on their power while increasing the regulatory 
instruments by which politicians exercise control over public managers' work. It is worth 
noting that NPM is far from a perfect, cohesive model; it has been found to contain a long 
list and an ever increasing number of internal inconsistencies, conflicts, contractions, which 
collectively constitute the source of the many criticisms levelled against NPM, which I 
discuss next. 
2.11 Criticisms of NPM: internal inconsistencies tensions and contradictions in NPM 
The first criticism is that NPM has a theoretical foundation premised on two opposite 
theories of public choice and managerialism, emphasising values in conflict and tension 
with each other (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). For instance 
while public choice emphasises contractualism, enduing politicians with increased power to 
exercise control over the delivery of services, managerialism on the contrary emphasises 
greater devolution and autonomy to public managers (hands-on management) (Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2002. In this sense the harmonisation (in NPM) of contractualism and 
devolution underpins one of the much debated contradictions and conflicts within NPM 
(Emery and Giauque, 2003). Essentially then, the centralising tendencies of contractualism 
and devolutionary tendencies of managerialism produce possible paradoxes and 
contradictions (Aucoin, 1990; Pollit, Birchall and Putnam, 1998). Such paradoxes, it has 
been argued (Aucoin, 1990), result in the adoption of administrative principles best 
described as pendulums moving towards binary ends, producing in a tensional fashion, 
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political centralisation with managerial decentralisation; political coordination with 
managerial deregulation; and political control with managerial delegation. 
A second criticism of NPM germane to this study is its one dimensional emphasis on 
economic values and norms (efficiency) to the obvious neglect of other (equity, quality and 
ethical) considerations (Boston, 1991; Chrsitensen and Laegreid, 1999; 2002). This criticism 
questions the empirical basis of the belief that markets are better at distributing services 
than state bureaucracies. Consequently, commentators such as Noordhoek and Saner 
(2004) have concluded that `NPM suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding between 
`value-driven and effectiveness-driven approaches to government and public management. 
The implementation of NPM reforms could thus lead to very difficult trade-offs such that 
cost-saving decisions could seriously compromise other important public service values. 
Thirdly, NPM has been criticised for taking public service honesty as given, thus ignoring 
any possibilities for public managers to engage in rent-seeking behaviour to the detriment 
of the national good. This is because the NPM model is premised on the assumption that 
public managers would be honest, and can be trusted to use their discretionary power in 
pursuing the public interest although there is little to safeguard or guarantee this. Thus the 
era of NPM has been an era of increased focus on outputs and results rather than 
procedures, a practice expressed as `accountability for outputs'. However, this has led to 
corrupt practices, resulting in high public costs through public managers' dishonesty 
especially in recruitment and contract awarding process (Hood, 1995). Arguing from public 
choice perspective, if, as rational economic units, managers are believed to be guided by 
self-interest, how and to what extent can they be trusted to act in the public interest 
without being caught in the web of rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour (Terry, 1998)? This 
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threat of corruption would represent a possible corrosion in the `robustness and resilience' 
dimension of public administration values (Lambda-type values, Hood, 1995) of NPM as 
explained in the previous section above (discussed in detail in chapter six). This argument is 
particularly relevant for economies in which democracy has yet to take root, and where 
public service ethics has not been fully developed (Hood, 1991; Olowu, 2002) as later 
analysis in this chapter reveals. 
Fourth, there are questions about the empirical validity of the claim to fashioning public 
sector management on the model of operation of private business management in the 
manner suggested by the NPM model. The question here is, `do private organisations 
actually operative in the manner presented by NPM theorists? Again, the fundamental 
assumption of NPM for transporting private management practices to public sector-that 
private and public management are similar-cannot be sustained under all circumstances 
(Olowu, 2002); moreover, the equating of customers to citizens, the pivot on which 
competition in public sector with its ramified practices has been animated, is either a 
display of ignorance or distortion of public service ethics based on sound principles of 
democratic citizenship and patriotism. 
Lastly, there is little evidence to sustain the claim of the superiority of contractual 
production over bureaucratic production (Kelly, 1998). Similarly, the entrepreneurial model 
may be both a contradiction and undermining of democratic principles of fairness, justice, 
representation and participation (Olowu, 2002). While the list is by no means exhaustive, 
the foregoing summary represents the most common criticisms advanced in opposition to 
NPM. 
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2.12 Broad contemporary issues on NPM reforms 
Evidence from NPM reforms in OECD countries suggests outcomes have been more 
disappointing than promising. Central themes emerging from such studies border on 
conflicts between, and incompatibility of NPM principles with the public sector values, 
ethos, ethics, culture and method of doing business. For instance, there are instances, as in 
above, where the one-dimensional emphasis on costs to the neglect and downgrading of 
other equally important considerations e. g., the quality of service, ethics, equity and 
following due process have been generated conflicts, thus bringing senior managers, 
committed to cost savings and professionals committed to service quality into direct 
conflicts. In this section I present a summary of studies from Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
the United King and New Zealand. I end the section with some recent changes occurring 
to the NPM model following its implementation in developed countries, which also present 
a basis for examining NPM in LDCs. 
In their study of NPM reforms in Switzerland, Emery and Giauque (2003) found a number 
of what they described as contradictory injunctions in the internal design of NPM: 
1. Clashes between individual and organisational goals where the inducement by 
rewards unleashed a commitment to meeting targets at the sacrifice of service 
quality 
2. The rhetoric of empowerment of senior managers to manage with free hands 
resulted in increased control of professional middle level managers and substantial 
restriction on their professional autonomy and discretion. 
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3. Success was measured by the attainment of ends and results with little attention to 
means (procedures); this consideration is reinforced by the motivation for financial 
rewards. In other words, there was a confusing and hence conflating of output with 
outcomes. The argument is that motivation to perform is taken as end itself rather 
than a means to an end (developing a robust public sector with economic, social, 
ethnic and cultural considerations). 
Similarly, Noordhoek and Saner (2004, ) concluded from their studies in Netherlands that: 
1. `NPM' suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding between `value-driven and 
effectiveness-driven approaches to government. 
2. Citizens are turned into clients, and governments into companies negatively 
affecting citizens' contract with the State. This they claimed was eroding the pride 
that used to surround working for governments and threatens the very basis of 
patriotism in citizens 
3. NPM has taken for granted civil servants' trustworthiness; which has been eroded 
by several instances of corrupt practices by civil servants. This point has great 
significance for most LDCs where there is unending debate on corruption. It has 
moreover been argued that there is more to public management than trust and 
rationality and that were considerations of power and trust and rationality factored 
into the design of NPM, its weakened rationality would have been overcome. The 
authors concluded NPM is suffering a decline in popularity as managerialism risks 
widening the gap between citizens and the government, and suggest a turn to a new 
form of public management: new public administration. 
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Again Greenaway, (1995) and Doig (1997) reported that NPM reforms have been blamed 
for facilitating ethical misconduct and corruption in industrialised countries such as the 
UK. In his study of NPM in New Zealand, Norman (2004) noted the country is making a 
conceptual shift in a number of the originally cherished tendencies of NPM. Making 
analysis of historical shifts in NPM policies over a period of 16 years, (pre 1984; 1984-2000; 
2000 onwards) Norman noted the increasing political and ideological pressures on NPM 
policy frameworks to undergo major reshuffling in line with public sector ethics. He noted 
particularly how the policy changes have affected public sector functions, functionaries and 
procedures /methods over the period, and identified an emerging trend which points to a 
greater tendency to revert to some of the traditional PA values abandoned in preference for 
NPM strategies the 1980s. Such changes include: (i) a swing back to recruiting managers 
with technical or professional background rather than generic managers; (ii) a reduced 
emphasis on managerial autonomy and discretion from `let managers manage', to `let 
managers manage within a code of conduct amidst expectations of less competition and 
greater collaboration; (iii) a swift back to an emphasis on the employment of core staff and 
a reduction in the use of consultants; (iv) an ongoing restatement of public sector values in 
response to concerns about decline in public sector ethics. 
All this suggests about NPM reforms, as McDaniel (1997) remarked, hat there are reasons 
to expect conflicts and dilemmas in juxtaposing private sector management models on the 
public sector. In all this the values of managerialism superimposed on those of 
professionalism are creating greater contradiction for professional managers, and conflicts 
between senior and professional middle managers 
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2.13 Contemporary issues in NPM reforms: implications for middle managers 
Most studies of NPM reforms focusing attention on managers have treated the 
management function as a homogenous group, thus masking the diverse differences and 
issues emerging between the various levels of management. Middle managers are also 
confronted by a number of issues, being directly involved in reform implementation. In 
this section, I examine the challenges of subordinating professionals' work under senior 
managers, drawing the implications for managerial-professional relationships. 
2.13.1 Decentralisation/semi-autonomy under corporatiration 
The objective of giving semi-autonomy to public bodies is in part, to cut excessive 
bureaucratic control and increase innovation, flexibility and efficiency. Two issues have 
however arisen about the subject of autonomy. First, there are uncertainties and questions 
about the extent to which the rhetoric of autonomy has been translated into practical reality 
as experienced by managers; where this has occurred, it has almost entirely been restricted 
to senior managers, rather than professional middle managers. Second, in the context of 
public sector objectives autonomy is perceived as an exceptionally problematic 
phenomenon with difficult trade-offs (Collins and Green, 1999: 120-2). On the one hand, 
organisations without the requisite degree of autonomy tend to lack in terms of human and 
material resources and the power to make results-oriented decisions. On the other hand, 
too much autonomy to a public organisation, say a hospital for instance may result in the 
fragmentation of the health care system, creating a number of decision points, and has a 
great potential of two-fold conflict (Collins and Green, 1999). Moreover, there are conflicts 
between the short term objective of the particular department within the organisation (e. g. 
to meet performance targets for financial rewards) and those of the entire organisation; and 
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between those of the organisation and the public (health) sector as a whole. For instance a 
commitment to achieving hospital efficiency goals might cause hospital authorities to 
discharge patients much earlier from the wards than usual, against the overall health service 
objective of providing high quality health service to citizens. In addition, autonomy places 
an onus on the organisation to develop requisite managerial skills, systems and structures 
consistent with the management functions delegated to organisational functionaries, but 
the availability of these is often taken for granted and their absence can lead to gross 
inefficiency (Cassels, 1995). 
2.13.2 Public sector fciency argument. " ideological or evidence-based? 
The drive to attain economic efficiency is resulting in the need for a redefinition of 
efficiency in cost and output (quantitative) terms in agreement with broad NPM framework 
but in opposition to the traditional public administration's definition of efficiency, which 
incorporates positive outcomes of public policies for citizens. Consequentially, there have 
been instances of clash between individual and organisational objectives on the one hand 
protected and defended by senior managers, and public interest on the other protected and 
defended essentially by professionals (Laegreid and Roness, 2001; Emery and Giauque, 
2003). To paraphrase Caron and Giauque (2006), the drive for economic efficiency with 
the brainchild of performance-related pay system, has resulted in a `rise in institutional 
egoism' and a decline in the capacity to coordinate the state; the overvaluing of quantifiable 
results (output) measurement to the downgrading of assessment and evaluation of less 
quantifiable results (outcomes); an evolving syndrome of `every man for himself at both 
individual and organisational levels; and an evolution of a culture of fear and withdrawal in 
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a regime that penalises proper administrative procedures and endangers the ethics of the 
common good. 
Moreover, granting top managers devolved powers to specify middle managers' task and 
the process of performance is expected to enhance the organisations' capacity to improve 
performance and cut cost, which would result ultimately in lower prices and better quality 
public services. In the corporatisation of the public organisation that Walshe and Smith 
studied, it is paradoxical that when managerial control of the organisations has been 
strengthened in ways that diminish professionals' power and influence, managers' ability to 
get things done seemed reduced, not enhanced (Smith and Walshe, 2004). It is argued 
moreover, that there seems to be rather few well-documented studies of services being 
improved and prices being lowered through increased competition and use of contracts 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 1999). On the contrary, corporatisation might lead to a 
weakening of public expertise, increased use of resources through more people being 
employed than before to manage the boundary-spanning interface of outsourcing, for 
instance, the hiring of expensive private consultants, and tendencies towards private 
monopolies or cartels (Chrsitensen and Laegreid, 1999; Whitfield, 2001) 
Arguably, many strategic practices such as performance related pay and performance 
contracts aimed at delivering efficiency and value for money have failed to deliver these 
objectives (Whitfield, 2001). For instance performance-related pay, core to agency 
contracts has bee seen as paradoxical, yielding no clear performance; failing to create the 
envisioned flexible, satisfactory evaluation and compensation system, and failing to increase 
the motivation and productivity of managers or produce any difference in their (managers') 
loyalty to their organisations (Ingraham, 1998; OECD, 1998). It has tended instead to 
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produce top managers who hop from one organisation to another in search of agencies 
that offer the best contract (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999). Again, specifying everything 
in advance under performance-related contracts fails to provide a leeway for dealing with 
shocks and contingencies (Boston, 1996; Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). This failure 
might be linked with the contradictory nature of top managers' contracts, which enjoins 
them to act in accordance with the values and ethics of the civil service, yet to be 
concerned with the wider interests of the government and their ministers. 
2.13.3 Breakdown in public service values 
With the centrality of contracts and the conditioning potential of financial rewards under 
NPM, the relational contract that used to characterise the traditional public administration 
is rapidly giving way to transactional and agency contracts. Christensen and Laegreid (2002) 
reported that NPM has largely employed transactional and agency contracts and this has 
arguably aided the development of an elitist culture which replaces the egalitarian political 
administrative culture. The fragmentation of the public sector into corporatised bodies has 
been questioned (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999) for increasing competition between 
institutions, groups and individuals; weakening political leadership; reducing civil service 
and political loyalty and continuity in public institutions; and reducing professional 
expertise that used to typify public services. Again corporatisation (characterised by the 
competitive, contractual and low trust relationships) of hospitals has been criticised for 
contributing to a fall in the development of high trust relations and coordinated networks 
of action among healthcare organisations, which augur well for their operation and public 
welfare (Collins and Green, 1999). 
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2.13.4 Clash between empowerment and reinforcement of contml 
There are concerns that the language of empowerment has become a rhetorical smoke 
screen behind which hides an agenda for the reinforcement of political control. Broadbent 
and Laughlin (2002) found the prevalence of Tayloristic structures, particularly the control 
of task and work process by senior managers, under NPM. They argue that by defining 
output targets and tying resources to the achievement of different output levels NPM has 
introduced tighter hierarchical and market controls, thus undermining professional control 
or autonomy. This has been found to be demoralising and alienating especially if the 
required targets fail to be met (Townley, 1996; Broadbent et al, 1999). The cost of 
managerial authority is thus a decline in professional discretion. A similar argument goes 
that NPM entails the removal of policy advice from civil servants to private consultants, 
leading to the proliferation of private consulting firms, which weakens bureaucracy and 
strengthen political leadership. This has led to a strengthening of political control as 
politicised recruitment of public managers is likely to make managers more directly 
responsible to politicians, with appointed chief executives reluctant to give frank advice to 
politicians ((Boston, et al, 1991; Christensen and Laegreid, 1999). Additionally the incentive 
structure, which is widening the gap between public managers and civil servants, is 
increasing the political loyalty of public managers. 
2.13.5 Conflicts overprnfes ional values and managerial objectives 
As I have observed earlier in this chapter, the harmonisation of managerial objectives and 
professional autonomy remains a fundamental challenge of the NPM model. The growing 
dichotomy between administrative doctors (committed to enforcing managerial objectives) 
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and clinical doctors (committed to professional values and standards) in the hospitals has 
led to disagreements and conflicts among medical professionals (Sehested, 2002). One 
possible outcome of the current medical managerialism privileging managerial power over 
clinical autonomy (Cheung, 2002) could be the subordination of the professional and 
career interests of middle level doctors to managerial objectives such as cost-cutting and 
productivity enhancement. Now, that might not be the case in most circumstances but it 
does provide us with a starting point to examine the possible struggles between 
professionals and managers in the age of managerialism. Moreover, the establishment of a 
clinical manager's role, implying clinicians taking up managerial responsibilities (Doolin, 
2001) could create an ideological divide among medical professionals in whose psyche the 
taking up of managerial responsibilities represents waste of time. Consequently, those 
taking up management positions tend to lose the support of fellow professionals, possibly 
leading to corrosion in the solidarity among medical professionals. Appointing clinicians as 
managers might thus be interpreted as a device to break professionals' front and solidarity; 
a disguised form of divide-and-rule mechanism that enables politicians to rule and control 
professionals using professionals rather than external managers, which can help curb the 
intensity of the confrontation between professional doctors and politicians. In fact this 
could pave the way for holding clinical managers partly accountable for policy outcomes. 
2.13.6 Corruption as cause or effect of corßoratisation/NPM 
A topical issue emerging from NPM reforms, particularly in LDCs is the contradictory and 
ambiguous role of reforms regarding corrupt practices. Some studies have suggested 
reform policies in LDCs should be formulated to fight corruption before attempting to 
corporatise an over-bureaucratised public sector (Polidano, 1999; Hope and Chikulo, 2001; 
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Condrey et al, 2001; McCourt, 2001; Cheung, 2002). This means strengthening 
administrative and bureaucratic controls in ways that minimise corrupt rent-seeking 
behaviour by public office holders. However, there are ambiguities and dilemmas in 
following this argument as some of the findings also suggest that NPM reforms have 
paradoxically played a role in encouraging corrupt practices even in high places particularly 
in relation to the contract awarding and administration process (Polidano, 1999; Awortwi, 
2002). Centralising bureaucratic processes in public organisations has been seen as a means 
of controlling corruption especially in LDCs (Condrey et al, 2001; McCourt, 2001), which 
counters NPM endorsement of decentralisation. On the contrary, increased centralisation 
has been seen as encouraging corrupt practices (Greenaway, 1995; Doig, 1997; Awortwi, 
2002). This might help in explaining the reluctance of politicians to grant full autonomy or 
decentralised status to public organisations. Corruption has therefore remained a hotly 
debated, paradoxical and controversial subject in NPM reforms in LDCs. For professionals 
and their relationship with senior managers, the implications of all this could be numerous. 
The increased centralisation also means a reduction on professionals' autonomy and 
discretion over a range of issues, meaning greater senior management involvement in most 
organisational processes. As DeLeon and Green (2001: 621) argue the lessening of rules 
and increased flexibility will lead to administrative corruption because precise application of 
private sector management will not always work well in the public sector. 
2.13.7 Tensions between private and public sector values and objectives 
The juxtaposition of managerialism on public management ethos has presented 
professional managers with conflicting values and identities (Caron and Giauque, 2006). 
While it is not argued here that public sector values are opposed to cost savings, neither is 
cost savings and profit fundamental objectives of public organisations whose first and 
foremost objective is to deliver quality service; hence the pursuit of cost savings in public 
organisation at the expense of other values is likely to generate conflicts and tensions. 
There are concerns that most NPM principles have in-built capacity to make civil servants 
and professionals act in ways that contradict public service values (Caron and Giauque, 
2006). Examples include the conflict over quality and quantity in performance-related pay 
schemes and regimes; protecting organisational or institutional interest to attract more 
resources even if this would lead to negative externalities. In all these, frictions are likely to 
arise between cost saving oriented senior managers and professional managers, 
fundamentally oriented towards public sector values such as quality and equity. 
2.13.8 Middle managers: control, disillusionment and resistance 
Devolution to public organisations increases demand on them for effective management 
capacities, often lacking in public organisations. In hospital devolution, for instance, the 
management of GP health institutions ceases to be a function managed by doctors but that 
of managers (Mulgan, 2004; Smith and Walshe, 2004). Devolution has therefore tended to 
have serious implications for professional managers who find senior management's 
management style as classical scientific management (Emery and Giauque, 2003). Since 
professionals generally resent being managed by non-professional managers they have 
resisted in various ways including withdrawal and disengagement (Reinhardt, 2000; Doolin, 
2001; Sehested, 2002; Thomas and Davies, 2005). This phenomenon has been described as 
engendering a `vicious circle of professional disempowerment, disengagement and 
disenchantment' (Robinson, 1999; Reinhardt, 2000). This leads to reduction in professional 
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managers' involvement in their organisations, which does not augur well for the respective 
organisations. 
2.13.9 Personnel and HR practices 
The NPM reform agenda has enacted a context in which short-term contracts are gradually 
displacing the life-time career employment of public servants. Such short-term contracts 
are often devoid of relational contracts lacking the high trust relationship existing between 
professional bureaucrats and politicians (Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). Additionally, 
performance contracts are replacing the hitherto autonomous professional environment. 
Since NPM principle of hand-on professional management anticipates that chief executives 
will be management experts from the private sector (Yamamoto, 2003), it is difficult to 
categorise such chief executives as true public servants, it is equally uncertain whether and 
the extent to which such hybrid public managers (Sehested, 2002) can transmit public sector 
values without being caught in the web of self-interest behaviour. This could pose serious 
challenges to the relationships between senior managers and professionals as it is already 
eroding the commitment and loyalty of public servants, and professionals while the 
concept of the public servant has been well negotiated. 
2.14 Why NPM reforms have failed to perform well 
The review so far suggests little evidence that NPM reforms have performed excellently as 
the architects would have us believe. Several reasons have been identified for this. 
Firstly, the efficacy argument maintains that some form of competition in public service 
delivery is necessary (Hood, 1991), thus implementation of NPM reforms necessarily 
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introduces quasi-market relationships to the public sector. Following from this is the need 
to integrate private organisations in the provision of public services through arrangements 
such as outsourcing. One such concern has been how outsourcing of public health 
services, for instance, intended to result in efficiency has introduced competition, which 
tends to produce winning and losing public organisations depending on their level of 
resource endowment (Collins and Green, 1999). Such competition, analysts argue, tends to 
downgrade ethical/equity considerations central to traditional public administration 
(Collins and Green, 1999). Moreover public sector competition has been perceived as 
hardly genuine (McPake and. Ngalande Banda, 1995) and blamed for creating private 
monopolies or cartels (service providers) rather than competitors in a technical sense, and 
described as at best politically-controlled, (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999). 
Second, some analysts argue most public organisations lack the expertise for contract 
administration introduced by such quasi-market relationships under NPM. Contract 
administration is a particularly challenging area described as a domain prone to corruption 
in both developed OECD countries (Greenaway, 1995) and, LDCs (Polidano, 1999; 
Awortwi, 2002) but more profound in LDCs-I return to these challenges, including the 
issue of corruption later in this chapter. This has tended to undermine the efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy objectives that have driven most public sector outsourcing 
initiatives. 
Third, outsourcing as NPM strategy has been highly politicized, having received 
considerable political impetus. Indeed, so tremendously has the economic argument been 
wrapped up in the political that it has been practically difficult to decouple the ideological 
component from the economic component of the public sector efficiency argument 
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employed in support of outsourcing, not least in the UK (Reilly and Tamkin, 1996). For 
instance in the private sector, there is no doubt that outsourcing helps save cost (Jennings, 
2002; Fill and Visser, 2000), and improves quality (Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; Jennings, 
2002). However, in the context of the public sector, it is difficult to sustain any such cost- 
saving argument to a high degree not least as outsourcing was generally perceived to be 
given impetus by political ideological persuasions and argumentations, and sustained by a 
series of legislation (Whitfield, 2001) 
Fourth, the disproportionate emphasis on cost and output in agreement with broad NPM 
framework undermines traditional public administration's definition of efficiency, which 
incorporates outcomes of public policies for citizens (Hood, 1991). This has led to clashes 
between individual and organisational objectives (Caron and Giauque, 2006; Emery and 
Giauque, 2003). For instance, when one public sector organisation saves cost at the 
expense of another, such clear institutional saving is difficult to describe as public savings; 
it might in fact be a public loss depending on the magnitude of such saving. Thus there has 
been a growing concern that under NPN the pursuit of public service values continues to 
be subsumed in the efficacy argument. This is evident in the tendency to over- 
contractualize relations between citizens and the state and replace an egalitarian political 
administrative culture with an elitist culture (Whitfield, 2001; Laegreid, 2002), a process 
achieved through the corporatisation of public organisations (Christensen and Laegreid, 
1999) core NPM. 
Fifth, there are analysts who have expressed fears about the increased weakening of 
political leadership and political loyalty as well as reduced civil service and diminishing 
professional expertise and autonomy that originally typified public service provision. For 
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instance, the devolution of power to contract managers it has been argued, is leading to 
increased loss of political control over public activities (Chrsitensen and Laegreid, 1999; 
2002), which might in fact never be regained (Collins and Green, 1999), but might indeed 
undermine core NPM reform objectives. Additionally, concerns have been raised that the 
long term transfer of certain public services to private firms and other related agreements 
such as private finance initiatives (PFIs), public-private partnerships (PPPs), and franchises 
might ultimately result in achieving private `corporate welfare' at the cost of public welfare 
(Whitfield, 2001). As an illustration, the outsourcing of both policy formulation to 
consultants and policy implementation and service delivery to external private organisations 
could contribute to further loss of political control, leaving us with the central question 
`whose policies controls the state, and who is responsible for implementing such policies? '. 
Sixth, NPM and its strategic [private sector] practices are generally understood as 
fundamentally cost-cutting initiatives (Dixon et al, 1998; Christensen and Laegreid, 1999) 
and imply disproportionate emphasis on costs and economic efficiency, calling for 
increased devolved power for top managers who tend to determine middle managers' task 
and specific ways of performing them, resulting often in reduction in the latter's autonomy 
and discretion. Different interpretations have been given to such developments, which are 
reshaping relations between senior managers and professional managers in various ways. 
Although these initiatives obviously aim at enhancing public organisations' capacity to 
improve performance, cut cost, and lower prices and thus ensure value for public money, 
they are also introducing a complex set of issues and challenges to middle management, 
many of them professionals. For instance, corporatization often requires an increase in the 
power of senior managers and the reduction in that of middle managers on the premise 
that this ensures senior managers' ability to get things done more effectively. Paradoxically, 
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this has often not enhanced senior managers' capacity to get things done (Smith and 
Walshe, 2004), suggesting that corporatisation might lead to a weakening of public 
organisations' ability to perform their roles effectively, which might be both a cause and 
consequence of increased use of private expertise and consultants (Chrsitensen and 
Laegreid, 1999). 
Finally, there is potential that the transfer of what were seen as traditionally core 
government responsibilities to private organisations would serve as opportunities for 
governments to shirk their-responsibilities (Yamamoto, 2003). Under such circumstances, it 
becomes difficult to hold a government department responsible for poor services in an area 
which has been outsourced to private firms. A related issue is that the language in which 
the corporatization agenda underpinning NPM reforms has been couched and pursued is 
that of organisational empowerment. There have however been concerns that, under NPM, 
the very language of empowerment has become a management tool for controlling 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002), and thus undermine professional control or autonomy in 
delivering public services. This has been found to be demoralising and alienating especially 
for professional middle managers (Robert, 1996; Townley, 1996; Broadbent et al, 1999). 
The cost of managerial authority, by implication then is a decline in professional discretion, 
one of the central issues identified in this thesis. 
2.15 Why reforms fail in developing countries 
Fundamentally, most developing countries lack robust, effective public service systems 
with strong bureaucratic structures supporting effective service delivery. It is this which 
principally accounts for the general inefficiency in public service delivery in these countries. 
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Some analysts (see Polidano, 1999; Awortwi, 2002) have argued the problem is not the 
absence of bureaucratic structures but the lack of effective systems of law enforcement. 
This further engenders the development, along the formal system, of the informal system, 
tending to paralyse any gains realised in the formal system. In a bid to tackle these 
efficiency-related challenges, politicians, reformers and international donors have 
vigorously embraced and pursued NPM reforms, viewing these as effective panaceas. 
However, from the perspectives of many analysts (Hensel, 1998; Polidano, 1999; Condrey 
et al, 2001; Hope, 2002; Hope and Chikulo, 2001) NPM reforms have been generally 
unsuccessful in LDCs, due to a wide range of prevailing conditions in those countries. 
Multi-faceted and numerous, such challenges include: deteriorating macroeconomic 
conditions such as high rates of inflation, unemployment combined with low productivity 
(Condrey et al, 2001); poorly developed bureaucratic structures in the public sector and the 
absence of public service ethics (Hood, 1991; Polidano, 1999); widespread public 
corruption, nepotism and abuse of public office (Dibie, 2004; Haruna, 2004; Egbue, 2006); 
political instability (Hensel, 1998); weak information systems and management (Polidano, 
1999: 9); and bad work cultures (Assimeng, 1996; Danso, 2007). Arguably, the 
pervasiveness of corruption and the absence of civil service culture or ethics could be 
understood as the most crucial causes of NPM failures in LDCs. 
But there are also definite fundamental reasons NPM reforms fail in LDCs, especially 
African countries. First, there is lack of true democracy combined with an absence of or 
distorted model of citizens (Mandan, 1996; Olowu, 2002). In OECD nations, democracy 
took several years to be ingrained in their socio-cultural fabric. As Olowu (2002) has 
observed, in Weber's view, the working of true democracy is fundamental to realising the 
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definitive form of bureaucracy. Inextricably linked with democratic culture is an evolved 
model of the citizen in which questioning democratic and bureaucratic leadership and 
authority as well as making demands on them become an inseparable part. In Africa and 
most other LDCs, citizens are unable to question and make demand on their leaders. What 
most African countries inherited from colonial regimes however, was but a form of 
oppressive administration oriented towards the welfare of the colonial masters and 
countries, which fell well short of true democracy. (For in those countries true features of 
democracy were apparently absent, so it was quite ironic that those same colonial countries 
turned round to criticise African countries for not practicing democracy, without 
considering whether the latter have experienced true democracy under colonialism in the 
first place). Even the concept of true citizenship was distorted in colonial regimes, where 
only a minority of privileged individuals enjoyed the rights of citizens, while the majority 
were used as a means to an end. The citizens in those states are those who cannot make 
demands on leaders; they see it as an obligation to satisfy the needs of leaders instead. The 
persistence of this sort of democratic culture even decades after political independence 
could be attributed to the fact that most successive African governments after 
independence perhaps simply reinforced, rather than challenge, revolutionise or change this 
status quo. 
Second, in most LDCs, there is absence of the basics of old public administration, which 
provides the foundation for successful NPM reforms. For instances, the establishment of 
public administration values makes easy the introduction of elements of informal structures 
and practices inherent in NPM such as awarding of contracts, high trust-low cost 
relationships; devolution of managerial powers to managers, etc (Hood, 1991; Olowu, 200). 
This absence of effective operation of bureaucracy, resulting from the absence of 
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democratic culture inhibits NPM success. It is thus suggested that African and LDCs need 
strong public bureaucracies as a prerequisite to NPM reforms (Polidano, 1999; Olowu, 
2002). The relative success of the Asian Tiger countries with NPM reforms is a classic 
evidence of how strong bureaucratic structures can aid NPM reforms (Olowu, 1999; 2002). 
In most African and developing countries, most, if not all of the conditions outlined above, 
combined with intense fiscal and institutional pressures in the mid 1970s have evolved 
malfunctioning public service systems, which fail to support the fast growing population 
(Hope, 2002). In response the international donors supported most governments 
financially, encouraging large-scale state interventions by strengthening state bureaucracies. 
However, by early 1980s the impotence of such an approach in sustaining the respective 
economies was becoming amply obvious (Caulfied, 2006), causing donors to make a sharp 
conceptual shift in perspective. In this new reform paradigm, the reformed State 
bureaucracies came to be viewed as impediments, and their expansion and continuous 
existence consequently discouraged (Caulfield, 2006). This called for a fresh approach to 
the problem of developing countries, which also provided a basis for introducing NPM 
reforms. 
Against the above background, NPM reforms have sought to address two interrelated 
challenges: (i) the general weaknesses inherent in public organisations (public 
bureaucracies); and (ii) the specific challenges of LDCs identified above. In this sense NPM 
reforms in LDCs are attempts to address both systemic and organisational problems 
(Polidano (1999). In the first instance, developing nations' problems would be understood 
as inherently bureaucracy-related. From public choice and managerialist perspectives as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, public bureaucracy is criticised for restricting the power of 
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politicians and public managers from effectively managing the State organisations for 
results. It is in this view that corporatisation [which has been claimed to tackle the 
bureaucratic challenge and the agency problem] as an organisational form is emerging as 
one of the most appropriate and common manifestations of NPM reforms in LDC. 'In 
the following section I summarise the major challenges encountered in the implementation 
of NPM reforms in LDCs: 
Incomplete implementation of NPM policy reforms: Most NPM reforms fail largely because 
reformers (principally politicians) resort to selective or incomplete implementation, 
whereby they hand pick aspects of reform they consider beneficial to their personal 
interests (Polidano, 1999), leaving out areas calling for greater commitment from them. 
Corporatisation, for instance, could occur not out of politicians' commitment to achieving 
greater efficiency or cost savings, but instead as a matter of convenience-a way of freeing a 
public function from the clutters of red-tape inherent in the civil service (see Polidano, 
1999; Moynihan, 2006). For instance, due to the difficulty in recruiting and retaining 
qualified staff in the public sector as a result of low public sector wages (Cohen, 1995; 
Colclough, 1997; Condrey et al, 2001), the practice of hiring temporary staffs on as-and- 
when-needed basis becomes necessary, and this is made possible under corporatisation. 
NPM then becomes necessary as a way of tackling low-capacity in the public and civil 
service, in which case, as Polidano (1999) observed, `corporatisation becomes less a means 
of improving efficiency and more a means of maintaining basic operational viability by 
making use of private sector expertise'. In this case, politicians skim through reform recipe, 
picking the ingredients they feel is more likely to meet their often parochial interest and 
leaving out aspects seemingly threatening and likely to challenge the status quo. For 
instance, since matching resources to objectives and devolving authority to public 
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managers to increase their managerial capacity and authority constitute requirements likely 
to curtail the power of politicians, these components are rarely incorporated in NPM 
reforms. 
Corruption, cultural practices and the nature of the public sector. Public sector reforms take place in 
the public sector, and the role of politicians, civil servants, public organisations, and private 
enterprises becomes a crucial factor in this interface (Egbue, 2006). Available research 
suggests corruption sweeps across a substantial spectrum of the African public including 
politicians, civil. and public servants, and private enterprise to which public work is often 
outsourced. The fact that public sector as the bureaucratic arm of the government is 
centrally located in the socio-economic arena of most developing African countries (Egbue, 
2006) highlights the significance of the ramifications public sector activities have for the 
entire economy, including individuals and organisations involved in reforms. Since most 
public sector reforms in Africa occur within the public sector where corruption is 
described as pervasive, one can argue in support of the claim by McCourt (2001) that 
reforms in developing nations are implemented in the environment of corruption, and this 
tends to mask the true effects of policy reforms. 
It must be noted though that for several reasons corruption is a rather complex and fluid 
phenomenon especially on the African continent. For instance, it has been claimed (Egbue, 
2006) a number of African traditional cultural values and practices tend to incorporate or 
lend support to those practices which might be defined as corrupt. Similarly, analysts argue 
that there is, in LDCs, a lose system of rules and administrative procedures that leaves 
room for manipulation especially by politicians, coupled with flawed personnel systems 
lacking in responsibility, accountability and professionalism (Hansel, 1998). Thus the 
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administrative and bureaucratic setups of a number of LDCs require conscious 
streamlining in order to make NPM reforms more effective. The situation in Africa is not 
much different from what pertains elsewhere in the developing world. For instance 
Condrey et al (2001) remark that the Ukrainian public sector has an organizational and 
administrative culture and climate that readily accepts public corruption. In consequence 
NPM reforms in most LDCs as in Ukraine are targeted at building professional civil service 
structures and processes rather than reforming over-bureaucratised civil service systems as 
in OECD countries (Condrey et al, 2001). 
Judging from the complexity of corruption in LDCs context, controlling corruption has 
been an enormous and often unsuccessful task in many African countries. In the first place, 
as Egbue (2006) has observed some radical social scientists might argue that so long as it 
leads to a redistribution of income especially if leads to taking resources away from the 
affluent ruling class to benefit the middle or lower class, corruption has a fairness interface. 
Second, where corruption occurs as a result of people paying their way through bribing in 
order to avoid the often long delays associated with inefficient bureaucracies, this could be 
described as a form of dynamic, rational action to the extent that this results in saving in 
time and in financial terms. The second point suggests the centralisation of procedures may 
not only fail to reduce corruption; it might actually sponsor or give occasion to that which 
might be defined essentially as corruption. 
There are two important points to note about corruption and NPM in LDCs. On the one 
hand, since NPM takes public servants' trust for granted (Hood, 1991) and claims to allow 
public managers greater discretion in decision making, greatly unencumbered by long 
bureaucratic procedures, it could in fact, reinforce corruption. On the other, increasing 
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centralisation and reducing managers' discretion could, and have often led to administrative 
and bureaucratic inertia resulting in gross inefficiency (Polidano, 1999; Hope and Chikulo, 
2001). All these negatively impact NPM reform outcomes in developing countries. 
Frequent political interference: Political interference represents one of the major causes of 
reform failures (Polidano, 1999) in most developing countries, and Africa, especially, 
bringing us back to the important role of traditional PA which emphasizes low trust in 
politicians (Hood (1995) and insists on strict distinction between the public and the 
private. Moreover, the increased power advocated for politicians under NPM is, often 
abused and the absence or inability of anti-corruption commissions to handle corruption 
charges against public servants tends to reinforce political interference (Aryetey, 1998). Due 
to all this, rather than giving greater power to politicians, NPM reforms in LDCs might in 
fact need to take more power from them, placing it in the hands of bureaucrats. This 
means reform objectives in LDCs might in fact be to intensify bureaucratic procedures so 
as to curb the executive power of politicians and restrict the administrative power of public 
managers, and might represent the opposite of NPM reforms in developed countries 
Lack of capacity: According to a number of analysts (Polidano, McCourt, 2001; Condrey et 
al, 2001), lack of adequate human capacity, which makes NPM reform implementation 
difficult constitutes one of the major challenges and causes of NPM failures in LDCs. This 
is because in corporatised organisations, for instance, there is requirement for greater 
degree of autonomy, managerially and technically, but this is often lacking. The major cause 
of this is the wide pay gap between public and private sector employees (Polidano, 1999). 
One solution is hiring consultants if often at high cost. But there is a great deal of dilemma 
with respect to hiring consultants. On the one hand, the hiring of consultants might resolve 
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the capacity problem but lead to increased costs, which might defeat the reform objective 
of attaining economic efficiency through frugality, shrewdness and parsimony in public 
resource use. More payment to consultants, for instance also implies less money available 
for actual service provision, considering that inadequate funding is an endemic problem in 
many developing countries. On the other hand, whereas spending less on consultants 
might cut costs in a sense, this might be achieved at the sacrifice of the very operational 
viability of the public institution as Polidano (1999) had earlier noted. Polidano pointed out 
such capacity inadequacies often result from poor remuneration in the public sector and 
concluded that. much NBPM reform in Africa is nothing more than capacity building. The 
foregoing discussion notwithstanding, there are isolated cases of NPM success described as 
`island of excellence' (Polidano, 1999), which presents a basis for arguing NPM could work 
in some developing countries under certain circumstances. 
2.16 Conclusion 
Debates about NPM have focused more on the political and ideological aspects as well as 
the implications of NPM for public services and citizens, and less on its substance and 
theoretical underpinning. In fact it is a popular view among most academics that NPM 
lacks a coherent theory and qualifies only as a set of doctrines. Consequently it is becoming 
fashionable for analysts to steer clear of definitional issues and it is unbelievable that in my 
entire literature search and review, I have hardly come across a concise definition of NPM. 
Rather than focusing on the ideological debates, I attempted to address theoretical issues, 
provided a working definition of NPM and attempted to link current management and 
organisational practices (corporatisation and outsourcing) to NPM as a concept. In 
addition I have identified and discussed from the relevant literature, theoretical distortions 
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within the NPM framework, which analysts believe could make its implementation 
challenging. It is clear that public choice and managerialism (the main theoretical bases of 
NPM) are viewed as promoting values which are inherently conflicting, antithetical and 
contradictory, and it is this, which constitutes the major criticism against NPM. Problems 
arise between politicians and public managers when it comes to drawing proper lines of 
authority, accountability and control in managing public sector organisations. The increased 
use of corporatisation, meant to deal with the agency problem, was found to have done 
little to resolve the agency problem; it has instead degenerated into an increased use of 
private service providing firms for actual service provision, gradually crowding out public 
departments from the actual provision of services, and pushing them into close nucleuses 
where they are left only with the management and supervision of public services (Exworthy 
and Halford, 1999). 
NPM is an entire system of ideas relating to practices within public organisations especially 
with respect to how service provision is managed and the nature of organisational 
arrangements and structured required for succeeding in this effort. One such arrangement- 
corporatisation and a strategy for delivering public services-outsourcing, are discussed in 
detail as the commonest manifestation of NPM in the African context. The outcomes of 
corporatisation and outsourcing of public services and the implications for the role of 
senior managers and their relationships with professional middle managers have been well 
examined, with the conclusion that managerial authority is being increasingly privileged on 
professional autonomy on grounds of economic efficiency. A widely obvious fact however 
is that the anticipated economic efficiency is hardly realised. Moreover, when applied to 
developing countries, NPM reforms become even more complex due to a range of 
pervasive systemic problems including corruption, which tend to deliver contradictory 
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outcomes. For instance as a result of corruption, politicians tend paradoxically to centralise 
power rather than devolve power to managers in contradiction of the NPM prescription. 
Where managerial devolution has occurred this seldom moves beyond senior management 
level. Even in corporatised organisations for fear of corruption there has been enormous 
tendency for senior managers to turn to increased centralisation [although this tends to 
defeat NPM reform objectives]. Such intervening variables tend to complicate and 
compound NPM outcomes in LDCs, suggesting that new perspectives that take these 
range of challenges into account be developed in both implementing and assessing the true 
outcomes of NPM reforms in these countries. 
This study aims to investigate ways that relationships between senior managers and 
professional middle managers are being shaped, negotiated and reshaped under NPM, and 
ways that the professional managers manage these changing relationships. Specifically, it 
seeks to understand how the shaping, and reshaping of such relationships occurs when 
NPM reforms are implemented in a developing country context such as Ghana. In the next 
chapter, I discuss various ways that professionalism and professionals' work is being 
shaped and reshaped under NPM and the new forms of co-operation, co-options, and 
collaboration which are flowing from managerial-professional relationships. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW II 
Management and Professional Relationships in the Context of New Managerialism 
3.0 Introduction 
This research is about managerial-professional relationships under NPM in corporatised 
health organisations in Ghana. Available research suggests that the conflicts and dilemmas 
generated by the need to harmonise increased management devolution and authority on the 
one hand, and increased professional autonomy on the other, constitute some of the 
emerging issues in managerial-professional relationships. Indeed, the resurgence of new 
managerialism in the public sector in recent times has resulted in the redefinition of the 
ideal public (senior) manager in terms of qualifications but more importantly attitudes and 
personal characteristics required of people aspiring to public management positions. There 
has also been widening distinctions between senior and middle managers in terms of roles, 
expectations and qualifications (Clarke et al, 2000). Moreover, recent developments in the 
public sector across the globe have given rise to greater need for senior managers and 
professionals to work together. Within that context one potential difficulty introduced is 
that senior managers especially in professional organisations (though by virtue of their 
training and qualification many of them are professionals yet are not necessarily practicing 
professionals) tend to be driven by objectives fundamentally in tension with those by which 
professionals tend to be driven. 
Research and debates on managers and professionals suggest their relationships and 
interactions follow various trajectories, characterised by antagonism and conflicts on the 
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one hand, and collaboration and compromise on the other (Exworthy and Halford, 1999). 
Managers, by their function are propelled by the ideals of managerialism, paying attention 
to costs, organisational targets, tangible organisational performance, while professionals are 
fundamentally driven by professional values and ideals (This is notwithstanding the fact 
that there are still unresolved debates about what professional values are, and whose 
interest they are meant to protect-Hutton and Massey, 2006). Under current public sector 
reforms managerialism has been described as essentially a dominant ideology to which 
other values have been subordinated. Indeed, some analysts have argued that an implicit 
agenda for managers under managerialism is to dismantle the power and autonomy that 
professionals once exercised over the provision of public services (Clarke et al, 1994a; 
Clarke et al (2000). For a clearer grasp of the issues I would be discussing, it is important to 
take a brief look at the subjects of professions, professionals, professionalism and 
professional autonomy, to be followed by a discussion of what managers, managerialism 
and managerial authority constitute especially in the era of NPM. 
3.1 Professions. professionals and Drofessionalism: definitional issues and feature 
The subjects of profession, professionals and professionalism have attracted a plethora of 
literature from different disciplines including (principally) industrial sociology. Major 
themes include what distinguishes a group of persons as professionals from another or 
what features distinguish one work as a profession from the other; why professionals 
demand autonomy and the basis for justifying this demand. Others equally important 
themes include why professional expertise is developed; how it is deployed; by whom it is 
deployed and for what ends it is deployed (Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Sullivan, 2000). 
Indeed perspectives on what a profession constitutes vary a great deal; nonetheless, a 
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common formulation is that a profession is defined in relation to the nature of tasks 
involved, knowledge required; and the level of difficulty in measuring the related activities 
and outputs, and in defining the processes involved (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002). 
Traditionally professionalism has come to apply to knowledge-based activities requiring 
long periods of education and training and entailing service meant for the common good. 
Professions are thus generally identified as altruistic, believed to be value-laden, and 
professionals as value-driven (Cruess et al, 2000). According to Kornhauser (1963) the 
basic function of a profession is to maintain standards of excellence against the pressures 
for immediate and easy solution, and this is achieved through developing . expertise, 
commitment, responsibility and autonomy for those practicing it. 
There is, from the foregoing, a task-base as well as knowledge-base notion of professions 
and professionalism. Taking this further, famous and Peloile (1970) differentiated the 
technical elements of tasks from that which remains indeterminate. Some authors have 
taken a more critical view by arguing that the whole notion of professionalism rests on the 
ability of a group to retain monopoly over the area of competence that is attributed to 
them (Larson, 1977). In this view the notion of professionalism is related to the control of 
access to a given knowledge and occupation (Johnson, 1972) with the view to maximising 
the accompanying economic benefits and social prestige. Professionals' power thus in a 
sense stems from their expert knowledge, which Crozier (1964: 160-5) argued constitutes a 
sort of power [expert power] (I return to this later in this chapter). This implies there are 
economic and ideological bases for professions and professionalism. 
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3.2 Debates about professionalism and professionalisation 
For centuries, the work of professionals has been understood to require discretion over a 
range of issues that fall under their domain of authority, and although a professional is not 
required to ignore material considerations, they are expected to subordinate financial gain 
to higher values of responsibility to clients and to the public (Sullivan, 2000). Therefore the 
belief that the professions will place societal welfare above that of the profession and its 
members had formed the basis of the society's contract with professions (Cruess et al, 
2000). Moreover, society's trust in professions is linked to its perception of how the 
profession meets its societal obligations. In this sense if the public has a cause to believe a 
profession is failing in its duties, professional status and autonomy may be withdrawn or 
modified (Cruess et al, 2000). 
On the basis of their access to privileged knowledge, professionals tend to demand 
autonomy over the practice of their profession. This claim to expert knowledge, which 
constitutes the source of professionals' [expert] power (Crozier, 1964) also identifies the 
interrelated dimensions of political, cognitive, organisational and technical power that 
define and legitimate their position within traditional and modern societies (Reed, 1996). 
Thus if it is to provide a reasonably stable cognitive and social base for the 
institutionalisation of expert power (Larson, 1990) and remain a specialised preserve of a 
particular expert group (Abbott, 1988) the expertise of experts must be storable, 
controllable, indeterminable (Boreham, 1983) and protectable (Reed, 1996). Problems that 
require the application of such specialised knowledge for their solution are constructed, 
through political strategies and tactics, as the jurisdictional domains of experts, and are 
policed and supported by ideological resources and moral prohibitions that legitimate 
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monopoly control for one group by de-legitimating predatory incursions by another (Crompton, 
1990). This sort of argumentation exposes the apparent ideological and economic bases of 
professions, and introduces serious ethical and moral questions relating to the extent to 
which professionals can be treated as those who strictly seek to protect the public interest. 
This has increased the need for a greater insight from the public into what professionals do 
in order to forestall likely rent-seeking behaviours from professionals who could easily 
harness the public trust to their personal advantage. However, this restriction on 
professionals' autonomy in itself constitutes a serious source of challenge to the 
professionals and a dilemma to the public for two apparent reasons. On the one hand, it 
protects and guards the public against selfish professionals desiring to profiteer at the 
expense of the public; on the other, professionals who have genuine commitment to 
protecting the public interest would tend to lose their autonomy which they require to 
operate effectively. 
The role of professionals as well as the extent to which they can be autonomous has 
become ever more circumscribed under the NPM. On the one hand, increasing fiscal 
imbalances especially in the 1980s has called for the need to increase the regulatory and 
monitoring capacities of the State over how public money is expended, and the subsequent 
subordination of the work of professionals under these regulatory mechanisms. On the 
other hand, it has meant that public managers be empowered to play their roles effectively. 
From this flows a further question: to what extent should professionals' work be regulated 
by managers? 
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3.3 Questioning the claim of professional autonomy 
The recent increase in State regulatory mechanism has meant that this category of expert 
groups (professionals), as Reed (1996) observed, were now faced with a `new battery of 
control instruments and practices that strove to commodify, regulate, and rationalise their 
claim to specialised knowledge and exercise of esoteric skills in such a way that their 
position within corporate, occupational and class power structures would be seriously 
undermined'. This represents a form of power struggle targeted at dominating the power of 
professionals, which the quote below taken from Crozier's analysis of the dynamics of 
expert power and control within modern organisations clearly exemplifies: 
As long as the requirement of action creates situations of uncertainty, the individuals who 
have to face them have power over those who are affected by the results of their 
choice.. . 
Two types of power will develop... First, will evolve the power of the expert... 
Second, there will emerge the power necessary to check the power of the expert. Thus the 
expert's success is constantly self-defining. The rationalisation process gives him [them] 
power but the rationalisation curtails this power ultimately... (Crozier, 1964: 60) 
Relating this to State professionals, although the State's role of rationalising the work of 
professionals has placed them at an advantage, this rationalisation has triggered the 
emergence of an external power that intrudes the practice of professions. Thus the position 
of professionals is a self-contradictory one; as they seek to exercise control over society by 
virtue of their esoteric knowledge, society, through various means of instrumentation, 
attempts to take back part of the control that professionals do exercise. 
This self-defining feature of the rationalisation of professions underpins the two 
perspectives that analysts have held about professions and professionals (Le Bianic, 2003). 
The first views professionals' role as reproducing and preserving the capitalist social order, 
suggesting that professionals enable the state to preserve the capitalist system. Larson's 
(1977) work may be viewed as an explanation of the material basis for professionalism, 
since it described professionalism as an institution within modern capitalist society, and 
professionals' call for autonomy as self-seeking activity to secure status, resources, power 
and economic reward. By arguing that professionalism is the transformation of one form of 
scarce resources (specialised knowledge) into another (economic reward), Larson has recast 
professionalism as an institution that helps maintain the capitalist society. The second 
relates to debates by authors such as. Braverman (1974), and Derber (1982), who defend the 
thesis of the `proletarianisation of professionals' and commodification of intellectual work, 
both occurring in the course of the development of capitalism. This school conceives of 
professions and professionalism as an institution in the development of modem capitalist 
societies by maintaining that like other forms of labour, professionals are subject to the 
control of capital. From the foregoing discussions, what a profession is remains a subject 
considerable complexity, and professional autonomy has assumed greater ambiguity under 
NPM. Within the context of that complexity, it is important to briefly examine the concept 
of autonomy in order to situate the subject of professional autonomy. I now turn to a 
discussion on the dimensions of autonomy below. 
3.4 Dimensions of autonomy 
Worker autonomy as a sociological construct has received much attention from sociologists 
and psychologist, with models designed to measure such things as degree and scope of 
autonomy. Major pioneering works in this area include Turner and Lawrence's (1965); 
Hackman and Oldham (1975); Sims et al (1976); Karasek (1979); and Bailyn (1985). All 
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except Bailyn (1985) defined and conceived of autonomy as occurring at general rather 
than, different levels. For instance Hackman and Oldham's (1975) Job Diagnostic Survey, 
and Sims et al's (1976) Job Characteristic Inventory both measured global, not facets of, 
autonomy (Breaugh, 1999). As a result Bailyn (1985) called for a rethink of autonomy in 
more differentiated ways. Following Bailyn, Breaugh (1985; 1989) constructed a model of 
autonomy scale that attempted measuring different areas and levels of autonomy. Bailyn's 
model conceptualised autonomy as a multidimensional construct (see Nicholson, 1984). 
Relatively recently, researchers have emphasised the importance of measuring three broadly 
defined facets of autonomy with regards to: work methods, work scheduling, and work 
criteria (Breaugh, 1999). Among the three facets, work methods autonomy and work 
scheduling autonomy have received the greatest attention from academics although all 
except few analysts including Breaugh (1985; 1989) and Jackson et al (1993) made 
painstaking attempts at distinguishing between work methods and work scheduling 
autonomy (Breaugh, 1999). 
Breaugh's (1985) work attempted to validly measure autonomy with respect to: 
1. work method (i. e. the degree of discretion/choice individuals have regarding the 
procedures /methods they utilize in going about their work); 
2. work scheduling (i. e. the extent to which workers feel they can control the 
scheduling/sequencing/timing of their work activities); and 
3. work criteria (i. e. the degree to which workers have the ability to modify or choose 
the criteria used for evaluating their performance). 
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These measures of facets of autonomy seem to be based on lower level employees rather 
than middle managers. It thus does appear that the first and third (work method and 
criteria autonomy) might apply to professional middle managers while the second might be 
less appropriate. There also appears to be, in addition to these two, negotiation of 
autonomy/ discretion over access to resources (human and non-human) and standards. It is 
thus important that any analysis of professional autonomy addresses the dimensions of 
autonomy. I have observed above that the power of professionals especially in the public 
sector is being increasingly curtailed in line with increased regulation of the use of public 
money. This growing constraint on the power of professionals can be explained by 
reference to the recent surge in what is referred to as public sector managerialism, which I 
briefly discuss in the section that follows. 
3.5 Managerialism and Public Sector (new) Managerialism 
Public sector managerialism is the belief that the ills of public sector organisations can be 
effectively addressed by following the prescriptions of managerialism. It is the private 
sector "solution" to the public sector "problem" (Dixon et al, 1998), and `the pursuit of 
results-oriented government management that combines greater autonomy and greater 
responsibility for the programme manager' (Uhr, 1990). New managerialism then can be 
understood as attempts to get the public sector to embrace the `enterprise culture' (Du Gay 
2000, Exworthy and Halford, 1999), which represents a significant shift in public 
management paradigm over the past two to three decades. It means `the right of public 
managers to manage' public organisations with greater devolution (Aucoin, 1990). 
According to Pollitt (1990) the concept of new managerialism encapsulates a set of beliefs 
and practices at the core of which lay the seldom-tested assumption that better 
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management will prove as an effective solvent for a wide range of economic and social ills 
confronting the public sector. 
Public sector managerialism agenda has also a political underpinning as Pollift (1990: 49) 
noted: 
Better management provides a label under which private sector disciplines can be 
introduced to the public services, political control can be strengthened, budgets trimmed, 
professional autonomy reduced, public service unions weakened and a quasi-competitive 
framework erected to flush out the natural inefficiencies of bureaucracy 
It can be concluded from the above that while many and wide-ranging, core components 
of new managerialism include: transposing private sector ideas to the public sector; 
strengthening political control through contractual public management; and ensuring 
frugality in public budgetary allocations. Others include reducing the influence and control 
of professionals and unions; increasing managerial control over public services; and 
marketising the relationships between the providers and users of hugely bureaucratised, 
inefficient public services. 
In a broad NPM framework, and in the context of new managerialism, managers' role 
becomes crucial and effectiveness becomes extremely important as a prerequisite for 
attaining predetermined performance targets, often exogenously set by politicians, and fed 
back into performance agreement contracts with senior public managers appointed on 
contracts. Public sector managerialism then views senior managers with increased 
devolution as a vehicle to attaining set goals and performance targets in the public sector. 
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3.6 Managerialism and managerial devolution/authority 
Managerialism and managerial devolution have similar connotations; both demand 
increased authority to managers to manage with free hands. Early critical NPM texts 
(Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; 1995) argued that by combining managerialism and public 
choice NPM potentially unleashes conflicts between public managers and politicians 
because it apparently establishes zero-sum relationship between them. However, with the 
surge in corporatisation the level of direct political involvement in public service provision 
seemed to have diminished substantially (McLaughlin et al, 2002). With this, the direct 
control of public organisations now comes to reside in contract-based senior managers, 
empowered to operate with a considerable degree of freedom. 
It is under these senior managers that professional middle managers now have to work. 
Hence, the hitherto politicians-management relationships now seem to be collapsing into 
senior-middle management relationships. Essentially, as research on NPM reforms and 
professional middle managers has demonstrated from the previous chapter, this [senior] 
managers' `freedom to manage' has often come at the cost of reduced autonomy for 
professional middle managers, and this has tended to generate substantial conflicts between 
the two levels of management. What is happening can be described best as `transfer of 
control' from politicians to senior managers and this is having considerable implications for 
managerial and professional relationships. The exercise of managerial authority tends to 
restrict professional autonomy. Here lies one of the greatest paradoxes of NPM: for senior 
managers to be effective they require increased devolution, but greater exercise of this 
devolution has tended to limit the extent of middle managers' (professionals') autonomy 
and discretion. Considered from this perspective, managerial-professional relationships 
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have been described as inherently antagonistic. As Causer and Exworthy (1999) and 
Exworthy and Halford (1999) observed, the thesis that managers and professionals stand in 
necessarily antagonistic relationships has been a recurrent one in the sociological literature. 
For instance circumstances under which senior public managers are appointed (short term 
performance contracts with less security of tenure-Yamamoto, 2003) suggest that their 
ability to operate with free hands could be greatly restricted to and circumscribed by 
predetermined politicians' agenda. As such senior managers could have a number of 
conflicts associated with their roles as they struggle to establish specific modes of 
behaviour that make them acceptable to politicians as well as subordinate professional 
managers. 
3.7 Conflictual and antagonistic relationships 
Different themes have emerged from the discussion of managers and professionals but two 
are explicitly distinguishable. The first, if rather oversimplified formulation, conceives of 
managers and professionals as separate categories performing separate roles, and whose 
relationship is necessarily characterised by conflicts. This viewpoint, which also partly holds 
that managerialism has prevailed over professionalism is succinctly summarised in Clarke et 
al (2000: 9): 
Managerialism, like professionalism, defines a set of expectations, values and beliefs; it's a 
normative system concerning what counts as valuable knowledge, who knows it and who is 
empowered to act in ways as a consequence. . .A central issue in the managerislisation of 
public services has been the concerted effort to displace or subordinate the claims of 
professionalism. It can no longer be assumed that professionals know best; rather, we are 
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invited to accept that managers do the right thing. -Within organisations managerialisation 
has tended to subordinate other forms of power, and knowledge to managerial authority. 
This quote suggests that the philosophy of public service organisations has been largely 
influenced by the ideals of managerialism. The effect of this dominant tendency, according 
to Clarke and Newman (1995) has been `a range' of resistances, adaptations and Co options, 
particularly around strong centres of pmfessionalism . Resistance is always preceded by control, real 
or imagined of various forms. In that sense resistance from professionals may be clearly 
founded, as Exworthy and Halford (1999) explanation of professionals' fears and concerns 
demonstrates. Such professional fear might be explained from three angles according to 
(Exworthy and Halford, 1999). First, some professionals might have personal fears or 
doubts about the fate of their professions under managerialism, e. g., being sidelined into 
practitioner niches where they are restricted in their practice (see also Crompton and 
Sanderson, 1990; Causer and Exworthy, 1999). Second, some professionals might have 
uncertainties about their ability to perform in the entrepreneurial culture (Scase and 
Goffee, 1989). Finally, some professionals might be sceptical about the efficacy of new 
structures imported from private sector and their capacity to deliver public services 
efficiently (Newman and Clarke, 1994). 
The reality of this conflict perspective is that it is nothing new per se as professionals and 
managers have always been in negotiation with one another in the history of public 
administrative thought, hence the era of NPM could be conceptualised as simply another 
round or epoch in this process of negotiation and accommodation. However, responses 
from professionals to this conflictual situation have taken various forms, embedded in 
modes of resistance by individuals and groups to control instruments, be it between 
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managers and workers or between the ranks of managers or even between supervisors and 
their subordinates as the literature on industrial sociology demonstrates. Collinson's (1994) 
analysis of workplace resistance provides an excellent framework for understanding these 
issues. Collinson argued that resistance and consent are inextricably and simultaneously 
linked, often in contradictory ways within particular organisational culture, discourses and 
practices, observing that resistance frequently contains elements of consent, and consent 
often incorporates aspects of resistance. As analysts such as Burawoy, (1979) have argued, 
workers are capable of devising their own subtle, indirect and non-confrontational 
engagement strategies as means of resisting management to their own advantage. A classic 
example is making out-a strategy related by Burawoy (1979) by which machine operators in a 
shop floor succeeded in manipulating and reducing the pace of the machine as a way of 
intelligently holding back their labour. 
Traditionally, critical scholars have emphasised control or domination at the expense of 
resistance (Ascraft and Mumby, 2004; Carlone and Larson, 2006). But this emphasis on 
domination often masks the agency of humans with respect to their experience of 
contemporary life, and tends to inhibit responses that might help fight domination. Control 
or domination has for long been understood as achievable through consent, suggesting that 
whenever people give their consent they are necessarily submitting themselves to be 
controlled and dominated (Carlone and Larson, 2006). However, recent analyses of 
consent (Collinson, 1994; 1999; 2003) have suggested consent could and has been 
employed as a powerful and effective tool in resisting managerial control. This suggests 
that to maintain that when people give their consent they are necessarily subordinating 
themselves to be controlled would be too simplistic a formulation in control/resistance 
analysis. In this respect, `the widely accepted conception of hegemony as ideological 
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domination achieved through consent, as Mumby (1997) had earlier on argued, should 
rather be understood, as Collinson (2003) suggests, as `a dialectic between control and 
resistance'. This is supported by Mumby (2000) and Carlone and Larson (2006) argument 
that attempts to control may simultaneously represent opportunities for resistance. For 
instance, Rosenthal (2004) found how control mechanisms deployed by management were 
harnessed by employees and used to their advantage in a call centre, while Lankshear 
(2001) reported on how call centre staff welcomed [as an evidence to avoid being 
victimised by management] rather than resisted the taping of customer calls deployed to 
increase managerial control. 
But whether or not and the extent to which those perceiving control resist directly or do so 
through consent would depends largely on what the subjects think of themselves; in other 
words, the concept of the self is crucial to how we respond to the natural and social 
environment. This relates to the question of identity in the sense that our mode of reaction 
to stimuli depends principally on our perception of our true selves but our perception of 
our true selves can change, producing varying and shifting identities. Applying this 
framework Collinson (2003) identified three different selves that emerged as workers, 
trying to react to managerial control, recast themselves in various ways and into various 
categories. These are the resistant selves, the conformist selves, and the dramatu ical selves. 
Employing a Foucauldian perspective, Collinson (2003) draws attention to the inherent 
capacity of organisational systems to enact a complex process of production and 
reproduction of `disciplined or conformist selves', in which self-disciplining modes often 
tend to split individual selves between `competing and conflicting ends'. In this sense, by 
ascribing primary significance to life outside work, employees can begin to divide their 
identity between the instrumental and ind Pennt me at work; and the real me outside of work. 
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Dramturgical selves, Collinson asserts, emerge as self-conscious individuals in surveillance 
organisations become increasingly skilled manipulators of self, reputation and image in the 
eyes of others. In other words, they become actors trying to act out the ideal personality 
dictated by powerful organisational discourses, their true selves remaining significantly 
intact. Dramaturgical selves also tend to manipulate data to please management (Collinson, 
1999). Noon and Blyton (1997) demonstrate how even in tightly monitored [surveillance] 
organisations employees can still find creative responses such as making out, fiddling, 
joking, sabotage and escaping. Resistant selves, according to Collinson (2003; 2005) 
constitute a primary means by which employees express their discontent about workplace 
processes, and may help subordinates in surviving organisational regimes of tight control 
and commodification. By engaging in resistance then employees construct an alternative, 
more positive sense of self, to that provided, prescribed or circumscribed by the 
organisation (Goffman, 1968). As recent studies suggest such resistance strategies have 
become even more diverse, shifting, and multiple in their character, and frequently covert, 
and subterranean (Knights and McCabe, 2000). According to Collinson (2003) such 
strategies are more subtle and include indifference, cynicism and foot-drugging; whistle- 
blowing, and irony and satire. 
In spite of the differences in the organisational environment where Collinson's and Noon 
and Blyton's studies were based (manual workers) and the organisational environment in 
which professionals work, there could be parallels in their modes of resistance to perceived 
or real control. It is my intension to research how far Collinson's categories for 
understanding manual workers might apply to public sector professionals in the context of 
the new forms of control they experience under NPM. Another important theory, the 
weapons of the weak (Scott, 1985), which examines from a micro-perspective, the mundane 
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activities of a dispossessed, marginalised class, provides an insight into the nature of 
resistance. Scott's studies were conducted in a developing country context, and could help 
in enlightening us on the subject of resistance among the weak, less powerful class in a 
developing country context, and to this I now turn. 
3.8 NPM. professionals and professional resistance in developing countries 
As long as professionals operate in organisations where scarcity of resources exists, there is 
bound to be -conflicts 
between them and management, as structural arrangements are 
fundamentally an attempt to harmonise rational use of resources for the sake of efficiency, 
and uncontrolled use of resources for the sake of professional autonomy. This situation is 
unavoidable irrespective of level of development in the economy. However, the intensity of 
this conflict is rendered higher is LDCs where an even stronger pressure on scarce 
economic resources compels managers to employ much stricter controls on resource use. 
This is likely to heighten the conflicts between managers and professionals in developing 
countries. Well academically documented reports on professionals and professionalism, 
particularly in the way professionals respond to the new public management model in 
developing countries is relatively scarce. However, given the greater pressure on economic 
resources in these countries, compared to developed countries, one can argue that 
professionals in these economies are more likely to feel the pressures of managerial control 
than their counterparts in OECD nations. In the next section, I review an influential 
academically documented account of resistance in a developing country context: James 
Scott's `weapons of the weak' (WOTW) thesis, which focuses on peasants' resistance in 
Malaysia. In spite of the contrast in the context of Scott's study (in a peasant rice context), 
compared to professional context, the WOTW thesis has relevance for understanding the 
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complex, sometimes ambivalent nature of resistance by a management category that feels 
dispossessed especially in a developing country context, and therefore, germane to our 
analysis. 
3.8.1 The weapons of the weak (W/OTW) 
The WOTW theory was propounded by Scott (1985) whose study focuses on the polemics 
of peasant resistance. Drawing the distinctions and relationships between `public action' 
and `cognitive objective' of a seemingly marginalised, oppressed, class, Scott showed how 
apparently suppressed, marginalised groups respond to attempts at controlling them. Scott 
examined, from a micro-perspective, the symptoms of the gestation of peasant resistance, 
and by his thesis, attempted to fill the gap left by macro approaches of Marxist analysts. 
This he accomplished by showing how class consciousness and conflict are actually 
generated, and how they are perceived by the actors themselves (Nagata, 1987). Unlike 
Marxists, Scott does not consider revolution, which results in the overthrow of the 
dominant class, to be inevitable or even predictable in the context of his studied category. 
He argues that the reason for avoiding revolution is obvious: to protect the moral 
economy, which continues to exercise a moderating influence in the face of economic 
reality. 
The fact that the resistance of this peasant group occurred in a context where they were 
confronted by an unending dilemma in a bourgeoning agricultural economy could offer an 
explanation for their chosen mode of resistance in which public compliance was preferred 
to recalcitrance. On the one hand, the necessity of ensuring their own economic security 
has imposed the demand to confront the injustices of economic inequality resulting from 
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the prospering mechanised agricultural production. The `economic cleavage, argues Nagata 
(1987), `is reinforced by the larger landowners' control of new technology and 
manipulation of political benefits, which results in a reduction of a benign tenancy 
patronage, and traditional gleaning rights of the poor'. On the other, the peasants were 
compelled by the demands of a moral economy, which forbids confrontation and violence, 
as a way of maintaining, rather than revolutionising or overturning the status quo, to 
restrict their resistance activities to methods that remain non-confrontational and non- 
violent, yet retained potential capability of producing visible effects. 
Scott illustrates how-concerned with the enormous inequality of access to the means of 
production, and the obviously increasing exploitation and conscious of their predicament- 
the dispossessed and marginalised group manage their behaviour and discourse to their 
own advantage, without engaging in full-blown recalcitrance. Nagata (1987) vividly 
articulates the processes and strategies involved in the weapons of the weak, which he 
argued are entirely rational and consistent with the context: 
the discontent of the dispossessed is displayed in a pattern of a simmering resistance, of 
low-key recalcitrance, chicanery, petty pilferage, foot dragging, dissimulation and minor 
sabotage, all expressed verbally in metaphors quite appropriate to the local social scene; 
hence in that context, rational (Nagata, 1987: 1243). 
The central argument of Scott's thesis is that, aware of their condition, suppressed, 
apparently voiceless people evolve their own [sophisticated] means and strategies of 
displaying resistance. Moreover, while they take precautions to hide their intentions from 
the public, they do expect the effects of their resistance to be felt. Whereas such a class 
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may publicly comply with an order or regime, their cognitive objectives might stand directly 
opposed to their public behaviour. This type of resistance is so intelligently executed that it 
provides little occasion for others to suspect any intention to resist. Moreover, even if the 
effect of their resistance is not publicly felt, an intrinsic satisfaction does ensue from the 
realisation of their accomplishment arising from resisting a clearly greater authority 
(Hanchard, 2004). 
In summary, like, Collinson, Scott accepts the crucial role of the human agency-the 
tendency of people to shift between various selves. For instance in managing attempts by 
the more powerful to control them, marginalised groups are able to shift between the 
private self that resists, and the public self that complies to forms of control, real, imagined 
or apparent. It is true that Scott, unlike Collinson, was writing from a fundamentally 
political science, rather than sociology background-the subjects of his study being non- 
professionals in a peasant setting. In any case, his thesis provides valuable insight into 
various ways that groups or classes that feel dispossessed or marginalised tend to manage 
and negotiate, to their own advantage, discourses that define and position them. The 
`weapon of the weak' thesis thus has some relevance for understanding the dynamics of 
managerial-professional relationships in the context of my thesis. It also suggests that there 
are other forms of resistance, beyond those reviewed in earlier sections, which combine 
apparent consent with non-confrontational resistance. These are found in a variety of LDC 
settings, especially the context I provided earlier in this section, which suggests the 
possibility of managerial attempts to control professionals' work. Just as Collinson's work 
on blue collar workers has some relevance to LDC professionals, so do forms of resistance 
identified in other settings, including those on which the weapons of the weak thesis is 
premised. Having now examined managerial-professional relationships from a conflictual 
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perspective, I now turn to contexts where such relationships occur in more collaborative 
fashion. 
3.9 Collaborative and Collitional managerial-professional relationships 
The second general perspective on managerial and professional relationships is one that 
admits of a number of overlaps between managers and professionals, which provide the 
basis for their peaceful co-existence and managed harmony. Such a perspective suggests that 
metaphors other than `conflicts and antipathy' would be more appropriate in describing 
such relationships given the complexities in which they are embedded. Three reasons 
underline this line of argument (Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Harrison, 1999). One, 
professionals have long taken up managerial roles, meaning that certain aspects of 
managerialsim may find acceptance among some professionals. In this case the new 
managerialsim is not merely about controlling professionals; it may in fact champion new 
patterns of compromise and collaboration between the two as in the case of professional- 
turned-managers. Two, the new managerialism may create managers out of professionals, 
thus providing opportunities to resource public sector organisations with a new cadre of 
managers who effectively combine technical expertise with managerial competence (see 
also Hoggett, 1996). Three, there is some possibility of knowledge sharing and knowledge 
transfer as managers attempt to imbibe the professional culture whilst professionals add a 
touch of management to their professional thinking and behaviour. This way, argues 
Causer and Exworthy (1999), it becomes difficult to distinguish whether it is managers who 
are imposing their agendas on professionals or whether professionals are voluntarily 
embracing managerialism which they perceive to be in their interest. This way it could 
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simply become a win-win, rather than zero-sum, win-lost situation for both managers and 
professionals. 
Adjustment to and negotiations about the managerialism discourse has occurred within 
individuals and groups that are non-managerial in many possible ways, which suggests that 
whereas conflicts may be inevitable, so too are adaptations [most obviously by 
professionals to the managerialism discourse] as well as co-options. Causer and Exworthy's 
(1999) analysis of the various ways professional-managerial relationships are being recast in 
the new public sector along task/role lines thus provides an appropriate and perhaps more 
robust framework for understanding the complexities in which such relationships are 
deeply embedded. These are leading to increased blurring of the roles of managers and 
professionals in the context of NPM. In this process of reordering, some professionals are 
taking up management roles. From this perspective a different (complex) picture emerges 
that is entirely antithetical to the conflict perspective not least as professional employees 
are commonly managed by those drawn from within the ' ranks of the profession itself, 
and not necessarily by non-professional managers (Causer and Exworthy, 1999). 
Consequently, although managerial control may entail some loss of control on the part of 
the professionals, the fact that managers are either practising professionals or of 
professional origin may be argued to represent a continuation on the principle of 
professional control (see Freidson, 1994). In Freidson's view, professionals are themselves 
stratified, with a division between the rank-and-file practitioner and the supervisory or 
managerial professional. In Causer and Exworthy's (1999: 83) words below, even this two- 
level stratification within professions is still an oversimplification: 
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In many settings, a hard-and-fast distinction along these lines may be difficult to make for 
at least three reasons. Firstly, the group of managerial professionals may itself be internally 
stratified.... Secondly, a number of areas are characterised by the existence of hybrid roles 
in which the exercise of formalised managerial responsibilities is carried on along 
continuous engagement in professional practice. Thirdly, the role of the rank-and-file 
practitioner may itself entail activities of managerial kind even where the position occupied 
is not formally designated as a managerial one. 
There is, judging from this quote, a need to develop a more complex typology (based on 
roles rather than discrete categories) which mirrors the various ways in which relationships 
between managers and professionals are being altered under NPM might be mapped out. 
This is because various individuals in the same position may interpret and enact their roles 
in different ways. Causer and Exworthy (1999: 84) identified three broad roles in 
organisations employing professionals, each of which they argue might be further 
differentiated into two. Firstly, there is the practising (rank-and-file) professional 
comprising those with no supervisory roles (the pure practitioner), and those whose role 
entail some form of supervision though they are not formally designated as managers 
(quasi-managerial practitioner). Secondly, there is the role of the managerial professional 
(drawn from the ranks of practicing professionals with primary responsibility for managing 
the day-to-day work of other professionals and resources they utilise). This role comprises 
the `practicing managing professional' who, besides their managerial role also continues to 
practice as professionals; and the non practicing managing professional who discontinues their 
professional practice following take up of managerial responsibility. Thirdly, there is the 
role of the general manager (with overall managerial responsibility for the activities of 
professional employees but are not themselves concerned with the direct management of 
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day-to-day practice). This role may require knowledge of the profession and may involve 
two different categories: the prr fesrionallygrounded general manager (with a background in the 
profession) and the non profe. rsionalgeneral manager (who has no background in the profession 
being practiced). This way of categorisation elucidates the complexities in the roles and 
positions of managers and professionals' roles in the new public sector. 
The professional managers and [senior] managers studied for this project reflect the 
practicing managing professional' and the non practicing managing professional respectively. We need 
to ask the question `what is managers' apparent control of professionals meant to achieve'; 
and whose interest (public or selfish sectional) is that achievement meant to protect? It is 
equally important to ask if and why professionals are demanding greater levels of 
autonomy. On the one hand, one might argue that senior public managers could have the 
moral right to curtail the autonomy of professional middle managers in the sense that the 
former might lay claim to operating with an ethical code to public service given that the 
former arguably play a `proxy role' on behalf of politicians committed to reforming an 
apparently inefficient public sector. In doing so however, public interest must remain 
privileged over sectional interests. On the other, one could argue that professional middle 
managers deserve some degree of autonomy to operate in protecting the public interest 
provided they truly protect public, rather than personal (or professional) interests. 
Moreover, professional middle managers occupy a uniquely challenging and conflictual 
position in the sense that besides their professional position, they also double as managers 
(Practicing managing professional). They thus need to be empowered to operate in both 
capacities as professionals but also as managers; in other words, autonomy to professional 
managers needs to be understood as a move to enhance their capacity to operate both as 
professionals and managers. It is however doubtful whether and the extent to which this 
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need is being currently recognised and met. This can constitute a source of conflict for 
professional middle managers in two distinct ways. On the one hand conflicts might 
develop between managers and professionals; on the other hand, even within the same 
professional, role conflicts can arise as they find themselves in positions where they have to 
make major [financial] decisions as managers, which might compromise their professional 
standards, and as professionals that might undermine their managerial values, ideals and 
motivations. 
These issues could constitute an interesting area of further future research but this is 
certainly beyond the scope of my research. The public manager and the public professional 
then would be seen to be playing complementary roles although from different angles so 
that the justification for increased autonomy for public professionals or increased control 
for senior managers would be greatly determined and constrained by the extent to which 
each category practically demonstrates their commitment to protecting the public interest. 
Researching these issues would help to clarify the seeming confusion that surrounds the 
role of the professional-turned manager (or the practicing managing professional, to employ 
Causer and Exworthy's, 1999 framework). The discussion chapter of my thesis addresses 
these issues in greater detail. 
3.10 Outsourcing. public managers and professionals 
The introduction of quasi-market relationships into the public sector following the 
separation of production from provision, and the concomitant integration of private 
organisations in the provision of public services, seemed to have complicated the position 
and role of middle managers (professionals) as well as their relationships with senior 
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managers. This could be due largely to the extra responsibility placed on professionals in 
monitoring the work of outsourcing service providing staffs from private firms. 
Outsourcing is a subject that requires major decision making in which PMMs should be 
involved. It is here that PMMs have a number of issues of conflicts and considerable 
ambiguity. They include making decisions on outsourcing. For professional managers the 
question is `how have these arrangements affected their roles, and what resources do they 
have to perform these roles effectively? For instance as Cooke (2006: 270) observed: 
... public-private outsourcing relationships are often 
described in terms like "strategic 
alliance" and "partnership", which implies a positive relationship strategically forged 
between the (two) parties involved. These positive connotations not only mask the true 
motive and nature of the contractual relationships, but also conceal the tensions and 
conflicts in the process of managing these relationships, which are often a major source of 
pressure for the managers as well as the workforce who are responsible for delivering the 
services. 
Tensions and conflicts especially with regards to managers managing such contracts are 
thus unavoidable under such arrangements. Again Scarborough and Burrel (1996) observed 
that studies in recent years on managers in the UK have also pointed to the fact that 
managerial work has been intensified in a period in which downsizing and delayering of 
organisational structures were common strategies adopted by firms. Middle management is 
the group that has been most negatively affected (Scarborough and Burrel, 1996, p. 178). 
Yet studies about middle managers under NPM have focused more on macro issues and 
challenges of organisations within which middle managers work and less on the lived 
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experiences of middle managers as self-conscious individuals (Cooke, 2006) and micro 
aspects of the middle managers' work. 
It is this missing link-the lived experiences of professional middle managers under NPM, 
and ways in which they respond to such experiences, as well as tools they employed in 
response-that this thesis is aimed at investigating and elucidating. But more importantly, the 
justification for such a study lay principally in how the relationships between managers and 
professionals are mediated by a set of systemic political, socio-cultural and economic 
factors in which social interaction in the-. public sector in a developing country such as 
Ghana is embedded. 
3.11 Conclusion 
From a historical perspective, professionals' work, and professional autonomy under public 
administrators /managers has been continuously negotiated, and this largely resonated with 
the recent shifts in the philosophy about managing public organisations. Early analysis of 
managerial-professional relationships have been carried out from broad Marxist 
perspectives, viewing managers and professionals as separate categories pursuing values 
fundamentally different and with power relationships perceived to be of zero-sum fashion. 
However, this perspective has been criticised as too simplistic, losing sight of the complex 
nature of power relations and the human agency in organisations. As Collinson (1999; 
2003) noted, quoting Kaghan (2005), power relations are not so easily subsumed in a 
simple class struggle model. That aside, professionals too have, over the years, been 
elevated to managerial positions and made responsible for the supervision of the work of 
externally contracted service providers. 
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Moreover, faced with the challenges presented by deteriorating quality of public services, 
compounded by the pressures of growing fiscal imbalances, the State has seen the need to 
increase its regulatory instruments over professional work, which had hitherto dominated 
the delivery of public services. This has tended to subject professionals' work and 
professional autonomy under senior public managers and managerialist's framework. As 
the analyses have shown, the necessity of current challenges facing governments, 
principally with respect to fiscal imbalances, have meant that the regulation by 
governments of professionals' work is no longer a choice but a necessity in ensuring the 
societal [common] good. This has led to a redefinition of public sector professionalism that 
came to be subsumed in and subjected to, increased managerial authority, responsibility 
and accountability for the use of state funds on contracts executed by private firms. 
For the large number of professionals who have been given managerial responsibilities, the 
need to marry professional role with their augmented managerial roles became apparent 
and compelling. This fusion of roles means that the categorical distinctions between 
management and professionals in a technical sense can no longer be sustainable. As 
managers and professionals they are faced daily with the difficult, conflicting decisions of 
either imbibing the managerialists' discourses, remaining consistently attached and 
committed to their professional discourse and detached from management, or shifting their 
emphasis and identities between professionals' and managerialists' values at different times. 
How do they cope? Confronted with this complexity and somewhat conflict, what coping 
strategies do they employ and how can these be conceptualised and analysed? It is these 
sets of questions which are addressed in this research. Sullivan (2000) argues that the 
bringing of professional practice under the control of management may weaken the hold of 
professional (technical) expertise, allowing the profession's contract with society to be 
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recast on a different basis than either the old `professional sovereignty' or the newer 
imperatives of `state cost-control or corporate interests'. 
There are several significant implications for the above quote, one of which is that the 
socio economic challenges of the time can no longer permit the demand for professional 
autonomy to be granted on a silver platter. Professional autonomy can only be granted if 
professions can demonstrate that they can convert such autonomy to improved services 
that benefit entire society rather than protecting the selfish interests of a handful of 
privileged aristocratic group. Thus professions as a concept and professional autonomy as a 
sociological construct are being severally redefined and recast in contemporary public 
sectors across the globe in line with the demands created by these changing socio- 
economic trends. 
However, and as a balancing effect, the call for a redefinition of professional autonomy in 
ways that protect public interest and ensure public welfare should not be assumed to 
necessarily guarantee the arbitrary curbing or dismantling of professional power by 
managers as suggested by Clarke et al (1994a). On the contrary, the new order calls for 
managers and professionals to complement, not compete, with each other in promoting 
the public interest. It calls for `compromises and collaboration', in Exworthy and Halford's 
(1999) words, between professionals and managers. It is in this context of renegotiated and 
redefined professional autonomy that the work of professionals and their relationship with 
managers have been analysed and discussed in this thesis dissertation. My research thus 
seeks to investigate these interrelated issues regarding managers and professionals under 
the new managerialism as experienced essentially by professional managers. Details of my 
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research objectives and methods are provided in the next chapter (4-Research Design), and 
for brevity sake, are not duplicated here. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH OUTLINE AND DESIGN 
4.0. Introduction 
The objectives of this chapter are to present: (i) a summary of the research framework, 
covering the interrelated issues regarding NPM, in the context of LDCs in general and of 
Ghana in particular; (ii) a summary of the research focus, objectives and questions; (iii) a 
discussion of the methodology, and a research design justifying a case study on Ghana and 
in health; and finally (iv) the description of the cases selected, including methods used in 
collecting and analysing the data for this research. 
4.1 Research Framework 
In chapters 1-3 1 discussed in greater depth some of the salient changes that have and 
continue to occur in the management of public sectors; changes analysts have labelled as 
NPM. Indeed, NPM is a contested terrain, a domain of conflicts, contradictions, and 
dilemmas because of the implications of its fundamental assumptions and building blocks 
of public choice and managerialism among others, for political and managerial authority 
and professional autonomy. By bringing together public choice and managerialism 
therefore, NPM is believed to create tensions between the need for greater managerial 
discretion and greater degree of accountability to politicians (Thomas, 1998; Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2002). This `marriage of opposites' (Hood, 1995) requires the combination, 
albeit in an unspecified proportions, of centralisation and decentralisation; coordination 
and deregulation; and control and delegation (Aucoin, 1990). It is the absence of precision 
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in the proportion in which centralisation and decentralisation should be combined (which 
NPM framework fails to specify) that constitutes one of the major areas of conflicts and 
tensions between public managers and politicians (Christensen and Laegreid, 2002; 
Appana, 2003) and provides a recipe for power abuse under NPM. 
There are different viewpoints on proportions in which centralisation and decentralisation 
are combined under NPM. Some argue that the difficulty in resolving these paradoxes 
makes NPM stronger on rhetoric and weak on reality (Hood, 1991), and is therefore 
nothing new. Others argue NPM increases centralisation and political power unevenly 
against managerial authority while others taking a contrary view maintain politicians are 
losing control to public managers (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999,2002). Yet still others 
(Aucoin, 1990) argue it is possible to resolve these paradoxes although this would require 
effective combination of centralisation/decentralisation, in different proportions under 
different circumstances. 
NPM thus defines a set of principles, and management philosophy and an organisational 
structure within which these reform prescriptions would be effectively implemented and 
reform agenda realised. A common organisational structure and design that seems to fit 
perfectly into the NPM design is corporatisation (fully explained in chapter two). This 
framework, common to most NPM reforms (Polidano, 1999) is believed to provide the 
organisational arrangements and management structures necessary for increasing 
organisational autonomy, allowing private participation in delivering public services by 
means of outsourcing. Autonomy to such organisations (often managed by professionally 
contracted chief executives from the private sector and a management board- Yamamoto, 
2003) provides the leeway for making a number of decisions, including questions on which 
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services to provide in-house and which to source from private providers under outsourcing 
contractual arrangements. Such agreements mean that professional middle managers 
(PMMs) now have to learn to relate to private organisations, which are in many respects 
different in values systems and business practices, while at the same time maintaining 
public service values and ethos. The necessity of such a dual role suggests a possible source 
of conflict. 
Available research suggests that middle managers working under such outsourcing 
arrangements encounter a number of challenges including being subject to corporate 
surveillance in the form of tightening targets and performance assessment, and less job 
security (Cooke, 2006). Other studies (Sehested, 2002; Thomas and Walshe, 2004) suggest 
senior managers and professionals are often in conflicts over professional and managerial 
values. While the NPM rhetoric is strong on the need for increased managerial authority, 
there is hardly a consensus on which level of management (senior or middle) exercises this 
acclaimed autonomy. Some commentators argue autonomy resides in senior management 
leading to the control and marginalisation of middle management (Willmott, 1997; 
Townley, 1996) while others argue that by their direct involvement in public policy 
implementation middle managers exercise significant degree of autonomy, thus locating 
autonomy in middle management as well (Smith and Walshe, 2004). That apart, there 
seems to be fundamental differences in the motivations and values held by senior 
management (appointed on contract often to fulfil pre-determined political agenda) and 
middle management (mostly civil servants), which have given rise to a form of power battle 
that seems to be linked with a number of issues middle managers encounter under 
corporatisation. These issues already discussed in chapter two are varied and wide-ranging, 
but can be summarised as: conflicts over professional civil service values and efficiency 
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considerations (Emery and Giauque, 2003; 2002); conflicts over public and private sector 
values (Collins and Green, 1999; Laegreid, 2002; Caron and Giauque, 2006); questions 
about corruption relating to the contracting process (Greenaway, 1995; Doig, 1997; 
Polidano, 1999;, McCourt, 2001; Awortwi, 2002); confusion over managerial accountability 
and political responsibility (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Collins and Green, 1999; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2000); the prevalence of Tayloristic management styles (Robert, 1996; 
Broadbent et al, 1999; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002); and clashes between senior 
management objectives and middle management (professional) autonomy. 
An emerging trend between senior and middle management arising from the identified 
issues is a form of control (Doolin, 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002; Emery and 
Giauque, 2003; Caron and Giauque, 2006) akin to that evident between management and 
workers in organisational studies literature. In responding to the issues they encounter 
professional middle managers in the studies reviewed so far, have employed a number of 
strategies, which seem to chart varied perspectives on the nature of managerial autonomy, 
workplace control and resistance. Such resistance strategies have helped to move 
understanding of control and resistance from the stage where it is understood as a one- 
dimensional, liner process, where the most powerful tend to control and the less powerful 
resist, to a more complex, non-linear, and multi-tier process involving less straightforward 
and complex set of fine-grained negotiation (see chapter three for detailed discussion). 
Relating the above to senior managers and professional middle management relations, 
control is viewed as a highly negotiated subject wrapped up in middle managers' subject 
positions and negotiation of personal identities (Thomas and Davies, 2005). 
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Professional middle managers are seen to possess complex, shifting, if conflicting 
identifications depending on who professionals identify with-managers or professionals 
(Thomas and Davies, 2005). In this regard one could argue that while senior managers 
might have access to legitimate autonomy and control by virtue of their position in the 
organisation, their ability to control and ensure the effectiveness of such controls strategies 
can be hardly guaranteed under all circumstances (Smith and Walshe, 2004). A possible 
explanation of this irony is the realisation that tools deployed by management to control 
others might fail to deliver the expected results; they could, and in fact, have delivered quite 
the opposite outcome by empowering those they are deployed originally to control 
(Rosenthal, 2004). From the foregoing a recap of the major issues faced by professional 
middle managers is useful. These include constant threats to their authority, control and 
autonomy; complexities and uncertainties arising from working with private organisation 
and trying to maintain public sector values in that context; temptations to engage in corrupt 
practices; continuous negotiation of their identities as professionals or managers or both; 
and finally, conflicts over their dual position as managers and as subordinates or 
employees-possible targets of managerial control (Willmott, 1997). These all combine to 
form the research framework, and are presented on a diagram in Fig 1 below. 
Against this background, this thesis research aims at understanding how all these complex, 
intertwined issues arising from the conflicts between increased managerial authority and 
professional autonomy are played out in relations between managers and professionals in 
outsourcing environments. Bringing in the subject of outsourcing is quite likely to 
compound the problems and conflicts. On the one hand, senior managers and the private 
outsourcing providing companies are fundamentally cost efficiency-driven (this is apparent 
under NPM); on the other, professional middle managers are believed to be committed to 
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ensuring service quality, first and foremost. For instance, the challenge of contract 
management that might indeed be new to professional middle managers, introduced by 
outsourcing is likely to present a further source of conflicts between senior managers and 
professional managers on the one hand, and possibly professional middle managers and 
private outsourcing managers on the other. 
A Framework for Understanding Issues Professional Middle Managers Encounter under NPM Reforms 
Fig 1 
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NPM Managerial 
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In the context of developing countries, an even greater complexity is introduced to the 
relationships between managers and professionals largely because of a number of 
intervening variables (see chapter two for full analysis), principally, corruption. One of 
the outcomes of such corruption-scare consciousness in developing countries has been 
the increased tendency for management to centralise control rather than decentralise it, 
producing the net result of restricted autonomy and discretion for professional middle 
managers. This has tended to compound the issues professional middle managers 
encounter under NPM reforms especially in developing countries. What follows is the 
research focus, including the research questions. 
4.2 Research Focus 
Quite recently, there has been a proliferation of research on NPM-type reforms in 
developing countries. Such reforms, which have taken place through organisational 
restructuring strategies such as corporatisation, and such service delivery strategies as 
outsourcing, have delivered a range of contradictory organisational outcomes. As earlier 
explained corporatisation and outsourcing represent two special arrangements that seek to 
bring together public and private sector organisations for collaborating in delivering public 
services, and hence these are the most representative form of NPM reforms. In spite of 
some overlaps, there exist considerable differences in goals and preoccupations, and 
rationales for outsourcing between the perspectives of senior management and professional 
middle management. Such differences are capable of delivering different outcomes and 
experiences for both levels of management within the public sector, which could further 
compound and contradict reform outcomes. Essentially, professional middle managers 
represent one category of managers that have both experienced and been affected by such 
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contradictions not least because they are directly involved with reform implementation. 
Against that backdrop the lived experiences of professional middle managers, playing a 
boundary-spanning role in outsourcing projects, implemented under senior managers in 
collaboration with private service providers, would be a good starting point for examining 
and understanding the nature of such contradictory reform outcomes. 
Whereas NPM-type reforms have been significantly researched in Ghana, only few 
researchers focused on the experiences of professional middle managers or attempted to 
examine the particular challenges they face as they work under senior managers in the 
implementation of such reforms. I argue that the lived experiences of these managers 
are worth studying for at least three reasons. One, because of their critical position in 
any public sector reform programme as those directly involved with implementation and 
associated challenges. Two, in the context outsourcing initiatives, professional middle 
managers operate between senior managers and private outsourcing providing firms, 
playing a crucial boundary-spanning role, where the subject of contract management 
does pose a crucial challenge. Three, as made clear from chapter two and early part of 
this chapter, NPM reforms in a developing country such as Ghana are further mediated 
by a number of systemic factors that tend to complicate the outcomes especially for 
professional middle managers. Corruption is a case at issue, engendering a situation 
where increased centralisation [rather than decentralisation in line with NPM 
prescription] is pursued, which tends to curtail the power and discretion of professional 
managers and reduce their ability to perform effectively. Lessons from investigating 
these hitherto under-researched issues can help contribute to our understanding and lead 
to a reconceptualisation of particular challenges both managers and professional in 
LDCs encounter under NPM. 
4.3 Research Questions 
Against this background, this research attempts to answer three main questions, which I 
discuss below under separate sections: 
1. What issues and challenges (conflicts, contradictions, dilemmas and paradoxes) do public managers, 
especially professional middle managers in Ghana encounter in corporatised organisations outsourcing some 
functions to private companies? 
Drawing on previous chapters, it is clear that in the context of NPM there are potentials 
for conflicts and tensions between politicians and public managers. It is also clear that such 
politicians-public managers' conflicts have been reduced significantly by the increased use 
of contracts which makes public managers accountable to politicians, giving the latter a 
proxy role to supervise and execute the implementation of public policies as they affect 
service delivery. This consequently increased the power of senior managers in comparison 
to professional managers and necessitated the subordination of the latter group as well as 
values they espouse to senior managers and managerial values. Chapter three demonstrates 
that both managerialism and professionalism define a system of values and beliefs that 
could be seen as potentially in conflict and tension with each other, which suggests 
potential conflicts between senior and professional middle managers. 
In line with this, the first research question aims to investigate the nature of such tensions, 
contradictions and conflicts by examining three sub-questions as follows: 
1.1 What are the various rationales underlying outsourcing initiatives? 
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Most commonly-cited academic literatures suggest that public sector outsourcing is by 
many standards a political decision underlain by the need to attain economic efficiency, 
thus often drawing little attention to particular circumstances of public organisations other 
than economic inefficiency that might warrant outsourcing. Investigating and 
understanding the rationale for outsourcing from both senior and professional [public] 
managers' point of view would help provide common grounds for outsourcing among 
senior managers and professionals, which could provide the context for understanding 
managerial-professional interactions in outsourcing initiatives. 
1.2 What is the extent of professional middle managers' involvement in making decisions relating 
to outsourcing? 
My thesis intends, for instance to investigate whether and the extent to which professional 
middle managers make inputs to determining which functions get outsourced as well as 
which service providing firms are selected and the criteria for achieving this. From 
organisation studies literature and recently from human resource management literature, 
involving organisational members in decision making is believed to be crucial to sustaining 
their commitment to the organisation. Moreover, in professional environments such as 
health institutions, the involvement of professionals in decision making is an important 
component of professional autonomy; in other words professional autonomy and 
discretion relate in crucial ways to whether and the extent to which professionals' views on 
important organisational issues are sought. Professional autonomy also borders on whether 
and the extent to which professionals are allowed to make both strategic and operational 
decisions regarding their day-to-day practice. The extent of discretion professional middle 
managers are allowed would also be investigated. 
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1.3 What issues come up in managerial professional relationships especially in dealing with 
external service providing managers? 
The introduction of private players with quite different ethos and work habits at least in 
Ghana's context, necessitating the additional need for managing contracts, could potentially 
unleash conflicts and tensions between senior managers, professional middle managers and 
private managers. For instance, it was observed in chapter two that while corporatisation is 
believed to ensure organisational autonomy, such autonomy imposes additional 
requirements of skills to effectively manage contracts on the corporatised organisation, 
although the availability of such skills capacity is often taken for granted. A lack of contract 
management skills within both senior and professional middle management compounded 
by differences in ethos of public and private organisations is likely to constitute a major 
source of conflict. For professional middle managers, directly involved with 
implementation and daily supervising of outsourcing contracts, these issues could assume 
an even greater dimension, as they attempt to steer between their managerial function and 
professional roles. 
Against this background, several issues could be identified that could potentially affect 
managerial-professional relationships. Among such, and fundamental to this discussion is 
how managerial and professional values and frameworks conflict and tend to unleash 
tensions and dilemmas in managerial-professional relationships and interactions. Such 
tensions and dilemmas include attaining cost-efficiency at the expense of professional 
standards; focussing unnecessarily on results to the possible neglect of proper procedures; 
and the exercise of managerial authority and its associated consequences for professional 
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autonomy. Additionally, the [economic, political, social and cultural] issues which constitute 
the typical Ghanaian workplace dynamics, which I introduced in chapter one could 
potentially pose a challenge to managerial-professional relationships. In a nut shell, this 
question seeks to investigate the potential issues [which the challenges identified above, 
coupled with the contradictory role that the range of cultural practices including corruption 
plays in NPM reforms especially in Africa] are likely to be introduced into the relationships 
and interactions between senior managers and professional middle managers. 
2. U7hat strategies or coping devices do professional middle managers engage in msßonse to 
these issues, and how can we conceptualise these strategies 
Chapter two provides a summary of professionals' response to managerial control 
attempts, employing a variety of strategies that either portrayed them as powerless and 
unquestioning selves or as powerful, self-conscious individuals able to negotiate their 
personal selves and identities (Scott, 1985; Collinson, 1999; 2003). Through various means 
of resistance professionals have shown, in line with Fenton-O'Creevy's (2001) viewpoint, 
that organisational power is better conceived and understood as something which circulates 
freely in the organisation rather than monopolised by a handful of senior managers. 
Moreover, the exercise of power and the response to it tends to differ significantly across 
individuals and under various circumstances in ways that can portray the same individual as 
different selves at different times; for instance, as resistant selves, conformist selves, and 
dramaturgical selves (Collinson, 2003-see chapter three). This suggests professionals have a 
range response options with respect to managerial exercise of control resources: resisting 
these by different means or portraying selves which are entirely different [and shifting] 
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from their true selves. Such shifting modes of identity could split individual selves between 
`competing and conflicting ends (Collinson, 2003). In this context professionals could, for 
instance ascribe different levels of significance to their position: as professionals and as 
managers, which would tend to influence their [divided and managed] loyalty to their 
managerial function and professional roles. This could in turn split their identity between 
the instrumental and ind? erent self as a manager; and the real self as a professional, assuming 
they identify more with professionals and less with managers. In this sense, depending on 
which (their professional role or their managerial role) they ascribe greater significance 
professionals could be `acting' or `dramatising' in the exercise of their duties as 
professionals or as managers. On the other hand, if they wish to remain the `ideal manager' 
and `ideal professionals' simultaneously, this option would also introduce a possible range 
of behaviours with associated challenges. 
Against this background, different response or coping strategies are anticipated from 
professionals. In the context of Ghana-a developing country with the challenge of 
corruption, poorly developed public service values and ethics, and of course little engrained 
participatory management culture in both the body politic and in enterprise-responses to 
issues are expected to follow different trajectories, mediated, reflected and compounded by 
a range of factors embedded in the country's peculiar political, economic and socio-cultural 
orientation as discussed in chapter one. Responses in this context are not expected to as 
confrontational as would be complex and indirect including gossip, reflecting the 
reactionary behaviour typical of a power-distance society. 
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3. What lessons can we learn from questions 1 and 2 above to move forward our 
understanding of the implication of the interaction between managerial authority and professional 
autonomy for NPM reform outcomes in a developing non-Western country context? 
Exploring the above issues and how professionals respond to them would contribute to 
our understanding of: 
1. The local factors that determine and give shape to the nature, trend and outcomes 
of NPM reforms in a developing country context. 
2. How local factors tend to affect managerial-professional relationships in a 
developing country undergoing NPM reforms. 
4.4 Research Methodologv 
A research methodology combines various techniques in enquiring into a specific situation 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). Against this background I judge qualitative survey, using semi- 
structured interviews as most appropriate research methodology for investigating the 
identified issues in this project. In this study, a phenomenon- interaction and reactions of 
senior-middle managers under NPM reforms-is being studied in the context of a 
developing, transition economy, Ghana, a country that has peculiar features and 
circumstances capable of shaping reform implementation and outcomes. It is 
commonplace in social science and management research to allow the choice of research 
methodology to be freely influenced by the type of research question and the degree of 
control an investigator has over actual behavioural events (Yin, 1984). 
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Given the complexity of both the phenomenon to be investigated and the context in which 
the study is being undertaken, case studies, which combines interviews with such 
alternative sources of data as important organisational documents, artefacts, and participant 
observation would have seemed the most appropriate. However, as the tremendous 
difficulty encountered in accessing these additional data sources was leading to unnecessary 
waste in terms of time and budget, I have decided to use semi-structured interviews, which 
I consider equally appropriate under the circumstances. 
To address any possible lapses resulting from reliance on a single major source of data, I 
have taken great care in designing the interview guides in as comprehensive as possible 
manner. For instance, I interviewed three categories of managers: senior, middle [public 
managers) and external private, service providing managers. By far, as I made clear in 
chapters two and three, senior-middle management relations have been substantially 
conflictual and tensional especially with respect to approach to contract management. Such 
conflicts seem compounded by bringing on board private sector service providing 
managers who tend to hold quite different opinions, values and ethos, compared to public 
managers. In my view, this divergence in values and ethos could constitute considerable 
source of conflicts, hence involving these three categories of managers in the research was 
aimed to unearth possible deep-seated issues by which managerial-professional 
relationships have been characterised. 
I designed interview guides in a manner that helps probe managers' responses further, and 
administered these in a tension-free, non-threatening atmosphere, allowing respondents' 
free opinions on questions asked. Having a background in conversation analysis and 
discursive research, I paid particular attention to respondents' use of language, both vocal 
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and body, attempting to avoid imposing my personal opinions on their responses. 
Moreover, by the nature of both the issues under investigation and the context of this 
research, I have abandoned research methodologies involving the testing [for confirmation] 
or falsification of hypotheses in preference for those that provide opportunities to explore 
understand, and learn (Kupler and Kupler, 1985). This research is aimed to explore, learn 
and understand what is occurring in a social process of interaction, embedded in a 
constellation of political, socio-cultural and economic factors that provide a form of social 
lens through which to make sense of the phenomenon under investigation. It is the 
peculiarity of the context which is expected to give shape to this study, and significantly 
distinguish theories emerging from it from existing theories, making the application of such 
theories particularly relevant, if largely restricted, to that and similar contexts. 
While such concepts as managers, outsourcing, and economic efficiency are nothing new in 
the context of public sector organisations, outsourcing as a method of delivering public 
services seems to be gaining an unprecedented level of popularity in the current era of 
managerialism, when market factors are assuming greater level of influence on public 
service delivery. Within this framework, complexities are likely to set in for a variety of, but 
at least two reasons. First, senior managers are, in a sense seen to be playing a double role: 
representing the interests of politicians and of managers, suggesting their loyalties are likely 
to be split between politicians' and managers' goals. Second, and similarly, professional 
middle managers (PMMs) could be trapped in a loyalty-splitting role, making them linger or 
stuck between professional and managerial goals. Part of the central concern of this study 
is to understand how both categories of managers behave when confronted with the 
complexities within public organisations on the one hand, and the dilemmas and tensions 
inherent in their dual-role on the other. 
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Within this context, rather than survey questionnaires [which require respondents to 
indicate whether and the extent to which they agree or disagree with certain exogenously 
predetermined statements on a structured rating scale that purportedly describe their 
encountered and experienced phenomenon], semi-structured interview [which allows 
respondents to provide their independent, individualised discursive accounts of the issues], 
becomes a preferred methodology for investigation. I am sufficiently aware of the 
limitations and criticisms, which are held, among academics particularly those from the 
quantitative research tradition, to go with qualitative research in general and semi- 
structured interviews in particular. 
However, there is a reawakening within academics to the long-held misconceptions about 
qualitative research, using methods such as case study and semi-structured interviews (Seale 
et al, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Sedmark, 2007). For instance, questions are raised about the 
validity and reliability of qualitative research, especially because most qualitative researchers 
do not employ sampling techniques. It is in recognition of this that I have taken the steps 
outlined above to ameliorate any such possible shortcoming. By the nature of the issues to 
be investigated as well as the subjects required, this study is by no means a sample study; 
thus no systematic probabilistic sampling procedure has been followed in selecting the 
cases for this project. On the contrary, the cases were purposefully selected to reflect the 
ideal organisations considered necessary for generating data relevant for examining and 
understanding the complex issues identified for investigation. Indeed the cases were 
selected not because they constitute a representative sample but because they have features 
critical to understanding the issues identified for investigation. This type of purposeful 
selection of cases, Flyvbjerg (2006) calls `a clever or strategic choice of cases', which he 
argues is important in improving the generalizability of the findings to a certain degree. 
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4.4.1 Research History and Pilot Studies 
The issues identified in this research were initially proposed to be investigated using the 
Ghana Army as a Case. This proposal was based on a preliminary background survey of 
the Ghana Army, which confirmed the possibility of obtaining the type of data being 
sought. The first research visit to Ghana was therefore embarked upon in September 2005 
with the view to establishing relevant links and conducting a pilot study based on a list of 
pilot interviews. After two weeks of frustrating, unsuccessful attempts, three successful 
interviews were eventually conducted, all of which revealed the disappointing reality that 
while the Ghana Army has outsourced a large number of functional areas, it has very little 
to offer in terms of data with respect to the relevant issues into which insight was being 
sought. Upon advice from my key contact to approach the Ghana Health Service (GHS), a 
public institution that had seen a substantial growth in both the reach and scale of 
outsourcing in recent times, I made a key contact and a number of strategic contacts in the 
GHS before returning to the UK. 
The period spanning October and December saw intensification of relationships and 
networking, through correspondence, with the GHS contacts, paving the way for a second 
trip to Ghana in early January 2006 after a second set of pilot interview schedule was 
prepared. GHS proved more promising in terms of the type of data sought as well as the 
cooperation of the contacts. However, after more than ten successful interviews providing 
data into a number of interesting issues another painful decision was made to look for 
another institution for this investigation due to two main reasons: (i) the levels of 
management (senior and middle) upon which investigation is based is lacking; (ii) although 
involved in shaping health policy with respect to outsourcing, GHS being a policy, rather 
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than service delivery institution, is not directly involved with the management of 
outsourcing contracts. The names of the two largest teaching hospitals (KBu and KATH) 
finally came up. After a careful survey of their (KBu and KATH) organisational and 
governance structures including the levels of management and the functional areas where 
outsourcing has occurred the final decision was made to base the study on these two 
institutions. The trip for the final data collection therefore took place in early May 2006, 
lasting some seven weeks. Whereas much of the data analysed for this thesis was based on 
KATH and KBu, some, if, little use was made of pilot interview data in this thesis 
4.4.2 Research Sites and Choice of Cases 
Two research sites (KAT and KBu) were selected because they possess characteristics 
archetypal of corporatized, semi-autonomous organisations with senior and middle 
(professional) management levels within the public health institutions. Although K'Bu is 
the nation's premier hospital and remains largest teaching hospital in the country, it is not 
in any significant way different from KATH with respect to resource endowment, 
administration and governance as well as the mode of and arrangements for delivering 
public services. Additionally, both institutions are teaching hospitals, have similar 
departments offering similar services, and have both benefited from a recent refurbishment 
and furnishing with state-of-the-art medical facilities and technology for treating a wide 
range of diseases and ailments. Both institutions have also for more two decades enjoyed a 
relatively higher degree of autonomy, compared to other public health institutions across 
the country. The only major difference between the two sites though, if insignificant, lies in 
their geographical location; KBu is located in the capital at the coast while KATH is 
located in the middle belt of the country, away from the capital. 
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The selection of two research sites was not in any way informed by the need to build a 
comparative interface into the research process in respect of how site characteristics might 
influence research outcomes. Instead a second site became necessary as a matter of 
convenience: to provide the required number of respondents, fitting into the researcher's 
definition of senior managers and professional middle managers in the skill areas 
concerned. The cases so selected thus reflect fundamental differences in the skills levels in 
the functional areas where outsourcing has occurred. For instance, the 
Installation/Maintenance case. involves departments performing tasks requiring highly 
sophisticated technical skills such as magnetic resonance imagery (MRI), biological 
engineering and the installation of sophisticated medical equipment and machinery, while 
the Cleaning case require mainly low-value skills such as the Environmental sanitation and 
cleaning departments. Thus the comparative element in this piece of research applies only 
to the differences in the level of skills involved with the two cases 
(Installation/Maintenance on the one hand, and Cleaning on the other) as opposed to 
research site characteristics. It is the former, not the latter, that provides the basis for 
critical comparative analysis. 
Two main sets of issues exercised the researcher in selecting the cases. The first includes: 
the complexity of task and level of skills required to perform it (see next section for 
discussion). The second is the rationale for outsourcing. For instance it became obvious 
that the rationale for outsourcing low-value skills (e. g. cleaning) would be different from 
the rationale for outsourcing high-value skills such as installation and maintenance. These 
are apparent factors likely to influence senior managers' disposition or inclination to 
exercise control over what professional middle managers do, which would in effect 
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influence the degree to which the latter would resist or comply. The task of managers from 
installation and maintenance involves more complex skills than those of cleaning. 
4.4.3 Installation/Maintenance 
This case involves medical-related experts such as biomedical engineers whose primary 
duty is to ensure that [due] strict procedures and standards are followed in procuring, 
installing and maintaining medical systems. Also included here are experts such as civil and 
electrical engineers who are responsible for ensuring that the hospital's estates and other 
facilities such as lifts are regularly maintained. Most managers interviewed in this case are 
professionals in their respective fields in terms of training and membership to professional 
bodies. Such managers have responsibility for only one department and their work involves 
high-value [expert] skills in that no unskilled person can be employed to perform their 
tasks, making their position extremely important in the organisation. Since their work 
requires expert skills, which according to Crozier' (1964) and Reed's (1996) analysis 
constitutes a source of expert power, against which another form of [controlling and 
regulating] power develops (see chapter three), it is expected that the tendency of 
management to exercise control over their work would be great in this case. Again, much 
of what these managers do is what the service providing managers have been contracted to 
do, suggesting that their entire domain of influence is being taken over as a result of 
outsourcing. Referring to this category of managers, whose domain of professional practice 
seems restricted Causer and Exworthy (1999) observed that many of them could have 
personal fears of being sidelined into practitioner niches where they are restricted to 
practicing as professionals (see chapter three for a fuller analysis). 
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Against this background, it was anticipated that managers in Installation/Maintenance 
would be more predisposed to resenting senior management control than would managers 
from Cleaning. Consequently, adopting Crozier and Reed's framework above, a more 
conflictual relationship is anticipated between senior management and PMMs in 
Installation/Maintenance than those in Cleaning. Although the central focus of this 
research is professional middle managers, the views of senior managers and service 
providing managers can give indication of and elucidate the potential issues middle 
managers encounter in working in corporatised organisations where some functions are 
outsourced. ... 
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Table 4.1 List of Managers interviewed for the Installation/Maintenance (KATH e; ^' KBu) 
Management 
Position Professional Status Managerial Responsibility Category 
Chief Executive Qualified/certified [non- Overall responsibility for running Senior 
practicing] medical the hospital, drives for goal Management 
officer/qualification in attainment 
management 
Director of Qualified Responsibility for overall Senior 
Administration Administrator/MBA administrative issues management 
Procurement Non-medical officer Coordinates procurement activities Senior 
Manager Degree in Procurement & in all hospital departments Management 
MBA 
Technical/Busi Qualified Mechanical Provides consultancy advice on Professional 
ness Manager Engineer (including human/non-human procurement Middle 
hospital engineering) related to health (not support) manager 
services; coordinates engineering- 
related activities 
Biomedical Qualified/certified medical In charge of the biomedical Professional 
Engineering officer/biomedical department, managing other Middle 
Manager engineer biomedical engineers and manager 
technicians 
Estate Manager Qualified/certified Civil Advise management on civil works, Professional 
Engineer/certificate in make preliminary assessment of Middle 
Estate Management proposed projects, estimates costs, manager 
responsible for hospital 
accommodation issues 
Maintenance Qualified/certified Overall responsibility for planned Professional 
Manager mechanical engineer and preventive maintenance of Middle 
hospital manager 
machinery/plant/accommodation, 
coordinates technical 
officers/ technicians 
Manager, Qualified Chemical Contracted to coordinate the Service 
Philips Medical Engineer and certified purchase/installation/maintenance providing 
Systems customer service manager of medical equipment and systems manager 
Manager, Qualified Chemical Contracted to coordinate Service 
Hospital Engineer specializing in purchase/installation/maintenance providing 
Engineering hospital engineering of medical/non-medical equipment manager 
Manager, Qualified Electrical Contracted to coordinate the regular Service 
Elesca Engineer maintenance and repair of elevators providing 
Engineering and escalators (hence the name, manager 
Ele-sca) 
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4.4.4 Cleaning 
This case involves managers whose primary duty is ensuring the cleanliness, neatness and 
health of the hospital environment. Managers in this department are, by training and 
practice, health professionals such as doctors, nurses and environmental and sanitation 
experts. These managers have under them a large number of unskilled staffs, who do the 
`cleaning and grass mowing' to keep hospital environment clean. Their task largely involves 
supervising the supporting staffs to do the work. Moreover, among those interviewed, 
many have other responsibilities outside their immediate department. For instance, the 
nurses' manager is also a practicing nurse. The Poly manager manages a whole Polyclinic 
unit. The estates manager has responsibility for all hospital estates, and not only for the 
cleaning department, while the environmental sanitation manager has overall responsibility 
for the health and cleanliness of the entire hospital. These managers are responsible for 
managing outsourcing contracts for more routine tasks, which should surely be more 
straightforward to manage than their counterparts in the Installation and Maintenance case. 
In this case, it is not likely, adopting Crozier's framework they would be seen by senior 
management to constitute an expert power, hence it is expected that senior management 
would exhibit less propensity to control what professional middle managers do. Even if 
senior management should decide to exercise control over the activities of these managers, 
because the latter have responsibilities for areas other than the cleaning department, it is 
quite unlikely whether they would seriously resent senior management attempt to reduce 
their power or autonomy by taking over some of their (middle managers') areas of 
responsibility. Following are those involved with cleaning cases. 
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Table 4.2 List of Managers (Cleaning) (KATH & KBu) 
Position Professional Status Managerial Responsibility 
Management 
Category 
Chief Executive Qualified/certified Overall responsibility for running Senior 
[non-practicing] medical the hospital, drives for goal Management 
officer/qualification in attainment 
management 
Director of Qualified Responsibility for overall Senior 
Administration Administrator/MBA administrative issues management 
Procurement Non-medical officer Coordinates procurement Senior 
Manager Degree in Procurement activities in all hospital Management 
& MBA departments 
Estate Manager Qualified/certified Civil Advise management on civil Professional 
Engineer/certificate in works, make preliminary Middle 
Estate Management assessment of proposed projects, manager 
estimates costs, responsible for 
hospital accommodation issues 
Environmental Certified and Overall responsibility for the Professional 
Sanitation practicing cleanliness of hospital Middle 
Manager Community/Public including drains, and rubbish manage 
Health expert collection 
Nurses Qualified/registered Responsibility of the Professional 
Manager practicing Nurse cleanliness of wards, ensuring Middle 
the practice of nursing is done manage 
to acceptable standards 
Polyclinic Qualified, practicing Responsibility for managing Professional 
Manager Medical Officer the Polyclinic with budgetary Middle 
responsibilities Manage 
Bontu Non-professional Contracted to oversee the Service 
Manager manager cleaning of selected hospital providing 
departments manager 
City Janitorial Non-professional Contracted to oversee the Service 
Manager manager cleaning of selected hospital providing 
departments manager 
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4.5.0 Method of Inguiiv 
4.5.1 Data Collection 
Instruments for data collection: Semi-structured interviews were used to gather qualitative data 
from respondents. Senior and middle public managers answered the same set of questions 
while for private middle managers the questions were modified to preclude aspects asking 
for outcomes of outsourced projects. All interviews took place during normal office hours 
and respondents were allowed time off to respond to interviews. Interviews lasted 45-60; 
50-65 and 35-45 minutes on the average, for senior public managers, professional middle 
public managers and private service providing managers respectively. While access to 
background information such as minutes of meetings, documents reviewing the outcomes 
of outsourced projects, etc was highly anticipated, a great difficulty was experienced in 
achieving this, explaining the heavy reliance of this research on interview data. However 
there was opportunity for some form of observation, which helped make greater sense of 
the issues encountered by the various respondents. 
Content of interview schedule: There were two parts to interviews. The first part deals 
with issues such as reasons for outsourcing; who made outsourcing decisions; and 
whether the right people were involved in making such decisions. For the second part, 
questions cover pertinent issues and challenges respondents encountered in their 
experience of outsourcing and in working with other categories of managers; how these 
issues were dealt with and the coping strategies they employed as well as the lessons 
learnt in the process. In conducting the interviews, a discourse analytic approach was 
adopted, which means special attention was accorded non-verbal language in its various 
forms including facial expressions, unprecedented pauses, and instances where it 
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became obvious respondents felt uncomfortable or they were `treading a forbidden 
territory'. By `treading a forbidden territory', I mean a clear indication that the issues 
they were talking about were issues they considered too `heavy' or `sacred', which they 
felt uncomfortable talking about. Typical statements associated with such instances 
include, `could this be taken off record? ' I don't know', some of these things'... it's hard 
to talk about them. Each interview was audio taped using digital recording device while 
journal summary entries were made alongside (please see interview schedule in the 
Appendix section). 
4.5.2 Data Analysis 
Data oqanitiation: Interview data were audio-recorded digitally and compared with written 
fieldwork summaries. The use of digital files allowed for storing interview data on PCs, 
laptops, flash memory sticks as well as MP3 players, and even burnt onto data CD, which 
were carried along and played several times to ensure every important detail from the 
interviews were captured in the form of transcripts. That said any information considered 
irrelevant is excluded from being transcribed although not deleted from files. 
Data display and analy is Interview transcripts are organized into simple display matrices, 
which take several forms but based principally on themes that emerge from the interview 
transcripts. Such themes emerged freely from responses to questions rather than 
exogenously determined and imposed. Matrices were developed around research questions 
with the vertical axis recording detailed research questions and the horizontal axis, 
responses of manager to the questions. The responses were recorded in the appropriate 
grid, mapping research question to respondent. The data was organized on the basis of 
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cases, and management category, not research sites [which I have earlier explained has little 
relevance for our analysis]. In this sense tables and matrices comparing the two cases 
(Installation/Maintenance) from both sites (KATH and KBu) within the same 
management category were organize, which provided the basis for critical comparative 
analysis. This way, the Installation/Maintenance cases from both sites were compared with 
the cleaning cases from both sites within the same management category or level. Since 
senior managers were interviewed once, their responses covering their opinions, 
assessment and evaluation of outsourcing in general (both high-value and low-value skills 
area), their views. were analysed only once. Thus while for instance, middle managers' 
responses to Installation/Maintenance cases were analysed separately from their responses 
to cleaning cases senior managers' views were sought on outsourcing generally, not on any 
particular functional area. 
The framework employed in the analysis of data for this research is a combination of a 
number of theories including grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) (although not 
much use was made of coding), and the framework presented by Miles and Huberman, 
1994). In attempting to make sense of interactions some application of discourse analysis 
(Wetherell, Taylor, Yates, 2001) especially conversation analysis (Woofitt, 2001) and critical 
discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2001) was made. The application of discourse analytic 
framework was prompted by the need to make sense of responses which were largely less 
straightforward and indirect and require looking continuously at words, phrases and 
sentences. Specifically, the focus was on talk: how respondents understood themselves, 
how they construct and reconstruct themselves and their position in the organization in 
relation to others, and the significance of their chosen mode of reaction or coping 
strategies for the research questions addressed in this project. 
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The analysis also attempts an explanation of differences between one case 
[Installation/Maintenance] and another [Cleaning] on the basis of the basic beliefs 
underlying the selection of the cases. Insights gained from literature examining the 
interactions and relationships between managers and professionals in the public sector (see 
chapter three) have greatly informed the framework used for investigating and 
understanding the interactions occurring between and among the various categories of 
managers studied. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA ANALYSIS 
5.0. Introduction: Background to KATH and KBu 
As the nation's two largest teaching hospitals, KATH and KBu have played a crucial role as 
referral hospitals for a number of diseases and ailments and from a wide range of hospitals, 
clinics and health institutions. Both institutions were initially established to provide tertiary 
health care, provide facilities to educate and train health professionals, and to conduct 
research and champion specialist outreach services. The need to treat a wide range of 
terminal diseases made government invest heavily in both institutions especially in heavy 
hospital machinery and equipment. With over 1000-bed capacity and about 2,500 members 
of staff each, these tertiary health institutions serve the referral needs of the entire country, 
apart from normal out-patient and in-patient services. 
KATH is affiliated to Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology Medical 
School while KBu is affiliated to University of Ghana Medical School, and both are 
accredited for postgraduate training by the West African College of Surgeons in surgery, 
obstetrics and gynaecology, otorhinolaryingology, ophthalmology and radiology. At the 
heart of the mission statements of these institutions is the heightened need to form 
strategic collaborations with local and international partners for the provision of excellent, 
world-class clinical and non-clinical health service. Part of this strategic collaboration 
involves encouraging greater private participation by means of outsourcing or sub- 
contracting of both clinical and non-clinical functions to private firms. It is in line with this 
vision, aligned with the present political vision of making the private sector the engine of 
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the country's economic growth, that the installation and maintenance, and cleaning 
functions studied for this thesis have been outsourced. 
5.0.1 Governance and Autonomy Status 
Both institutions began under management of a relatively independent management board 
although still within the constraints of the Ministry of Health with subvention from the 
Ministry of Finance. The governance of the two Teaching Hospitals revolves around a 
nine-member Board, a full-time Chief Executive while the general management revolves 
around a tripartite management (Senior Management Board in charge of General 
Administration; Medical Administration, and Nursing Administration). The Board 
(topmost) consists of a Chairman and four persons appointed by the government, the 
Chief Executive of the hospital, the Dean of the Medical School, and a representative each 
of the Ministries of Health and Finance. The following gives the governance and 
management structure of the two institutions. KATH is presented as site A and KBu as site 
B, implying such numbering as Table 5.1A and 5.1B correspond to the first table for 
KATH and KBu respectively. 
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Table 5.0 Governing and Management Structure (KATH and KBu) 
Governing Board 
a Chief Executive 
Senior Management Board (General Administration) 
Medical Administration Nursing Administration 
11 
Departmental Heads Departmental Heads 
5.0.2 The process of decision making 
Decision making in these institutions occurs at three disparate levels: the governance level- 
involving the Governing Board and the Chief Executive; the general administration level- 
involving the Chief Executive and Senior Management Board; and on the medical/Clinical 
level involving the Chief Executive and the Medical and Nursing Managers, in line with the 
governance and management structure. Senior managers studied for these cases are located 
within the General Administration together with the Chief Executive, while professional 
middle managers are located within the ranks of Medical and Nursing Administration. 
Central management Board (CMB), as used in these cases is composed of Senior 
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Management Board together with the Heads of the various Departments under the Medical 
and Nursing Administrative Units. This means professional middle managers automatically 
belong to CMB. All professional middle managers (PMMs) are heads of departments 
(HODs). Regarding strategic issues and issues of general administration, senior 
management board (SMB) is the final authority; however, decisions on any issue relating to 
or with direct effect on medical and nursing practice must be referred to CMB. Normal 
operational decisions regarding the conduct of medical and nursing practice are the 
domains of heads of departments and the ranks of medical/nursing professionals. It is 
practically difficult to include CMB on Table 5.0 as membership runs across the various 
ranks and levels of management (i. e. it includes the Chief Executive, senior managers and 
middle managers). 
5.0.3 The administration of outsourcing contracts 
The contract procedure guideline stipulates that once a decision is reached to outsource a 
given function, a tender is prepared to allow potential service providers to bid on a 
competitive basis, all in line with the move to bring competition to the delivery of public 
services. If the function being outsourced is a high-value skill area in which senior 
managers feel they do not possess enough expertise in order to understand the 
technicalities the need for an external [hired] consultant with expertise in the area becomes 
imperative. In that case the consultant becomes a specialist technical advisor to senior 
management but also serves as a special supervisor in protecting the interest of the hospital 
in the administration of the contract. In such circumstances although professional middle 
managers (HODs) are supposed to be the supervisors over the service providing managers, 
advising senior management on what to do, they tend to lose this position to hired 
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consultants who are believed to know best (As I show later in the analysis, it is this which 
represents a fundamental conflict between senior managers, consultants and professional 
middle managers. 
5.0.4 Background to Installation and Maintenance Cases 
Like several other hospitals in the country, KBu & KATH were for years confronted with 
the challenge of machines and equipment lying redundant because they are either broken 
down and cannot be repaired or have been wrongly procured and installed. Underlying this 
challenge was a dearth of medical doctors and other experts required to handle such 
equipment, mainly due to the low public sector wages, which limited government's capacity 
to recruit, train, motivate and retain qualified health professionals. This challenge 
intensified following the deregulation of the health market in the 1980s, when a number of 
private players entered either providing health services or as suppliers of pharmaceutical 
products or medical equipment. By mid 1990s, public health institutions were already 
battling with shortage of health professionals including medical and paramedical staffs. 
These developments contributed to a further aggravation of the nation's health situation in 
the sense that the scarce national health resources were either being expended on acquiring 
wrong health or medical equipment that could neither be used or repaired in the event of 
breakdown due to lack of expert technicians. 
In 1996, the government decided to address this challenge by standardizing most 
equipment in many of the public hospitals and health facilities across the country and 
contracting their supply to private firms. Under the contract the firms were to take over the 
supply, installation and regular maintenance (preventive and corrective) of named 
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equipment. But KBu & KATH were presented with an additional package in which an 
agreement was reached with Philips Medical Systems, one of the contractor firms to 
regularly train their staffs in handling hospital equipment. With these arrangements, the 
potential for purchasing wrong medical equipment became appreciably minimal; if this 
should occur, the cost (burden) was transferred to the contractor firms. Also under the 
agreement both hospitals were required to present to the contractor firms a full list of 
equipment, and a list of potential medical engineers to be trained to handle them. Senior 
managers indicated there were separate contracts for each hospital although access could 
not be granted to these for the researcher. It is in this context that the two hospitals 
decided to outsource their Installation/Maintenance function to private service providing 
firms, including Philips Medical Systems, Hospital Engineering and Elesca Engineering. 
Depending on the degree of complexity in the task area outsourced, external consultants 
were hired to both advise the hospital and oversee the execution of the contracts by the 
contracted service providing firms. The focus of this research is investigating the challenges 
the outsourcing of this function presented to the professional middle managers who are 
heads of departments working under senior managers on the one hand, and with private 
service providing managers, on the other in both hospitals. 
It is in the context of all this that the questions posed in this research are investigated. 
Tables 5.1 below displays the responses of senior management to the research questions 
whilst Tables 5.2 displays responses from PMMs 
164 
Table 5.1 Responses of Senior Management 
Chief Executive 
Research 
question 
KATH R' Bu 
Why Cost/benefit -economic 
outsource? Core/non-core -political 
Affordabilitv -openness 
Capacity -fight 
Worker attitudes corruption 
-capacity 
-attitudes to 
work 
Who made Chief l xecutivc -CB 
outsourcing KATZ I -(, F , decisions management -MolI 
Department heads -funding 
source 
Who should Satisfied with -Hobs 
have made those involved -OK 
decision 
Director, Administration Procurement/Sup-Chain 
Manager 
KATH K' Bu KATH K Bu 
Cost -economic 
Government -political 
policy -openness 
Core/non-core -fight 
Capacity corruption 
Bad Work habits -capacity 
-cost-cutting 
Central -(: NIB 
management -CI. 
Ileads of -I IoDs 
department 
We've involved -OK 
the right people 
Assessing Cost savings -savings 
Improved 
outsourcing Rising costs -expertise services performance -Corrupt practices Saved costs Rising costs 
Ok/Good Corrupt 
Successful practices 
Autonomy of Semi-autonomous 
managers No financial 
autonomy 
Autonomy with 
accountability 
Issues and Rctrcnchmcnt 
challenges issues 
emerging Union revolts 
-cost rise 
-good 
-expertise 
-service 
quality 
Cost/economic -cost savings 
Core/non-core -political 
Affordability ( )penncss/ 
Capacity -fight 
Work habits corruption 
-opcnncss 
-capacity 
CI" -Procurement 
C NIB department 
IlOI)s -CI'. 
Procurement -(; NIB 
department 
Central 
management 
Procurement 
dept 
Departmental 
heads 
Increasing costs 
Quite Successful 
-Corrupt deals 
-wide choicc 
of service 
providers 
-cost savings 
-yes Semi Semi Only quite Autonomy 
-account- autonomous autonomous autonomous with 
Able No financial Largely Quite responsibiliry/ 
autonomy autonomous discretionary Accountability 
-labour issues Uncertainties of 
-contractual procurement 
- weak 11ODs Higher costs 
Labour issues 
Strategies Reorganise -streamline Opening up 
for dealing retrenched contracts tenders to 
with workers into -reorganised/ greater issues/chall 
company absorb laid off competition 
enges Dccouple staffs CTndergoing 
departments to -use procurement 
cost centres who consultants course 
take up 
outsourcing 
contracts 
Lessons Private practice: -I IODs need 
learnt, model for public play greater 
conclusions sector role 
Mindset change -corruption 
required consequence/ 
Financial cause of 
autonomy, a outsourcing 
necessary 
condition 
-contract corrupt -procedures/ 
issues practices in results conflict 
-labour issues contract- -contractual 
-procurement awarding Issues 
issues Unqualified 
contractors 
bidding for 
projects 
-retrain staffs Organising -streamline 
-increase procurement contracts 
competition course -lralancc 
-compensate Streamlining results with 
laid off staffs contracts to procedures 
-use avoid corrupt -usc 
consultants practices consultants 
Outsourcing has 
resulted in better 
worker attitudes 
Solved 
supervisory 
problems 
Corruption 
needs addressing 
-decisions to 
involve I IoDs 
-I loI)s need 
attitude/ 
mindset 
change for 
progress 
Corruption 
needs a second 
look 
Devolution to 
mid mgt 
problematic 
Procedures 
need following 
Outsourcing 
-cant fail 
-encourages 
transparency 
involve 
I 10D.,; in 
decision 
making 
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5.1 What issues do managers encounter? 
As explained in chapter four, this question is subdivided into issues relating: rationale for 
outsourcing; involvement in decision-making about outsourcing; and issues relating to the 
problematic nature of NPM and of the local context. I treat these in turn. 
5.1.1 Issues relating to rationale for outsourcing 
The analyses below are based on Table 5.1, which displays responses from each of the 
senior managers to the first set of research questions on issues relating to the rationale for 
outsourcing. The decision to outsource the Installation/Maintenance function was 
underlined by a number of factors, including cost and efficiency considerations; core or 
non-core considerations and general flexibility issues; ensuring openness, reducing 
corruption to restore public trust in the hospital; and addressing capacity needs. There were 
also political and ideological influences. The major rationale for outsourcing this function 
appears to be very much to address capacity related issues, which might of course lead to 
some cost savings, as it would help transfer some financial risk to the service provider. 
Therefore, while attaining cost-efficiency surely remains one of the benefits of outsourcing, 
this was not the central objective of outsourcing the Installation and Maintenance case: 
The reasons we outsourced a function like installation of medical systems to an external 
provider for example, is that equipment we simply didn't have the required number of 
experts. In addition, equipment were procured or installed wrongly by our own staff. 
Outsourcing these functions, we believed, would help us both to access the right experts, 
and also transfer the risk associated with buying wrong equipment or installing them 
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incorrectly, and the huge maintenance cost to the service provider, who are already experts, 
so they wouldn't have the problems we have (Chief Executive, KATH). 
This shortage of experts required to install and maintain medical equipment was further 
heightened by the general lack of spare parts of medical equipment in the country. 
Managers contended that prior to outsourcing this function, the hospitals were shopping 
around for spare parts; often ordering wrong parts, which were returned at extra costs. 
Thus the decision to integrate these three functions, previously handled separately by the 
procurement department (ordering the parts), engineering department (installing the parts), 
and maintenance department (maintaining broken down equipment) into a single function 
and outsource it was seen as providing a `one-stop-shop' solution for the hospitals' 
capacity-related problems. Consequently the local representatives of medical equipment 
dealers such as Philips Medical Systems, Elesca Engineering, and Hospital Engineering 
signed contracts with KBu for the supply, installation and regular maintenance of 
medical/hospital equipment. By transferring the task of assessing the appropriateness of 
equipment [before purchase] to the supplier who now bears the risk of returning 
inappropriate medical equipment for replacement, senior management believed this 
arrangement has saved the hospitals a substantial financial burden, besides freeing 
Engineering and Maintenance departments of enormous workload to allow them to 
concentrate on supervising the service managers. A senior manager's summary: 
Actually, it's a combination of factors. First of all, the current government is in favour of 
outsourcing; and their policy is to reduce the size of the government sector and allow 
private sector expansion. Basically the idea is to explore the possibility of outsourcing 
functions not core business. Although we anticipated some cost savings, the main rationale 
for outsourcing the Installation/Maintenance function was to furnish our hospital with 
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experts able to handle and maintain our complex machines effectively because we just 
didn't have the required number of experts we needed. Additionally, from our hospital's 
viewpoint the process of securing financial clearance to hire staff is cumbersome. There are 
also efficiency considerations because due to lack of effective supervisors there's often low 
output. We in management held this view, which we discussed with the departments... 
(Director, Administration, KATH) 
Some senior managers felt in the circumstances government saw outsourcing as the most 
convenient option to beef up capacity in these health institutions due to its (government's) 
inability to offer health professionals attractive remuneration packages to retain full time 
staffs: 
Unfortunately, due to unattractive public sector salaries, it's been hard to get the experts to 
work with us, and the government thinks outsourcing is the way out. Besides they think the 
responsibility for managing most employees should be taken off government's head, and 
this has been the general trend in most public organisations. But we could actually have 
decided to not outsource in spite of government's strong commitment. But we, as an 
institution found it helpful to outsource for several reasons including access to specialists 
we would have been unable to pay on a permanent basis (Chief Executive, KBu). 
To other senior managers the political drive for outsourcing is equally strong, tending I 
fact, to dominate all other considerations. Additionally, outsourcing in general was viewed 
as a means of increasing stakeholder participation in the provision of public services, a 
means of avoiding or minimizing corruption by increasing openness: 
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..... the central 
issue is to eradicate or at least minimise corruption in the system and bring 
some sanity and transparency in the management of public funds and state projects 
because if the client manages it alone there could be manipulations so employing 
consultants brings some sanity to the system (Procurement Manager, KBu). 
It is apparent from senior management viewpoint that the need to cut cost by strategically 
addressing the capacity challenge is a strong underlying factor of outsourcing. I would 
argue towards the end that one effect of this cost-motivated rationale for outsourcing is the 
intensification of cost control measures that has serious implications for the degree to 
which professional middle managers could exercise their discretionary power over a range 
of issues in the delivery of their duties. In the next section I turn to the analysis of 
professional management views. 
With respect to cleaning, senior management reckons that the major reason for 
outsourcing is to deal with bad worker habits. They argue that such bad attitudes to work 
called for continuous supervision from managers, which led to unnecessary waste of time 
on peripheral issues, diverted from their core activities. Outsourcing this function then was 
seen as a matter of convenience, rather than resulting from the need to beef up capacity, a 
point confirmed by PMMs later in the analysis. 
5.1.2 Issues relating to decision making 
Senior managers agree that Chief Executive and CMB make outsourcing decisions. My 
concern here is to examine whether and to what extent middle managers are involved in 
making such decisions which could be described as both strategic and operational to the 
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extent that they affect the practice of their profession. Responses to these questions seem 
contradictory at first sight when considered in line with the decision making process 
outlined on Table 5.0, where final decision-making authority rests with CMB to which 
both senior management and PMMs belong. For instance, as can be seen from Table 5.1 
in response to the question, `who makes outsourcing decision? ', senior managers mention 
CMB and HODs, while in Table 5.2 all PMMs agree outsourcing decisions are made by 
senior managers, thus suggesting a further ambiguity and contradictory. To address this 
ambiguity, I followed with another question: `who should have made outsourcing 
decision? ' response to . which displayed further apparent contradictions. Senior managers 
expressed satisfaction about those involved in making decisions, suggesting no further need 
for other persons' involvement. However some senior managers concluded that the active 
involvement of HODs in making outsourcing decisions would be more helpful: 
I think at the time, we involved the right people in the decision to outsource, and I can't 
think of anybody or group of persons we should have involved who we didn't. But having 
now completed a number of projects, ... and with the experiences from these projects,... if 
you ask me, I'd tell you it'd be wise to involve the heads of department because they're 
directly involved with implementing the decisions we make (Procurement Manager, KBu). 
In short, senior managers think PMMs were involved in decision-making although the 
latter do not think so. This constitutes a significant source of disagreement between senior 
and professional management. 
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5.1.3 Issues related to the nature of NPM and peculiarity of research context 
From Table 5.1 senior managers seem to be greatly concerned with issues relating to 
contracts, cost, ineffectiveness of HODs and labour/union challenges. To them, the 
expected cost savings could hardly be realized as the complexity of contractual agreements 
leaves ample room for exploitation and manipulation by contractors, necessitating further 
expenditure to mediate the relationship between the organization and the outsourcing 
contractors. Such costs come in the form of fees paid to contractors, training staffs on 
procurement, contracting and contract management. They expressed surprise at the 
elusiveness of the anticipated cost savings, which they partially blamed on the inefficiency 
of HODs. Senior managers expected middle managers to be effective in managing the 
organization's contractual relationship with the service providing organizations at the 
operational level, and expressed disappointment that this could not be realized. A few 
interview excerpts are provided below: 
We realized our cost curves began to rise, surprisingly after outsourcing.... Smart 
contractors were taking undue advantage to exploit us. Then we decided to take our 
procurement department through the outsourcing contract and procurement processes and 
procedures, and now we can see some positive signs but they are gradual, and even that 
came at an extra cost. One problem was also with HODs, who are supervisors of such 
projects; they have little business background so speaking the private man's language was 
tough for them. Some do not seem to care much what the contractors come to do and 
how they do it. This is one area we need some more work. We also had to deal with union 
issues because some job losses were involved, and all this involves costs! Therefore when 
you think you've saved cost here, you also realise you incur some cost here and there, you 
know (Chief Executive, KBu)? 
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Firstly, it appears cost has risen quite sharply especially during and shortly after the first 
few months of outsourcing. Outsourcing in general involves a number of related costs 
incurred through our ignorance of the outsourcing process, apart from that incurred on 
various consultants. Moreover, it's a complex procedure having to work with a private 
firm. So although we thought we had a strong case to save cost through outsourcing, this 
has either failed to materialize or it's been practically difficult to measure. Secondly, the 
challenge involved calling your staff and telling them, `I'm sorry but you have to go, when 
some of them have been working here all their working lives with all loyalty. That was one 
problem HR faced. But we had to do that; it was one of my worst working experiences and 
it was painful because you're entirely aware of the economic situation and the high rate of 
unemployment in the country... (Director Administration, KBu) 
5.2.0 Professional Middle Managers 
Responses from middle managers to the first research question are discussed under the 
three subheadings as in the case of senior managers. 
5.2.1 Issues relating to the rational for outsourcing 
As indicated by Table 5.2 below, there is some difference between views expressed by 
senior management and PMMs on rationales for outsourcing, a major difference being that 
unlike senior managers, more professional middle managers felt the decision to outsource 
has received a strong political impetus and motivation. Like senior managers, they saw the 
necessity of outsourcing some of the hospital functions not so much as a way of saving 
cost but as a form of survival strategy or a way of convenience. They share the concerns of 
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senior managers over the challenge of getting the right calibre of technical experts as well 
as spare parts for their medical equipment. The two categories of managers therefore 
converge over the need to outsource this function in a number of ways. While not debating 
the necessity to address the capacity challenge professional middle management contended 
that ideological/political reasons and reducing staff size had strong influence on the 
decision to outsource: 
Remember the government think they are fed up with employees' bad attitudes towards 
work. There is huge spending here yet our people don't do the work well; if you bring in 
the private man they don't give you headache. For medical experts and other hospital 
engineers we don't have many of them in house, and there's no way we're going to be able 
to pay them as full time employees. Moreover much of what they do is on ad hoc basis-not 
required all the time; so management believes they can call them when they need them, and 
save some money for other things as well (Technical Manager, KATH). 
Some professional managers argue that the necessity for outsourcing this function was 
rendered compellingly stronger by the need to pass the cost and inconvenience of training 
experts to procure, install and maintain medical equipment, as well as by the complexity of 
and rate of risk involved in current medical equipment in use: 
The more complex the equipment the more likely you are to engage the services of the 
supplier for the provision of the related technical service (preparation of site, installing 
equipment, maintaining equipment, etc). Again, the higher the risk level the more likely 
they are to be given out on contract. Moreover there's a very limited market for medical 
equipment in Ghana, so it's not viable for the supplier to train people to man technical 
equipment, so if you outsource it to these providers you're helping to sustain the market 
and keep the supplier in business as well. So there are numerous factors responsible for our 
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decision to outsource. About 99% of the technology we use here is produced abroad, and 
so without this arrangement, it'll be practically impossible to source and maintain our 
equipment (Biomedic Manager, KBu). 
It can be argued on the basis of the foregoing that a number of factors including the 
easiness of sourcing the equipment, the risk level of the equipment, the complexity of the 
technology involved; the size of the local market for the equipment, and the cost of 
training, motivating and retaining qualified staffs to man the equipment jointly influenced 
the decision to outsource. With few exceptions both levels of management have a 
reasonable degree of agreement over the necessity to outsource and the rationale for 
outsourcing. From interview analysis, the need to access technical expertise, rather than a 
desire to reform an inefficient workplace composed of unproductive and despondent staffs 
with negative work habits, becomes the strongest pointer to outsourcing decision this 
function. 
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5.2.2. Issues relating to decision making 
This question investigates those making outsourcing decision and is intended to help 
ascertain the extent of PPMs' involvement in making decisions about outsourcing a given 
function, and selecting service providing firms to take over that function. As discussed in 
chapter three autonomy and discretion to professionals is measured partly by the areas or 
issues over which they possess and exercise decision making power. Thus, understanding 
the extent of professional middle managers' involvement in outsourcing decision making, it 
is expected, would give an indication of their discretion and autonomy. 
Although professional middle managers (HODs) emphasized the importance of their 
involvement in decision making as perquisite for successful outsourcing projects, interview 
data suggests managers other than HODs actually make such decisions. According to the 
governance structure the final decision on outsourcing should lie with CMB, and this has 
indeed been the case, as all managers interviewed affirmed. Obviously since CMB 
comprises HODs one would expect that they are practically part of this decision. However 
there is little evidence to support this claim as HODs felt the Chief Executive, senior 
management and project sponsors remain the major determinants of outsourcing decisions. 
Thus while senior managers argued HODs have been part of decision by reason of their 
membership to the CMB, HODs implied while part of CMB, their active involvement in 
such decisions has been appreciably minimal, if at all. One HOD (PMM) expressed it: 
Central management thought they have the power so they made the decision to outsource 
and even went ahead to select which organisations get the contracts without seeking our 
opinion. However, HODs had to endorse it before it could be implemented. Ideally, 
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initiatives for such decisions should come from HODs who better understand the situation 
in their respective departments. They should have asked our views before making the 
decision but this was not the case (Technical Manager, KA). 
Compared to their responses to the previous question the responses to this question (who 
else should have been involved in making outsourcing decisions) clearly elucidate the 
struggles of professional middle management over their supposed domain of authority. 
Here, senior managers expressed satisfaction with those involved and did not see the need 
to bring in other players. Senior managers were aware that although part of CMB middle 
management have not been actively involved in decision making, and felt this is ok 
although some of them saw the need to involve professional middle managers. Some 
HODs (note middle management and HODs are used interchangeably) actually felt even 
the non-managerial doctors and nurses should have been included in making decisions for 
outsourcing as the service providers would be working directly under the former. Two 
middle managers expressed their views: 
I think the Head of Estates Department should have been part of this decision because the 
project is happening in our department but I'm sad to say, this has not been the case. How 
can you go seeking the views of consultants on decisions we could have made with ease 
and at no financial cost (Biomedic Manager, KATH)? 
HODs felt they should have been involved in making outsourcing decisions. The lack of 
professional middle managers' involvement in active decision making raises a fundamental 
question: are middle managers active members of the decision making body (CMB), or do 
they make active input to CMB in the process of making decisions about outsourcing? It is 
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obvious the answer is in the negative. But the subject of involvement in decision making 
still remains a central issue of concern to middle managers as expressed below 
In my opinion, HODs, and even the doctors and nurses who make use of the facilities to 
serve patients should have been involved in deciding on whether or not to outsource... but 
this has never been the case. . . anyway! 
That's what I think. -I've always advocated that 
heads of the affected departments be part of the team that awards contract... What makes it 
complex is that although you (HOD) are not part of the decision to outsource or on who 
provides what services, you're required to be dealing with the contractor when they start 
the execution of the projects. This brings a number of problems (Estate manager, K'Bu). 
Some suppliers do not have the capacity to train.... This is one source of conflict between 
us and those who make decisions on who to supply given medical equipment. If we're 
brought into the process we are able to assess and advice on which organizations are 
competent to train and which are not, but we are often left out of this process. This has 
resulted in certain equipment just lying idle because there are no experts to handle them 
and the supplier does not have the capacity to train our staffs to handle them (Biomedic 
Manager, KBu). 
The analysis suggests one reason HODs are included in CMB might be to obtain legitimacy 
for CMB decisions; which could indeed be senior management decisions. In that sense it 
could be understood as a form of organizational involvement strategy with the objective to 
secure middle management support for and commitment to decisions. Essentially the 
subject of who gets involved in making decisions on outsourcing is one of considerable 
concern to middle managers who by virtue of their boundary-spanning roles, are required 
to serve as supervisors over external service contractors. It is apparent from the analysis 
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that while middle managers are represented on CMB, the final authority in making 
decisions about strategic organisational issues their input to the decision making process is 
only minimal if at all, and limited to ratifying rather than making actual decisions. Given 
this, one can possibly speculate that HODs' inclusion in CMB is as a strategy of cosmetic 
inclusiveness or participation by senior management sought to gain legitimacy for and 
commitment to their decisions. 
The apparent senior management domination in decisions regarding outsourcing could give 
an indication of the extent to which outsourcing the function in question is viewed as a 
strategic or operational issue. It might be that senior management view this as strategic 
while PMMs view it as operational. On these assumptions, senior management would be 
acting in good faith by saying `we have involved the right people' (Table 5.1) [because 
these are strategic decisions, and we have just involved the right people], and PMMs might 
be right by insisting that `even HODs and doctors should be involved' [because these 
decisions, though considered strategic, do have a serious impact on our day-to-day 
practice]. Thus it is possible that the degree to which the task or functional area is 
considered a strategic could have effect on who gets involved in making decisions to 
outsource it. There are also exogenous factors such as government policy and source of 
funding that influence outsourcing decision. 
5.2.3 Issues related to the nature of NPM and peculiarity of research context 
The main objective of this section is to investigate how the conflicts between managerial 
values and professional values identified in chapter three are playing out in relationships 
between senior managers and professional middle managers (PMM) in these cases. 
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In response to the question of issues they encountered, middle managers (HODs) indicated 
these relate to their level of autonomy and discretion, and it appears this relates to the 
extent of their involvement in taking decision on both strategic, and to some extent, 
operational issues. There is a perceived restriction on their degree of autonomy over 
decision on whether or not to outsource a function, and over contractors to be awarded 
such contracts. They felt senior management ignored their viewpoints and by-passed them 
in making crucial decisions, which might require the active participation of the latter. 
It is difficult to persuade senior management to seek our view before engaging in 
outsourcing projects. We supervise the execution of the projects so we need to be involved 
in planning the projects, designing the contracts and suggesting prospective service 
providers; we have been working with them and know those who work well. They need to 
look for people with good track record to execute the project, and we know these people. 
Nobody is saying don't outsource; what we are saying is that `involve us in the decision 
because at the end of the day we are going to be responsible for the supervision of the 
execution (Maintenance Manager, KBu). 
Not only did middle managers feel left out in strategic decisions; they felt their 
professional space has been overly taken up by administrators, who attempt to usurp their 
decision even on their (middle managers') day-to-day (operational) activities. As interview 
data suggests because senior managers and administrators lack the requisite professional 
knowledge which can be acquired only through continuous practice, they resort to 
excessive use of consultants at extra cost to the organization. Some of these issues 
identified about which middle managers are concerned relate to restrictions on their 
professional autonomy and discretion including not being actively involved in making 
crucial decisions; continuous conflicts between pursuing cost-efficiency strategies and 
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ensuring quality; conflicts between emphasis on procedures and results; and their restricted 
access to the organization's resources. The interview transcripts suggest middle managers 
are concerned that their views on new initiatives are either not sought or ignored 
altogether; they are denied the free hands necessary to make simple decisions regarding the 
way they do their work; and they lack the level of financial autonomy which they require to 
perform effectively in their roles especially in emergency situations. The following quotes 
represent PMMs' portrayal of senior managers: 
They don. 't listen; when you listen you act. They ask you to bring your grievances, you write 
a beautiful report; they file it and you don't hear anything again. So you sit down and watch 
them perform! The boss is always right but when you hold back your expertise and 
something gets wrong then they later find out they are wrong but wouldn't accept they are 
wrong because they can't be wrong. We belong to the same professional associations as 
some of the consultants they contract to tell them what we have always told them; so you 
ask, do they just want the advice from the consultants or there is a hidden agenda 
somewhere. I've tried to persuade them that some maintenance work must not be 
outsourced 'cos' there's no point for it but they go ahead and outsource them (Maintenance 
Manager, KBu). 
But the central issue is that we want to be left alone to work as professionals and be held 
accountable for the outcome of our decision. Often the main cause of conflicts is the 
difference in knowledge between service managers and service providers. Institutional 
practice is technology; those who do not practice at this level lack that technology, yet they 
wish to dictate what should be done at the hospitals at any given time. How can you 
effectively manage something you have been out of touch with for a long time? When it 
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happens that way, they tend to engage a number of consultants, which all increase the costs 
they think they are trying to save (Biomedic Engineering Engineer, KBu)? 
Professional middle managers resent this usurping of their position by senior managers and 
consultants on issues requiring technical and professional knowledge and experience. This 
is mainly because apart from the extra cost, the indiscriminate use of consultants also leads 
to inappropriate decisions being taken. Another issue of concern for PMMs relates to 
senior managers' undue interference. There are two possible explanations for this. The first 
is a possible corrosion in trust in middle managers' integrity and capacity to do things 
rightly and effectively. The second is a possible financial benefit or a form of rent-seeking 
attached to contracts for which there is a craving. Such views are expressed: 
They (senior managers) always want to identify themselves with whatever is going on but 
they don't need to; well give them a report eventually. So the professional element (failing 
to leave the professionals with little interference) has always been the central issue. As 
biomedical engineers we base our assessment of the choice of equipment on the type of 
service we render, not simply because you (hospital administration) have brought us a list 
of equipment you think might be good for us. It' not as if we don't know what to do or 
someone would just get up and do what they want; the type and level of service we're 
required to provide are clearly specified. So I don't see why they fail to leave us to operate 
as professionals (Biomedic Engineering Engineer, K'Bu). 
There are several health centres across the country, which lack facilities and expertise 
simply because the decision to cite them was made without the health professionals. 
Sometimes, they bring their own consultants simply because they always want to benefit 
from the project. They're probably afraid that if the professionals were allowed to manage 
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these projects, the money would go to them. One of the biggest problems we have now is 
the distinction between service provision and policy formulation. MoH is charged with 
responsibility for policy formulation while the GHS and agencies are for service provision. 
The policy makers can't effectively determine where a specific health facility should be 
located (Estate Manager, KBu, emphasis, mine). 
Certain conflicts within the reform agenda also became evident in the sense that the senior 
managers' increased emphasis on cost cutting strategies meant that quality had to be 
sacrificed for low costs. There was also considerable confusion over whether to focus on 
procedures or outputs or both. It appears that while senior management had a result- 
oriented outlook, their mistrust in middle managers made them tend to focus 
disproportionately on procedures as they attempted to be part of nearly every procedure 
middle managers go through. Thus senior management were found increasing control from 
the centre rather than granting PMMs discretionary decision making power regarding the 
day-to-day practice of their profession: 
They're only concerned with cutting costs, and have forgotten our basic objective is to 
provide quality health system that the public can trust. Now you can't see the difference 
between this hospital and other private hospitals. There's also `confusion over results and 
procedures'. When they introduced the new changes, we're told to focus on set targets. But 
people began to do things their own way ... so management 
decided to intensify regulatory 
procedures. Now too many procedures, that lead to delays; management wouldn't leave us 
alone to practice as professionals,... controls everywhere... you're treated like a shop-floor 
worker... somebody decides what you should and specify how you should do it every, step 
along the way... but we're believed to be professionals! (Maintenance Manager, KATH). 
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5.3 Coping strategies employed by manag 
In this section I investigate the various ways the managers studied responded to their 
encountered challenges by answering the question: what coping devices do managers 
employ in responding to the issues they encountered? In responding to these issues middle 
management employed a number of strategies, which were generally indirect rather than 
confrontational, and occur at the micro rather than macro level of the organization. These 
include offering suggestions, (i) insisting that the right thing (from middle managers' 
perspective) be done; (ii) pointing out shortfalls or weaknesses in case of project failures, 
(1) doing as told; and (iv) not bending rules. While few managers responded to the issues 
by employing conventional resistance strategies such as direct verbal confrontation; 
offering suggestions; and pointing out mistakes to senior managers, others resort to 
indirect strategies of withdrawal and disengagement with senior management, choosing 
instead to concentrate on their profession. Yet still others decided to take active part in 
reforms and are able to both influence the reforms and draw attention to the inherent 
weaknesses in the design of reforms. The quote below exemplifies professionals' intelligent 
withdrawal: 
The fact is that whether I'm involved in this or that project is actually immaterial because it 
does not affect how much I get paid, so why struggle over something which would end up 
making enemies for you when it wouldn't benefit you personally? I just come, do my work, 
and go... I'll rather concentrate on my profession (Technical Manager, K'Bu) 
In the quote below the manager refused to use his initiative in responding to an emergency 
situation, by holding back his expertise as a way of expressing his displeasure at being 
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denied access to resources to which outsourced service providing managers have 
unrestricted access. He, by this sought to employ the unresolved problem to draw 
attention, if indirectly, to the flaws in senior management's management style. He then 
repositions himself in the organization as `someone with power by reason of his 
knowledge', which he withheld: 
I have no control over decisions or resources. At a time, there was a problem; there was 
work going on at the theatre at a weekend; we ran out of oxygen; you called the private 
man, he wasn't there.. . and what 
I'm not supposed to touch, I wouldn't touch, and 
whoever was supposed to touch wasn't around, so the work wasn't done.. (Biomedic 
Engineering Manager, KATH). 
In the following quote, the professional middle manager negotiates his position in the 
organization, positioning himself as both a fund-managing head of department and a 
medical professional, but quickly and clearly draws the border line when his managerial 
requirements come counter to his professional role and standards. For this manager, the 
pressure from senior management to work with a tight budget conflicts with his 
commitment to patient welfare. In the circumstances he allows his professional 
commitment to overrule his managerial objective. He is thus able to create a greater space 
for himself (as a professional whose foremost loyalty is to his profession) outside of that 
created by senior management (a budget holding head of department who must comply 
with rules). 
This is the only area where we sometimes clash. I have been trained first and foremost as a 
medical expert to help save lives. When my technicians bring requests, I know those that 
are realistic. The fact that I'm trying to manage my funds does not mean I should sacrifice 
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quality for low cost and compromise my professional standards. We need to save cost but 
not at the expense of lives. My first responsibility is to the sick people. I see this work as 
my personal ministry and I'm not going to `shut up' so that someone who wants to make 
money does their own thing (Technical Manager, KATH). 
Several other strategies are used. The first is what I describe as spectating or watching them act, 
exemplified by the quote below: 
They ask you to bring your grievances, you write a beautiful report; they file it and you 
don't hear anything again. So you sit down and watch them perform!..... We belong to the 
same professional associations as the consultants they contract to tell them what we have 
always told them for free; so you ask, do they just want the advice from the consultants or 
there is a hidden agenda somewhere (Estate Manager, KATH). 
Other strategies include simply keeping quiet or avoiding talking, and waiting until things 
get out of control: 
I used to go to senior management frequently with grievances and suggestions for 
improvement but noted they were simply ignoring my viewpoints.... so I decided to be 
quiet. I do just what I'm allowed to do. They've defined for me what to do, and I'm going 
to ensure I do just that and very well too. As a professional no one should dictate to me what 
I should do and how I should go about my work but that's exactly what they've managed 
to do most of us.... If something goes wrong, you don't blame me, you blame the rules 
you've put in place (Maintenance Manager, KATH) 
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Yet another strategy is that professional middle managers decide to go by the rules instead 
of debating or contending them. By this strategy they able to draw attention to 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the system of rules 
They tell you, you can't do this or that, so you do what you're told to do, say what you're 
allowed to say. . . just ensure you 
don't bend the rules because that's the way they want you 
to behave. I just make sure I do the work the way they want me to do it. Yes, because 
when there's a problem you don't get the blame but those who make the law (Biomedical 
Engineering Manager, KATH). 
As I've said although we're not been involved in the planning we're required to supervise 
their execution, and if things go wrong they think we fail to supervise properly. But how 
can you blame me when you don't allow me to use my discretion in making simple 
decisions about how I do my work? I'll do what you've allowed me to do and cannot be 
blamed for failure (Estate Manager, KBu) 
Some other PMMs decided to cooperate with senior management to ensure the system 
runs smoothly in the interest of their profession, and people's lives. They explain although 
they're disappointed with senior management's behaviour, they're still committed to their 
profession, which they would not trade for anything because that'd place the health of 
people at great risk. 
... oh, 
it's been rough! But often, you simply need to cooperate because you know 
the likely results ... after all, it's about people's lives; it's about our profession. I 
mean it's hurting and frustrating when someone who thinks by virtue of their 
positions they know better than you, decide to tell you how you should do your 
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work but because its' about lives I'm careful what I do... (Biomedical Engineering 
manager, KATH). 
Therefore the object of PMMs' their adopted strategies, it appears, is to demonstrate that 
the organisation would struggle to reach its goals without them. For instance, doing as 
told', far from being a display of passive compliance with company procedures, has an 
intent of drawing attention to the power that professional middle managers' possess in the 
organisation. By this tool professional middle managers hope to reassert their importance 
rather than succumb to managerial pressures. Although this might be an unintended 
consequence, such strategies could be conceptualised as sabotage against the attainment of 
organisational goals. In this case relationships between professionals and managers have 
been seen as characterised by conflicts. In all this, one message from professionals to 
senior managers becomes apparent: we have knowledge and experience, which if properly 
harnessed rather than ignored, could save the organisation millions in funds; however, 
when ignored, the outcomes can be devastating! The following quotes illustrate this. 
As I said, the contracts are designed and awarded without me but when they run into 
problems, I'm the first person to contact. I used to be very concerned but I came to see 
that the fact that they contact me means they know I cannot be ignored at all times. 
Initially I thought I wasn't competent but when they started complaining to me whenever 
things went wrong I realized it was not because I was not competent. Now I see that no 
matter what, they will come to me when there are problems (Estate Manager, KBu). 
At first I used to be bitter, which was affecting my attitude to work. You know, I believe in 
doing things right. But it came to a point and I decided I wasn't going to allow this to get 
over me; I wouldn't allow the pressures from my job to disturb my attitude to my 
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profession. So I decided to be quiet. I do just enough of what I'm allowed to do... and wait 
for those thought qualified to make decisions about my work (Technical Manager, KBu) 
5.4 Cleaning Cases: Background 
5.5. What issues do managers encounter? 
In this section, the procedure followed in analysing the Installation/Maintenance cases is 
followed except that the views of senior managers are not included here, as already 
explained. I now turn to the first major research question. 
5.5.1 Issues relating to rationale for outsourcing 
From the perspectives of both senior managers (SMs) and PMMs economic factors of 
cutting cost, consideration of what function is considered core or non-core, and the need 
to address negative worker attitudes emerge as the most common of the many rationales 
for outsourcing. All management categories generally agreed that the cleaning function is 
not core to the central role of providing healthcare to the nation, and hence the possibility 
to outsource this function. Senior managers and PMMs agreed that outsourcing the 
cleaning function was necessitated by the need to address negative work habits rather than 
capacity shortage. It was generally agreed that political pressure not only influenced but 
also created the space within which the decision to outsource cleaning was circumscribed. 
Only few managers felt the decision to outsource cleaning was one of fashion. From the 
perspective of senior managers there are multiple rationales for outsourcing, which include 
the transfer of risks to the outsourcing providing organisations. Such risks involve 
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responsibilities and demands of maintaining full time permanent staffs [sick leave/sick pay, 
maternity leave and holiday pays]. Other rationales include transferring to the external 
service providers, responsibility for both the supply of some fixed assets such as cleaning 
gadgets, and managing permanent staffs including dealing with negative and poor worker 
attitudes. 
The entire Environmental Sanitation Department-the central body that oversees the 
cleaning function-was reconstituted into a skeletal staff made up of few managers, 
supervisors and staffs maintained. Two private companies were then contracted to take 
responsibility for cleaning some departments including the Polytechnic and the Out- 
Patients Department of the main hospital. 
As in other instances, managers and workers from the private cleaning companies while 
not hospital employees are monitored by the respective HODs. In principle, HODs are 
empowered to refuse endorsement of payment to any service company whose quality of 
work they judge to fall short of hospitals' required standards. Their role also include 
ensuring the availability of cleaning disposables which the service providers require as well 
as dealing with issues requiring urgent attention in ensuring the smooth operation of the 
hospitals. The major aim among others is to free the respective heads of department from 
daily routine supervision of their permanent staff, which some respondents claimed was a 
drain on their time and prevented them from focusing on their core responsibilities. 
Table 5.3 below presents a summary of responses from PMMs to all the questions posed. 
There is considerable agreement between and among the various managers interviewed that 
cost considerations and poor worker attitudes are among the major reasons for outsourcing 
cleaning. For senior management who consider cleaning as non-core function that can be 
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handled by external service providers, core or non-core considerations were paramount to 
outsourcing decision. PMMs and service managers' views converge over the fact that 
outsourcing decisions are largely influenced by the economics of flexibility as a normative 
form of management and HR practice in the public sector. Overall, the desire to cut costs 
together with what I call the move to `rationalise an inherently large, unproductive 
permanent workforce' stands tall among the rationales for outsourcing 
There's an attitudinal problem facing government work-... Take our catering department for 
example. For a whole year they were running at a loss, so at a point I decided to outsource 
it. Immediately we said we wanted to outsource, that month, we started making profits. But 
we said we were bent on outsourcing it so we advertised it and got it outsourced. The same 
management took it up but has been making profits since (Chief Executive, KBu)? 
Relieving our hospital of the intricacies of keeping a permanent staff: sick leaves, maternity 
leave, holiday pays, etc was one reason we outsourced; there's savings to benefit from! 
Another reason was the quality of work. Sometimes cost might not be the main issue but if 
outsourcing help improve quality of work, and ensures the work is done on time, and 
according to specifications, why not go in for it (Director of Administration, KATH) 
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The possibility of using outsourcing as a strategy for addressing the attitudinal problem 
among public workers was clearly iterated by a senior manager below: 
Outsourcing of health support services has become necessary due to the poor working 
habits in Ghana especially in the public sector. In the civil service, it's a taboo to fire an 
employee..., it's difficult and expensive to hire and fire. We've inherited a huge mass of 
incompetent staff and we simply can't do much with or about them. For instance when our 
former employees-redeployed to private contractors-come back to work here on 
contractual basis their attitude was entirely different to when they were working here as 
permanent employees (Chief Executive, KATH) 
Supporting the same view some PMMs conceded that it is through outsourcing that 
Ghanaian public workers would have appreciation for the concept of contract, especially 
the employment contract: 
People's attitude towards government in Ghana is wrong therefore bringing in the private 
sector saves government some money; people can only earn their wages. I seriously believe 
outsourcing would bring a legal face to the working and employment relationship so that 
the workers don't simply lazy about when they should be working because for the private 
person, `no work, no pay' (Estate Manager, KATH). 
You know they (workers in private organisations) are not like our own staffs, who report 
late for work, sit down, chat, calculate lotto, and close before it's time yet expect full pay at 
the end of the month. They know if they don't work, and properly too, they wont get full 
pay. The difference is clear. What amazes me is the sudden change in attitude of our own 
staffs joining such organizations. They work even if they are not being supervised 
(Environmental Sanitation Manager, KBu). 
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But there are many other reasons why cleaning was outsourced as the quote below by a 
senior manager suggests: 
We made the decision to outsource because we looked at the cost/benefit analysis as well 
as what is core and non-core to us. We noticed we would save costs by outsourcing some 
functions. The other question is `is it our core business? If it's not our core business, can 
somebody do it better and cheaper? Then we looked at all the numerous problems we have 
faced. So we looked at quality of work, and also the affordability of the service and 
availability of the expertise (Procurement Manager, KATH) 
Another manager feels outsourcing takes a load of unnecessary responsibilities including 
supervision off their head in order to concentrate on their core duties: 
You take a lot load off your head; you then have time to concentrate on the major core 
issues. For instance we no longer spend our working day supervising; we concentrate on 
our core role. Peripheral activities have been taken away leaving us to do the most 
important things. Outsourcing has come to stay (Environmental Sanitation Manager, 
KBu). 
In summary, with few exceptions, cleaning was outsourced because: it was expected to save 
costs; improve employee attitudes; bring legal and contract face to public employment; take 
unnecessary load off hospital staffs and help focus on core duties; and serves as a form of 
rationalisation to ensure numerical flexibility. 
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5.5.2 Issues relating to organisational decision making 
Data from Table 5.3 above suggests that middle managers attach great importance to 
organizational decision-making and wish to be active part of the process. I have said active 
part because while middle managers are, by virtue of their membership in CMB, part of 
decision-making, they are in practice not. However, compared to the 
Installation/Maintenance case, there are fewer instances of disagreement discontentment 
among PMMs with respect to their level of involvement in decision making as Table 5.3 
above suggests. For instance none of the Poly Managers in either hospital has any issues 
with respect to their decision making autonomy; on the contrary, they implied they possess 
a reasonable degree of decision making autonomy and discretion. While Nurse' Managers 
in both hospitals confirmed that most decisions were made by senior management, the 
former neither felt their professional domains were being beset by senior managers, who 
they thought was better placed to make decisions. Compared to the 
Installation/Maintenance case, there seems to be less disagreement between senior and 
professional management in the cleaning case. 
5.5.3 Issues related to the nature of NPM and peculiarity of research context 
Interviewees expressed disappointing views on the new form of managerial governance and 
the challenges this presents to them especially to the extent that it defines the practice of 
their professional and their day-to-day activities. Compared to professionals from the 
Installation/Maintenance case however, PMMs seem to have fewer issues with regards to 
the restrictions on their discretion over decisions regarding their work. There is at least one 
way in which this apparently relatively reduced level of senior management control over 
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PMMs could be interpreted. It might mean that since the tasks being managed by cleaning 
managers are not those that require high-values skills to perform, one could argue, on the 
basis of Crozier's expert power theory (chapter three), that their area of task does not 
constitute an explicit domain of expert power. Hence, it is unlikely there would develop 
from, or be deployed by senior managers, another form of (restrictive or monitoring) 
power to curtail PMMs' power. Themes used in this analysis emerged entirely from a 
critical examination of these viewpoints although jargons from management literature were 
used to ground them. I also listened to the views of both senior management and private 
service providers. The analysis based on the display on Tables 5.3. For senior managers 
cost-related and contract-related issues seem to be their major preoccupation as manifested 
in the two quotes below: 
There were procurement irregularities, and we had to go through the full procurement 
course because some defects were being detected in the contracting and procurement 
process. There were also some issues relating to costs. We had to advertise the jobs so 
there was some cost. The cost of the service, it appears that it's now higher than when it 
was being done in-house. So initially, it was costly... but we hope in the long run to save 
some costs (Chief Executive, KATH). 
For now, not much apart from the fact that some contracts tend to be very complex and 
provide the ground for people indulging in unacceptable, corrupt practices, which 
eventually shoots costs up (Procurement Manager, KATH). 
Other issues over which middle managers expressed concern include the conflicts over 
focusing on: procedures or results; costs and quality; and the centralization of control 
rather than decentralizing control to devolve greater powers to middle management as 
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senior managers draw towards greater degrees of centralization as became apparent from 
the following quote from a senior manager: 
It makes the officers more accountable and it tries to reduce the use of discretion, which 
has been so dominant in the past system. People decide when to do what and by what 
method it should be done. This old system doesn't make the public confident in you (the 
public manager) in using their resources. The question is how judicious are you putting the 
taxpayer's money to use (Procurement Manager, KBu)? 
This senior manager's perception of accountability is that it is achieved through reduced 
discretion to PMMs. In this case his interference in the work of the PMMs might not be 
interpreted as necessarily desiring to control them. 
PMMs on the other hand argue that the process of financial decentralization has been far 
from adequate as senior managers intensify their control over them and tighten rather than 
loosen financial procedures as would be required for being innovative and making quick 
decisions. Others felt the undue emphasis on procedures rather than results does not make 
for effective attainment of results. One middle manager expressed his view below: 
Our biggest headache is that the decentralisation process hasn't been complete; no 
financial decentralisation, resulting in long processing of payment. Still long bureaucratic 
trends-all these are thought to reduce corruption but then unfortunately they tend to 
increase corruption instead. Cutting down bureaucratic trends would tend to reduce the 
cost of contracts and consultants' fees (Environmental Sanitation Manager, KBu). 
Another issue of concern relates to the restrictions, limitations and constraints introduced 
by the new managerial governance arrangements which have serious ramifications for their 
discretion over certain decisions not only as professionals but also as managers. For 
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instance, PMMs said they are often in conflicts with senior management over the issue of 
costs. A classic case relates to the fact that senior management tend to determine the 
maximum quantity of cleaning consumables, which should be used in a day. However, 
PMMs claimed although working with daily quotas could be useful, these could be hardly 
enforced as `cleaning is done on demand' in the sense that messes are cleaned as and when 
they are made, not whether or not there are sufficient cleaning materials or detergents 
because it affects on the health of patients. One PMM remarked thus: 
It's frustrating to know the right thing but realise your capacity to do it is being reduced 
because someone who controls the funds is now telling how you should do your work. 
These private people don't come with their own detergents and cleaning materials; we buy 
what they use apart from the cleaning gadgets because we found that's much cheaper. But 
they (senior management) always want to determine how much of what these service 
providers should use for cleaning; there's no point because we're here to do that. Then 
when an area is left unclean, you take the blame because it's is happening under your area 
(Environmental Sanitation Manager, KBu). 
Although it might not be intentional of senior management to interfere with PMMs in the 
delivery of their duties, it appears the former's drive to save cost has often meant that all 
other considerations, including the perspectives of PMMs have got to be subordinated 
under the cost considerations as expressed below: 
The source of conflict has been between management and the professional experts (HoDs) 
because senior management has always gone for the lowest bidder irrespective of their 
quality, which often creates a problem. Sometimes a contractor would be so desperate for 
contracts and would quote low figures just to win the contract. Often they abandon the 
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project in the middle or do shoddy work due to insufficient funds because under-quoted. 
Management and administrators are always aiming at minimising cost at any rate, not 
examining the possible effects of that on project quality (Estate Manager, KATH). 
As another manager replied: 
There's too much emphasis on cost; that is cost in immediate terms. In that case there's ... 
I 
don't think I'm independent in taking decisions. They measure success purely in terms of 
cost; if they've been able to beat down cost then they've achieved their goal. The cost is 
central to most decisions (Estate Manager, KBu). 
Often they don't seek our views on things we think we have experience in doing, and this 
has been very costly to us but I don't think they always realise it. For instance, recently, 
they decided to outsource the cleaning of a given department and I only got to know of it 
through an informal source, and raised an objection but this couldn't go far and it was 
outsourced. But now there are problems because it has been complained vital confidential 
information is being tampered with. Now they are seeking my opinion on how to handle it 
(Estate Manager, KBu) 
But not all PMMs necessarily feel new governance arrangements at the managerial level 
present challenges to their operational effectiveness. The Poly Manager's observation 
below suggests that he has been instrumental in deciding on which areas in his department 
need to be outsourced: 
I suggested the idea but of course senior management had to decide whether it was viable, 
but I think I was instrumental in making such a decision. But then something went wrong. 
They didn't seek my views when they were going to decide which organizations to 
contract. You know, initially they literally handpicked the companies but then they began 
to realize service quality was deteriorating and so they decided to allow other companies to 
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bid for the tenders, which brought some competition and improved quality, and in the 
process they sought my opinion, which was really good (Poly Manager, KATH) 
The nurses' manager may be described as having obviously few, if any issues with senior 
management. However, making an objective assessment of her opinion is inhibited by the 
fact she remained or perhaps appeared quite reserved and appreciably withdrawn 
throughout the interview session. Again the fact of her gender (female-the only female 
interviewed) (with some exceptions the majority of Ghanaian women office holders do 
well to steer clear of organisational politics) compounded the issue. But laying all these 
contextual factors aside, in her view, senior management have got the power and mandate 
to take decision they consider prudent in the interest of the hospital, and so she has no 
reservations about this: 
I think central management have the power so they made the decision but the heads of 
department had to accept it before it could be implemented. It would have been beautiful 
to ask of our opinion before making the decision though because ideally, initiatives for 
such decisions should come from the heads of department. But at the end of the day, they 
better understand the situation and the needs of the hospital, and I don't think I have a 
problem with that (Nurses' Manager, KATH). 
With regard to service providing managers two major issues seemed to have exercised 
them: the apparent lack of entrepreneurship of PMMs reflected in their slow, non- 
business-like approach to their work, which run counter to the kind of orientation they 
(service providing managers) have to their work. For instance, asked what challenges they 
had experienced, one service manager replied: 
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They do seem to know exactly what to do but they don't seem to have the free hands they require, 
and they often appear rather slow. I mean we all know it's a public sector institution but I think 
things are changing all over now (Manager, City Janitorial, KATH). 
A similar view was expressed: 
Oh yes! The only thing, maybe it's really not a big issue, is that sometimes PMMs appear a 
bit slow as if they're not sure of the answers or about what to do... For instance, in my 
company, once you're a supervisor or manager you can do so many things and don't always 
need to consult. I think managers are there to solve problems, you know? What they do 
affect our work and our profitability (Manager, Bontu KBu). 
In the following section, we turn to the last important question, which seeks to understand 
and conceptualise how managers, especially PMMs cope with, respond to or deal with the 
identified issues above. 
5.6 Coping strategies and resistance techniques 
From interview data and my critical personal observation a range of strategies that 
managers employ to responding to the issue have been identified. Although the main focus 
is on middle managers the responses of senior managers are important as this creates the 
space for comparison. Senior management strategies are almost exclusively aimed at 
improving the financial position of the organisation and include increasing competition for 
contracts, streamlining contracts for greater clarity, and retraining staffs to be more 
effective in negotiating contracts and procurement deals. Following is an excerpt from an 
interview with a senior manager: 
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We have basically redefined responsibilities and liabilities to both the outsourcing providers 
and KATH. Again we ensure our contracts specify who qualifies for what: in short a lot of 
streamlining of the contracts has occurred and I think although this seems to increase the 
processes and procedures across departments it has helped reduce the possibility for 
opportunistic behaviours by some of staffs who are looking for loopholes in the contracts 
or procurement procedures for profiteering at the expense of the hospital (Chief 
Executive, KATH). 
Another senior manager remarked: 
We had to go through the full procurement course because some defects were being 
detected in the contracting and procurement process (Director of Admin, KATH). 
Within professional middle management direct engagement is a less preferred strategy; 
indirect and less straightforward strategies that avoid direct confrontation with senior 
management seemed to have found greater acceptance for a number of reasons, which I 
examine under the discussions chapter. For instance all middle managers employed at least 
one form of strategy that can be described as withdrawal. Only one middle manager 
accepted making suggestions to senior management; all others employed methods other 
than direct confrontation in registering their disapproval of new managerial governance 
arrangements. Others employed strategies that at first sight could be described as 
consenting to their own control although upon further scrutiny these can be seen as tools 
by which they sought to reassert their power in the organization. Thus by a means which 
looks like `compliance', (a form of secret engagement) PMMs sought to display their power 
and reconstruct their identity. In several other quotes to follow PMMs employed 
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compliance as a means of creating a space for themselves within which they struggle to 
negotiate, reconstruct and reposition themselves in the organization as a formidable source 
of power, authority and control. Not all managers employ this strategy though: 
We're on the ground; we know departments where the staffs don't work well. So when 
you're told at CMB meeting 'we've decided to outsource `Physio' or say `OPD', and have 
decided that Bontu Company should take over; clearly they are not asking for your opinion 
but are waiting to hear what you'd say, and everybody would be careful. So often we say that's 
good! Then along the way, maybe something goes wrong and then they inform you and 
you say you can't help. Then they know something has not gone well (Estate Manager, 
KATH). 
Middle managers employed quite indirect strategies in responding to the encountered 
issues. For instance, as Tables 5.3 indicates, just as in the case of installation and 
maintenance, PMMs use strategies such as `doing as told, not bending rules, avoiding 
talking, reasserting their worth by means of a number of fine-grained negotiations, and 
pointing out weaknesses in projects after project failure to respond to or cope with issues 
they encounter. 
What I've personally done is do my jobs as spelt out but nothing outside of what I've been 
asked to do. When things don't go well it is then that they know they need you. So I don't 
need to be involved in an argument to prove .... 
I just need to concentrate on my work and 
do it well; I should not allow anybody to come and ask me why haven't you done this or 
that? I know my job (Nurses' Manager, KBu). 
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I do this by insisting the right thing is done. By insisting that goods purchased because they 
are cheap (against my advice) are not used! It's good to insist because there's a legal 
backing for you and I can't be sacked by senior management because I refuse to do what is 
ethically or medically unacceptable. You don't need to engage in argument: simply insist on 
your rights, period (Estate Manager, KBu)! 
One PMM conceded that the way to ignore all this is to try to be one's own boss by being 
proactive, and doing what one needs to do without being told. With this, one would give 
no opportunity to anybody to control them 
They know I know my work. I ensure the place is always neat ... 
I think those who don't 
know what to do, they get told what to do... You must be your own boss or someone will 
boss you round: that's my principle. We all can't be senior management, otherwise who'd 
do the rest of the work? We all have something to offer; if everyone should concentrate on 
what they do, do it well senior management wouldn't find anybody to control again. 
Nobody can control me because I won't give them the chance in the first place (Nurses 
Manager, KBu). 
This manager's response suggests that senior management's commitment to quality work 
could make them appear exceptionally controlling and bossy especially in circumstances 
where they are unsure of PMMs capacity to perform their duties independently. In that 
regard what might appear as the inclination to control could actually be underlain by the 
desire to see things done properly, and perhaps lack of trust in PMMs capacity to perform. 
From the perspective of service managers, outsourcing is a strategy to effect culture change 
in public managers, and orient them towards strategic and cost-effective utilisation of 
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scarce national resource. While this viewpoint remains speculative, its importance is 
reinforced by the level of senior managers' expectation on PMMs. 
5.7 Experiences of Service Providing Managers 
For service providers public sector workers need a new orientation in the form of being 
efficiency-conscious, and they believe the move to outsource would help address this issue 
by bringing a business face to public sector management. While service providers could not 
categorically assign reasons for outsourcing, like senior managers they speculated cost 
considerations were likely to occupy centre stage: 
If employees in the government sector especially those managers can be a little more 
concerned about what is going on... now they simply use what government gives them but 
if they were to be made to be responsible for a considerable proportion of their 
expenditure, I believe attitudes would change. This, for me, is one of the reasons 
government has turned to outsourcing; in general, private people work far better so I fully 
support this idea of outsourcing (Elesca Engineering Manager, KATH). 
Another service manager expressed the sentiments that that suggests he sees outsourcing as 
the government's solution to the public sector crisis: 
This is personal: I believe all the problems we've talked about are real but I also think 
there's some form of mismanagement here, and as a taxpayer I'm concerned that my tax 
money is being wasted in a way. The heads of department who are supposed to be like 
supervisors over what we do don't seem to care much about what happens here. Most of 
my colleagues have complained about this. I believe it's because of this that the 
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government and maybe the KBu central management are deciding to bring in private 
companies to help (Manager, Philips Medicals, KBu). 
From the perspective of service managers, outsourcing is a strategy to effect culture change 
in public managers, and orient them towards strategic and cost-effective utilisation of 
scarce national resource. While this viewpoint remains speculative, its importance in 
heightened by the level of senior managers' expectation on PMMs. 
These concerns from HODs were affirmed by responses from service providing managers 
who felt the main issue they encounter relates to PMMs' inefficiency, possibly resulting 
from their lack of autonomy/discretion demonstrated through their too much need for 
approval from senior managers. Some service providing managers clearly articulate this: 
Just imagine this. I receive a telephone to resolve a problem at KATH. I get there 
and a problem crops up in the process; may be a part needs a replacement. The 
HOD cannot order me to go ahead and replace it until they have consulted 
sufficiently with the supply chain managers and finance manager, etc. I'm talking 
about hours of waiting and wasting time. Sometimes, no conclusion is reached and 
I leave without doing the job. I need to bum fuel again driving there the following 
day to resolve the problem (Elesca Engineering Manager, KATH). 
This is a bit sensitive... I'm not sure, but I doubt if they have any freedom or 
leeway in making decisions..., which has created a number of problems. Mind you, 
they are all professionals who know exactly what they are to do. They need to be 
given the chance and `a bit of free hands' to prove themselves. I know it's a public 
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sector institution but I think things are changing all over now (Philips Manager, 
KBu). 
so it becomes challenging to now come to work in an environment where most 
decisions require approval from a higher authority. For me as a manager every time 
counts, and each time we have to wait for approval we are wasting time; such 
wasted times are never paid for-even if they are paid for, it's still a waste of state 
money. There is no interference on what I do but it appears the managers are slow 
in making decisions. You know it's often said that the private man does not fear 
taking decisions and risks, that's why their businesses tend to prosper more. There's 
too much consultation. It's all waste of time (Philips Manager, KBu). 
5.8 Conclusion: Summary and Major Insights 
In this section I discuss the differences in the findings between the 
installation/maintenance and the cleaning cases. The discussion is held against the 
backdrop of the rationale for outsourcing, the involvement of middle managers in decision 
making, the issues and challenges encountered by managers and professionals, and the 
coping devices they employ in response. These issues define the nature of and what 
characterises managerial-professional relationships. I take each case in turn, beginning with 
Installation/Maintenance 
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5.8.1 Installation/Maintenance 
While there are various reasons underlying management's decision to outsource the 
Installation/Maintenance function it appears from the senior management and PMMs' 
perspective the principal reason is to find a lasting solution to the capacity challenge in 
both hospitals. There is shortage of personnel with the requisite knowledge and know-how 
on all aspects of hospital engineering but particularly those to be responsible for the 
procurement installation and maintenance of medical equipment and machinery. This 
shortage has cost the hospitals a substantial volume of scarce resources is a fact majority of 
respondents affirmed. However, there are such other considerations as cutting costs; 
government/ideological influences, and core/non-core functions over which there remain 
differences in the opinions of managers studied. For instance, from senior managers' 
perspective, outsourcing decision is driven by considerations such as costs, affordability 
and political influences while for PMMs, addressing work habits, level of complexity and 
being relieved of routine supervision become the major considerations. On their part 
service providers think cost cutting, political, capacity and addressing negative work habits 
are strong determinants of outsourcing decisions. 
The question of who should and who actually takes the decision to outsource a given 
function as well as determine the service providers generated considerable disagreement 
and controversy. Clearly although in theory, such decisions are taken by the CMB, 
outsourcing initiatives are input principally by senior, not professional middle management, 
and so one could argue that a possible reason for involving CMB is to legitimate such 
decisions. It also became apparent that there are possible conceptual ambiguities with 
respect to whether the outsourcing of the Installation/Maintenance function has been 
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conceptualised as a strategic decision or an operational one. Moreover, there are two 
interesting speculations with respect to the decision making structure of both hospitals (see 
background to cases, this chapter). One, senior management treated the decision to 
outsource as a strategic one, hence saw little need for professional management inputs. 
Two, PMM saw and treated outsourcing decision as operational one with enormous 
implications for the practice of their profession, hence saw their input to that decision as of 
fundamental importance to the success of the initiative. 
As regards the issues and challenges experienced, each category of management seems to 
have different experiences. Beginning with senior management, central issues seems to be 
cost-related, and include heightened costs after outsourcing, the contracts, contracting and 
procurement-surrounded by considerable ambiguity, giving occasion to corrupt practices; 
and union and labour issues. All these have considerable cost implications. For PMMs, the 
central issue relates to restriction on their professional autonomy, which is connected to 
their decision making power over a range of issues. According to PMM restrictions on their 
decision making power is reflected in the fact that: 
(i) They have not been actively involved in making decision on 
outsourcing a function [including the choice of service providers] 
under their professional and managerial domain, yet they are 
obliged to serve as supervisors over such projects; 
(ii) They have been told what to do and how to do it from managerial, 
not professional point of view; 
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(iii) The disproportionate emphasis by management on costs and results 
has often collided with PMMs' emphasis on quality, equity, and 
observing procedures; 
(iv) Senior managers by-pass PMMs and ignore their experience-based 
knowledge by engaging the external consultants [described as strong 
on theory but weak on practice] at higher costs; 
(v) Senior managers have taken over PMMs' professional space 
through getting personally involved in and making decisions over 
issues which are clearly the domains of PMM. 
(vi) External service providing managers, noticing the frequency of 
PMMs' consultation prior to arriving at decisions regarding the day- 
to-day practice of their profession concluded that the latter are 
inefficient and tend to waste scarce national resources 
(vii) It is possible PMMs experience some degree of ambiguity, conflict 
and contradiction with their role as professionals and managers 
It is apparent that compared to PMMs, senior managers, by their position, pay greater 
attention to strategic issues. Undoubtedly, when asked how they responded to the 
encountered issues, their responses tend to cover financial/economic-related issues. They 
employed direct, straightforward approach in response to the issues by which they are 
confronted (Table 5.1). 
PMM employed an entirely different approach, encompassing a complex mix of direct and 
indirect methods by which they sought to reposition and reconstruct themselves. It was 
obvious from the interviews that PMMs saw these strategies as transcending the tangible 
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limitations and constraints imposed on their autonomy, and capable of reasserting their 
positions-not simply order-compliant middle managers but professionals possessing the 
power to influence what goes on in their organisations. This is obvious from Table 5.2 
The main source of conflicts appeared to be the superimposition on professional values of 
managerial objectives with unbalanced emphasis on cost. These outcomes can be explained 
on the basis of NPM in which this thesis is grounded. However, this observation is not to 
be understood to mean that such senior-middle management conflicts are mutually 
exclusive to NPM environment. Such conflicts merely reveal the fundamental tension 
between senior and middle management even in the private sector. The central argument 
here is that while these tensions cannot be attributed exclusively to NPM reforms, their 
presence does draw attention to the issues and tensions likely to be experienced in NPM 
reform environment to the extent that the NPM model is based on private sector 
managerialism, which partly underpins such conflicts. 
5.8.2 Cleaning 
The fact that there are different opinions among management on the need to outsource the 
cleaning function is clearly established from the analysis. Clearly changing worker attitudes 
to public sector employment is a reason most managers gave for outsourcing. Reducing 
routine supervision and core/non-core considerations are two another reasons indicated by 
most managers while political/ideological, economic/cost reasons are the least indicated. 
Despite these differences there is clear evidence suggesting that for majority of respondents 
the rationale to outsource this function is underlain principally by the need to address the 
negative working habits of hospital staff. 
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With respect to decision making, there is a central management board (CMB) (which 
includes PMMs) vested with decision making powers. However PMMs maintained they are 
either kept at bay from active participation in making crucial decisions or their participation 
is restricted to trivial issues. One line of analysis is to argue that the inclusion of PMMs in 
the CMB, aside other reasons, could be a rhetorical strategy by senior management to gain 
their commitment to the hospital's decisions initiated by senior management. Middle 
management saw the decision-making function as crucial; their exclusion from active 
participation in decision making, which in their view, represents reduction in their 
discretionary power, seems to underlie much of their dissatisfaction with, senior 
management. In response PMMs employ a number of strategies, which, although 
inherently indirect, less straight-forward, and non-confrontational, may upon further 
scrutiny be interpreted as strategies by which they sought to point out the flaws in the new 
management governance arrangements so enacted by senior management. While interview 
data does not provide strong evidence of political influence over outsourcing decision, it is 
important to note that with respect to the public sector, there would always be a political 
action, which opens up the space for management action, in this case, the outsourcing of 
the cleaning function. 
Unlike the installation and maintenance case, however, no consultants were hired to 
manage the interface. Moreover, while in Installation/Maintenance, PMMs withhold their 
expertise as a form of resistance, in cleaning this is not the case. There appears to be fewer 
instances of conflicts between senior and professional managers in cleaning than in 
Installation/Maintenance (high-value skills area) case, where the advice or opinion of 
consultants seems to have priority over and carries greater weight than those of HODs. In 
the case of the outsourcing of cleaning (low-value skills area), HODs exercise a higher 
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degree of autonomy in both monitoring the activities of service providing managers and 
carrying out their mundane tasks. 
Finally, with respect to Installation/Maintenance case, both senior and professional 
management agree about the need to outsource but disagree over who decides which 
function gets outsourced and which service provider gets the contract. Thus in principle, 
outsourcing is believed to be strategically helpful in both cases from whichever angle it is 
looked at. Where the disagreement exists is the implementation interface, and as the 
analyses suggest, most PMMs evaluated outsourcing as a failure and waste of resources, 
leading to higher rather than the anticipated lower costs. In cleaning on the other hand, 
there is agreement over both the need to outsource and the outcome of outsourcing. The 
latter vary with the level of skills required in the functional area such that the high-value 
skills area seems to be associated with heightened degrees of disagreement and lower level 
of success than low-value skills area. The assessment of outsourcing outcomes as positive 
could be linked to good implementation. Thus, there is little doubt whether outsourcing is 
good and little disagreement over whether it would work; the central issue remains linked 
to implementation style and who gets involved in making crucial decisions in the process. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
DISCUSSSIONS 
6.0. Introduction 
To the research questions posed in chapter four, I discuss the major findings outlined in 
the previous chapter with respect to existing relevant literature. I begin by focusing on the 
first major research question, which attempts to investigate the issues PMMs encounter 
under NEM-type reforms. For a -clearer appreciation of the complexity of these issues I 
discuss these under three sub-headings. The first sub-question focuses on issues relating to 
the rationales for outsourcing various [high-value skills and low-value skills] functions. The 
second investigates the issues relating to making outsourcing decisions. The third focuses 
on the interrelated issues of conflicts, tensions and dilemmas introduced by the interaction 
of NPM described as the `marriage of opposites' (Hood, 1991) with particular political and 
socio-cultural dynamics by which the context of this research has been defined. 
The second major research question examines the strategies or coping devices managers 
employed in responding to the encountered issues. Although the views of PMMs remain 
the central focus, the views of senior managers, and in few instances those of service 
providing managers, are considered alongside these. I explore these coping strategies, 
which I analyse within the broad framework of workplace resistance. The theoretical 
framework I adopted in explaining and conceptualising professionals' resistance strategies 
relate to the concept of expert power (Crozier, 1963), the weapons of the weak (Scott, 
1985; Hanchard, 2004), and discourses shaping contemporary workplace industrial relations 
(Collinson, 1999). 1 identify the mediating role of the endemic, systemic local features and 
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challenges including a range of socio-cultural, political and economic factors that define the 
social interactions and workplace dynamics in Ghana's public sector. The third and final 
major question explores how insights from the first and second questions can broaden our 
understanding of the nature and effects of managerial-professional-relationships on NPM- 
type reforms in an LDC context. In doing this I look in retrospect at the NPM framework 
in terms of its content and focus (Hood, 1991; 1995), and examine how the management- 
professional interactions discovered in these cases, mediated by the above wide-ranging 
local factors, could lead to a possible shift in focus [of NPM]. 
6.1 Issues and challenges professionals encounter 
In this section, I discuss, from the cases investigated, the issues managers face with respect 
to the rationales for outsourcing, and the extent of involvement of professionals in 
organisational decision making. This part of the discussions (Section 6.1.1 to 6.6.5) forms 
part of the major Research Question 1. 
6.1.1 Issues related to rationale for outsourcing dderent functions 
The history of outsourcing not least in the UK draws attention to the role political and 
ideological factors have played in marketising outsourcing as a means of attaining economic 
efficiency in the public sector. This level of analysis places the subject of public sector 
outsourcing in a political domain; implying an over-totalizing power of politicians in 
determining outsourcing decisions. While this argument sounds plausible, partially true 
because politicians have undoubtedly played a pivotal role in publicising outsourcing 
(Whitfield, 2001), it does tend nevertheless to mask the challenging organisational 
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circumstances, apart from cost efficiency-related factors, that make the argument to 
outsource more compelling, and the need to outsource a real necessity rather than fashion. 
This section thus attempts to move the debate on the justification for outsourcing beyond 
the level of a political argument, and to factor in peculiar circumstances of public 
organisations that make outsourcing acceptable to politicians, management, and even 
professionals-major stakeholders in delivering public services. It attempts to show clearly 
how cost-efficiency and non-cost considerations have indeed given rise to the need to 
outsource in some circumstances. The analysis suggests that the rationale behind the 
. outsourcing of various 
functions as well as the level of skills required in a given task area of 
PMMs tend to influence the attitudes and interactions between senior managers and PMMs 
in the implementation process. Fig 6.1 presents the various rationales underlying 
outsourcing, with political objectives at the top under which all other rationales and 
objectives are subordinated. 
Fig 6.1 Rationales for outsourcing different functions 
Political objectives 
Institutional Circumstances 
High-value skills outsourcing Low-value skills outsourcing 
-Lack of expertise/ 
-capacity/capability 
-wrong purchase decision 
-faulty installation 
-maintenance problem 
-resource wastage 
-operational ineffectiveness 
-cost savinps eventually 
-Large supply of unskilled 
labour 
-bad/undesirable work 
habits 
-supervision problems 
-employee related costs 
-economic inefficiency 
-contractualising public 
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This project has held the explicit assumption that although the whole subject of 
outsourcing health services occurred within a well orchestrated political agenda, which 
undoubtedly defined and created the space for any management action, particular 
institutional circumstances are equally strong determinants of the decision to outsource, 
and are thus deserving of critical analysis. Chapter five has demonstrated that while the 
need to cut cost-which is at the very centre of the political ideology of the current Ghana 
government-has underpinned the move to outsource, in both the high-value skills and low- 
value skills areas, there are significant differences in rationale for outsourcing both 
functions. These differences, as made clear in chapter 5, lie partly in the types and level of 
skills required for each set of tasks in each case. 
From the previous chapter, the greatest challenge facing the high-value function 
(Installation/Maintenance) is inadequate capacity. The shortage of experts in making 
informed purchase decisions has resulted in: (i) the purchase of wrong equipment and the 
additional cost of returning them; (ii) wrong installation of equipment, leading to waste; 
and (iii) serious maintenance problems as broken down equipment could not be repaired. 
All this led to what I call a vicious cycle of resource wastage but such shortage of experts 
also challenged the very operational viability of the various departments. Thus the 
organisations could neither maintain their operational viability nor remain efficient, 
effective and economic. Thus there was, besides the ideological factor, a real need for 
expert staffs, which the hospitals could hardly attract due to low wages, leaving the 
outsourcing of this function the only viable option. 
It is here that the role of professional middle managers, who are required by virtue of their 
expert knowledge, to supervise the work of the external service providers, becomes crucial. 
As analysis suggests, because senior managers have not been very much involved with the 
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practice of their profession, having spent much of their time in management, they lack up- 
to-date knowledge about the type of expertise provided by the external service providers. 
Under the circumstances it would be helpful for senior managers to rely on professional 
managers in trying to understand and relate to external service providers. In any case, this 
would very much depend on PMMs' past record of performance especially with respect to 
making prudent financial decisions. However, the analysis suggests that senior managers 
by-passed PMMs, tending instead to rely on external consultants. It is this that remains the 
major source of conflicts between senior and professional managers. 
The rationale for outsourcing this function was to help the hospital to handle a skills area 
in which the necessary expertise was lacking. Under the outsourcing framework, to survive 
an outsourcing relationship, the client must necessarily possess some expertise in the 
function being outsourced in order to prevent the outsourcing provider from pursuing 
their selfish interest due to client's ignorance (McIvor, 2000), which would constitute a 
moral hazard typical of public choice. Arguably, PMMs who possess this expertise expect 
to exert considerable influence over managing this interface yet they felt their capacity to 
play this crucial role has been reduced by the hiring and increased reliance on external 
consultants, an issue which remains one of their gravest concerns throughout this research. 
Some PMMs argued that being allowed to play this role, which might involve being given 
access to certain `privileges' over which senior managers might wish to exercise exclusive 
control, could represent a reduction in senior management's power relative to theirs 
(PMMs'). Intentionally or unintentionally, senior managers avoided PMMs, tending to 
over-rely on consultants rather than on PMMs, a practice that PMMs seriously resent as the 
analysis suggests. 
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Coming back to the low-value skills outsourcing, the objective is to rationalise the 
organisation by cutting down on its human resources considered not only redundant but 
also as possessing work habits the organisation considers dysfunctional to its mandate. 
Outsourcing this function was meant to reduce the size of permanent staffs, avoid a range 
of indirect costs such as those related to holidays and maternity, and reduce managers' 
supervision time. Moreover, replacing permanent staffs with contract workers, who are 
believed to possess the right attitudes to work, would suggest that management has an 
agenda to effect attitudinal and cultural changes in the organisation. Since tasks performed 
by outsourcing providers, which are supervised by PMMs, do not require any highly 
specialised skills, senior management seem to have no difficulty relating to external service 
providers in this case. In that case senior management do not need to depend on 
professionals, neither do they need consultants because they can exercise full control over 
the process. By implication, PMMs in this case do not have any area over which to exercise 
exclusive control, hence do not constitute a source of expert power and therefore 
compared to the installation and maintenance case, pose lesser threats to senior 
management. This might explain why there are more instances of conflicts between senior 
management and PMMs in installation and maintenance cases than in cleaning cases. 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, the outsourcing of the high-value skills/complex 
function has greater potential for managerial-professional conflicts than the outsourcing of 
low-value skills function. Situations that require high-value skills to resolve would tend to 
reinforce the power of those in possession of those skills, constituting a source of expert 
power for them (in this case, professionals and external service providers). Once such a 
situation is created, there would emerge, according to Crozier's (1964: 160-5) theorizing, 
another power to control that power (see chapter 3). Thus a valid conclusion from this 
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analysis is that outsourcing complex skills and the expertise [from consultants] required to 
manage them will pose greater threat to PMMs. 
Additionally, the outsourcing of high-value skills was targeted primarily at addressing 
capacity shortage problems rather than cutting costs although cost-cutting remains 
significantly implicit in these initiatives. In fact the main issue for PMMs under the low- 
value skills case is senior managers' excessive emphasis on cost often at the sacrifice of 
quality. Cost is thus more central to the outsourcing of the cleaning function than it is in 
the case of outsourcing the installation and maintenance function. To the extent then that 
the skill required to perform in a functional area is complex that functional area would 
constitute a domain over which both senior and middle managers would seek to exercise 
control. 
6.1.2 Issues relating to involvement of professionals in outsourcing decision making: the contradictory role 
of middle managers in the decision making process 
The second potential source of conflicts relates to decision-making structures, and the level 
of professionals' involvement in the actual decision making process. Within the decision 
making framework (chapter five) no major decision could be made in the absence of 
PMMs. Ironically, the analysis revealed that while the presence of PMMs is required for 
decisions to be made, not so with their active involvement in the decision making process. 
For instance, in spite of their membership in the CMB most PMMs complained their 
viewpoints are often ignored, and they are often by-passed in taking major organizational 
initiatives. One could argue that PMMs' presence on the CMB could be for the purposes of 
rating decisions rather than actually initiating or making decisions. This is one of the 
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issues of concern to PMMs. Professionals expressed frustration and disappointment over 
their less active participation in making decisions regarding outsourcing; since, as they 
argued, they were directly involved in the implementation of such initiatives. 
6.1.3 Conceptualising the decision making structure and dynamics 
The inclusion of PMMs in CMB could be interpreted as a process of democratization to 
ensure the legitimacy of such decisions against the backdrop that in a democratic 
dispensation the legitimacy of any decision is greatly determined by the extent to which it is 
believed to emerge from the collective viewpoints of all or major stakeholders (Beetham, 
1991). Thus such decision-making strategy can be conceptualised as a strategy of 
`democratization for legitimation' Clearly, the need to ensure the legitimacy of decisions so as to 
guarantee PMMs' continuous involvement in, support for and commitment to these could 
be a possible explanatory variable for senior managers' inclusion of PMMs in CMB. In that 
sense the concepts of employee involvement, and empowerment could be employed to 
explain such senior management strategy. One could locate this strategy of PMMs' 
inclusion in CMB within empowerment discourse as an employee involvement strategy meant to 
accomplish in PMMs, two possible objectives: (1) get them to feel involved in the 
organization, and to be obliged to commit to CMB decisions; (ii) get them to see the 
legitimacy of such decisions. In the discussions that follow I employ the concepts of 
involvement and empowerment in greater detail as they relate to this discussion. 
I categorize PMMs as a target of involvement activities, placing them in the same category 
as other employees whose control and involvement [senior] management seeks for the 
attainment of organizational goals. It is a widely-held view that senior management is often 
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involved with strategic decisions, leaving operational ones to middle management (Procter 
et al, 1999; Fenton-O'Creevy, 2001). However, in this case, by involving PMMs in CMB, 
senior management was probably seeking to create within PMMs an impression that they 
are being involved in both strategic and operational decisions. But PMMs in this case, have 
in practical terms little involvement in decisions even on daily operational issues. 
Empowerment is understood fundamentally as a vehicle that can move organizations from 
a static rule-bound past to a flexible future (Wilkinson, 1998), allowing their (organisations') 
relationship with its employees to move from control to commitment (Procter et al, 1999: 
242). For most critics, empowerment represents nothing more than rhetorically 
constructed smoke-screen behind which lies a more sophisticated agenda of exploiting 
employees (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Procter et al, 1999). It is possible, according to 
Wilkinson (1998), that such involvement strategies could represent managerial vehicles to 
gain control over employees. Wilkinson observed that `empowerment takes place within 
the context of a strict management agenda such that power is given by management rather 
than taken by employees'. Collins (1996: 35) describes this (empowerment) as an 
innovation in managerial control, adding that the underpinning logic of empowerment 
initiatives is in fact, disempowerment. 
From this perspective, although one could not rule out the fact that the inclusion of PMMs 
in CMB could be underpinned by senior managers' commitment to ensuring the latter's 
input to decision making, neither can the possibility that this is an 
empowerment/involvement strategy be ruled out. Indeed in the empowerment and 
involvement literatures, the traditional role of middle managers has been challenged at best 
as unnecessary, and at worst harmful to the successful operation of the new, flexible 
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organization (Burrell, 1996; Palmer, 1995). The involvement of professionals in CMB in 
these cases might be described as a process to democratize with the view to eliciting their 
commitment J in, 2006: 71). Moreover, since PMMs are part of the decision making body, 
this could atrophy their inclination and capacity to question and oppose such decisions. 
Writers such as Ramsay (1977) in his influential `cycles of [managerial] control' suggest that 
employers introduce involvement activities as a way of appearing to share some degree of 
control in the face of threats to their authority from workers' organizations. However, as 
threats from labour abate they allow involvement practices to fade away (Fenton-O'Creevy, 
2001). Although Ramsays' (1.977) cycles of control and Collins' (1996) `cocktails of control' 
and `management cocktails' theories were derived from a very different OECD context, 
and based mainly on white/blue collar unionized workers, there are potential parallels that 
could be drawn from these to illustrate the managerially-initiated employee involvement 
strategy employed in these cases. 
Although the discussion in this section has centered on senior managers, rather than PMMs 
it is intended to provide a background to broaden our understanding of the nature of 
managerial environment within which PMMs operate. The objective of involving PMMs in 
CMB appeared to be defined first and foremost in senior managers' terms. PMMs 
experiences clearly demonstrate a feeling of a sense of exclusion in the environment of 
`supposed inclusion'. Even suppose that this speculative analysis has a weak basis in the 
absence of senior management intention to manipulate PMMs, one could still argue that 
senior management were perhaps unaware that their approach to decision-making was 
going to be ineffective in a complex professional domain. 
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As it emerged, excluding professionals from decision making had unintended consequences 
on organizational objectives, measured in terms of project failures. PMMs indeed saw 
project failures as opportunities to draw senior managers' attention to the weaknesses in 
organisational decision making, from which they appear to be cunningly excluded, giving 
credence to the fact that participative forms of management would be a better approach to 
managing professionals. Although participative management techniques have been believed 
to increase total control in an organization (Tannenbaum, 1968) and to lead to more, not 
less, control for (senior) managers (Kanter, 1984), senior managers from the case studies 
seemed unprepared to increase the power of their subordinates by involving them in 
making crucial outsourcing decisions. The result is a form of power struggle between the 
senior and middle managers studied. 
This section attempts to illuminate the ambiguous position of PMMs; they have limited 
involvement in organizational decision making about which they express a sense of 
frustration. They also feel inadequately informed about issues that subordinate workers had 
actually become aware of, a situation that is suggestive of the superficiality of their 
involvement in making organizational decisions. This came to light in one of the interviews 
when a PMM made the following observation: 
It's such that once you're part of CMB, you're supposed to embrace any decision made by 
central management, as a joint one, and not just something coming from senior 
management. At times, it's hard because although you might personally not agree with the 
decision, you have to show you're committed to it, and it's difficult to be yourself. 
Sometimes, a worker sees you, and says, `manager, is that the new plan; oh! And ... you 
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know you don't like it, sometimes you don't even know it but can't say it... (Technical 
Manager, K' Bu) 
In spite of this limited involvement, PMMs are the first contact persons required to 
monitor the activities of external services providers. This remains one of the sources of 
concern of PMMs, particularly those from Installation/Maintenance cases. They express 
concerns over monitoring outsourcing projects they do not decide, and service providers 
they have no hand in selecting; they attributed much outsourcing project failures to this. 
6.1.4 Issues and challenges introduced to managerial professional relationships by the conflictual and 
paradoxical NPM and the socio-cultural and economic context of Ghana 
Fig 6.2 below illustrates the context within which managerial-professional interactions 
occurred. Both levels of management experienced several issues, which I have explained 
below. Fig 6.2 would help understand the nature of such complex, conflicting factors 
underlining political, managerial and professional objectives. 
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Fig 6.2 The political, managerial/administrative and professional contexts of public 
sector reforms 
Reforming an inefficient, loss making public sector, attaining full cost-recovery, 
changing the mode of service delivery, changing the state's position as generous 
employer, integrating private sector into public service provision 
A 
Pursuing political agenda, attaining economic 
efficiency, reducing professional autonomy, 
pursuing cost efficient practices, reliance on 
consultants 
B 
Professional 
autonomy, ensuring 
public service 
values and ethics 
C 
6.2 The Political Context 
The entire project of outsourcing support services in health and other public organisations 
including local government departments, occurred in the context of a predetermined 
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political agenda, as represented by Fig 6.2 and supported by the following quote, which 
although not directly related to outsourcing health support services, has relevance in setting 
the contextual scene for outsourcing: 
Although the national policy gives the primary responsibility of waste management to 
LGs.... the state has seen the necessity to enable LGs to better perform their responsibilities. 
The policy mandates the (LGs) to invite the private sector to provide the actual services 
under contract or franchise... as appropriate. When these functions are transferred, the 
corresponding capital budget, personnel and equipment are also mandated to be transferred. The 
policy requires LGs to maintain adequate capacity to provide not less than 20 per cent of 
the services... (Min of LG, 1999: 14-15, taken from Awortwi, 2002: 80) (Emphasis, mine) 
The above quote makes clear the political environment within which outsourcing of health 
support services occurs. Hospital management then has to make outsourcing decisions 
within this broader policy framework. However, there appears to be lack of agreement 
even within senior management over the way they interpret this policy context. For 
instance a senior manager who expressed the following view implies that managers need to 
interpret these policies with respect to how they relate to their particular organisational 
circumstances and needs: 
... 
First of all, the current government is in favour of outsourcing; and their policy now is 
to reduce the size of the government sector and allow private sector participation and 
expansion. From government's viewpoint these issues border on efficiency because due to 
lack of effective supervision there's often low output. From our hospital's viewpoint the 
process of securing financial clearance to hire staff is cumbersome. Also it wasn't easy 
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getting staff to fill some of the vacancies especially in areas considered not core to our 
business, so we decided to outsource some of them (Director of Administration, KATH). 
Another senior manager however views the policy as over-determining and paralysing, 
calling only for compliance rather than active interpretation and negotiation in line with 
organisational circumstances: 
But this outsourcing policy is something that has come from government so it must 
survive. So even if you don't like it, you have to like it; you have to give it a chance to 
survive (Procurement Manager, KBu). 
One PMM maintains that both government and senior management are partners in 
fulfilling an agreed agenda: 
The Chief Executive was brought in by government, so he's accountable to 
government (Maintenance Manager, KATH) 
It is therefore the political will, objective and action that created the space within which any 
managerial action occurs. This agenda, with a strong emphasis on cost efficiency and new 
methods of delivering public services is grounded principally in the rhetoric of 
managerialism, one of the fundamental underpinnings of NPM. Although managers can 
still interpret and choose between these in accordance with their organisational needs 
management performance is clearly assessed by reference to this politically-determined 
agenda, cascaded down through senior managers, whom I call `politician surrogates'. 
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6.3. Managerial Context 
Bounded by the middle circle B in Fig 6.2 the managerial context is defined by senior 
managers whose foremost preoccupation is to ensure the pursuit of the agenda for which 
they have been recruited. The context defines this set of agenda, and includes achieving 
cost efficiency in delivering public services; exercising some level of control over what 
PMMs do perhaps to ensure organisational objectives are not sacrificed, and hiring 
consultants to manage this interface, if need be. The use of consultants becomes necessary 
especially when dealing with highly technical skills areas as evident from the following 
quotes from pilot interviews 
In case of highly technical projects we cannot deal directly with the contractor; instead we 
contract a consultant to do all the professional works related to the project. Often the 
consultants do all the professional work about the design of the contracts, and help open 
the tenders, etc. This ensures only the right decisions taken by the experts are implemented 
throughout (Works & Maintenance Engineer, Ghana Health Service-Pilot Studies 
September, 2004). 
The two hospitals work with the same philosophy, based on the fact that private 
outsourcing contractors and hospital staffs believed to be civil servants have two opposing 
philosophies and ethos, hence the need for a consultant who understands the language of 
both the contractor and hospital staffs: 
It's all because of the different philosophies of the private person (contractor) whose sole 
aim is to make profits and the civil servants in the hospitals who aim to protect the interest 
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of the hospital and that of the public (Capital Investment Analyst, Ghana Health Service, 
September 2004). 
While it would be difficult to argue that senior managers intentionally sought to control 
professionals by restricting their domain of discretionary power, it appears the success of 
the former's job in an increasingly accountable environment definitely requires some 
reduction in discretionary behaviour by the latter, as one senior manager remarked: 
Although we understand some people need to use their discretion, our first and foremost 
objective is to ensure we deliver results by keeping our eyes on what we've been brought in 
to do... For instance an auditor does not come in to audit your discretion-to see whether I 
or someone uses their discretion to approve documents-but to audit whether you've 
followed due process, and that will tell them whether you're on course or not.... So the old 
system of doing things would now have to subject to the new approved method, and 
gradually it is gaining ground (Procurement Manager, KBu). 
Within this environment it appears managerial authority and goals have been superimposed 
on professional objectives, which define and sometimes limit the space within which the 
latter's action occurs: 
Well, that was the Chief Executive's idea. You see when he was brought in, he complained of 
much inefficiency and bad attitude of employees, so... some of these things, it's a bit hard 
to comment on them (Environmental Sanitation Manager, KATH). 
A central goal of senior managers is to achieve cost efficiency, which seems paramount 
over every other consideration. In an environment of performance-based pay and 
contracts, by argument, the success of senior managers would be measured to a large by 
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reference to how much they achieved cost-efficiency, as confirmed by a PMM's when 
asked how successes is measured by senior management: 
... Purely in terms of cost; if they've been able to beat down cost, then they've achieved 
their goal. Cost becomes central to most decisions (Technical Manager, KATH). 
6.4 Professional Context 
The professionals are middle managers-heads of departments in their respective 
professional areas, and though addressed as (middle) managers, they are first and foremost 
professionals, but acting in some capacity as managers. Unlike senior managers however 
these are permanent employees whose salaries are to a large extent, fixed and not 
dependent directly on their output. Throughout this study it became evident that while 
professionals are surely committed to pursuing cost-efficient practices, and that the 
possibility of their involvement in rent-seeking or selfish, corrupt behaviour cannot be 
ruled out, their fundamental concern seems to be ensuring that public service values and 
ethos are maintained and service quality assured. These goals, they argued, are attainable 
only if they are allowed to practice their profession in a free, uninterrupted environment 
under collegial regulation. These assertions are supported: 
I wouldn't say no, because it becomes difficult for us to agree. They stress cost and we say, 
yes, cost is important but it's not just cost; we need to look at other equally important 
issues apart from cost. We need to ensure that service quality is good and of acceptable 
standard... This is one area we struggle a lot (Maintenance Manager, KBu) 
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These managerial-professional differences seem to emerge from the different [socially 
constructed] value systems enacted through the complex networks of contracts and 
incentive systems, which managers and professionals work in. Like other forms of value 
systems, such socially created value systems give rise to normative behaviours and 
expectations, which arguably underlie much of the issues and conflicts between managers 
and senior managers and PMMs. In the context of NPM it is fundamentally these 
differences in the normative values and motivations between managers and professionals 
that underlie much of the often-cited tensions which characterize their relationships. In this 
case although there is, between management professionals, a common ground for 
outsourcing in the sense that they both realized the urgency of the need to deal with both 
the capacity challenge (Installation/Maintenance) and the attitudinal problem (Cleaning) 
through outsourcing, expectations of outcomes seem to differ considerably, and appear as 
the underlining source of much conflict between senior managers and PMMs. 
Having established the contextual background, I now turn first to the main issues senior 
managers face, and against this background and within the broader context of NPM, 
examine the main issues professionals encountered. 
6.5 Senior Managers' Experiences 
On the basis of the often-cited academic literature that part of senior managers' duty under 
NPM is to reduce professionals' influence on the delivery of public services (`dismantle 
professionals' power-Newman and Clarke, 1994; Clarke et al, 2000), combined with the 
context presented in Fig 6.2 it is highly likely that senior managers, like professionals, 
could find themselves in a challenging situation, steering between political, economic and 
professional goals. Yet paradoxically, under current NPM reforms, managerial devolution 
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and professional autonomy are expected to be exercised concurrently in the same 
workplace. To be successful in their proxy role as representatives of politicians, managers 
[without being necessarily prejudiced against PMMs] need to exert a reasonable degree of 
control over what PMMs do; yet doing so would both imply restricting PMMs' autonomy. 
The difficult trade-offs and dilemmas created by this could become a fundamental source 
of conflicts between managers and professionals, expressed in various ways in these case 
studies. 
Senior managers expressed concern that the cost-cutting objective could only be partially 
realized, and contended that whilst some cost was definitely saved other issues translated to 
higher cost and eroded much of the savings realized. Such issues included non-transparent 
procurement processes, ill-defined, or technically complicated and ambiguous contracts 
that service providers exploited to their advantage, and the apparent inefficiency of PMMs. 
Consequently, according to PMMs, senior managers resorted to increased centralization of 
power, rather than decentralising power to give PMMs the autonomy they require to 
perform effectively. This means senior managers tend to focus sometimes indiscriminately 
on procedures, something that runs partly counter to NPM's avowed commitment to 
results-oriented public service delivery. Additionally, as observed by PMMs, senior 
managers tended to rely heavily on external consultants, by-passing PMMs, who felt 
aggrieved that their expertise was not used. 
Various meanings could be read into such senior management approach to working with 
professional middle managers. In the first place, this could be underscored by the need to 
ensure effective adherence to proper procedures in the way the hospital should conduct 
itself (Massey and Pyper, 2005), partly due to concerns that professionals might be weak on 
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self-regulation as claimed by Hutton and Massey (2006: 24). Second, it might be that senior 
managers have reservations about PMMs' claim to a commitment of ensuring the 
protection of public interest. Third, it could also be informed by Illich's (1977) argument 
that modern social professionals tend to disable members of society, who then depend on 
professionals on a number of decisions, privileging as they were, an educated caste in 
society. Illich thus concluded the whole essence of profession is nothing but a craving for 
power, status and privilege. This claim could be strengthened by questions raised for 
instance by Britain's New Right politicians [who view professionals' activity as a form of 
conspiracy against free flow of markets and resources, describing them as constraints on 
efficient and effective running of governments] about professionals' claim to altruism 
(Hutton and Massey, 2006). This viewpoint has led to the conception that professionals' 
power is a brake on reform, making modernizing governments to undermine professional 
influence through the elevation of a cult of the generalist manager (Massey and Pyper, 
2005). It is possible senior managers' actions and attitudes towards PMMs could be 
informed by and explained from such an ideological standpoint as suggested by the quote 
below: 
Another example was our staff canteen where our own staffs in the kitchen department 
were handling. A committee was formed to overlook their operations. For a year there 
were lots of problems; they were running at a loss, so at a point I decided to outsource it. 
Immediately we said we wanted to outsource, that very month, they started making profits. 
The same management took it up but was making profits but we said we were bent on 
outsourcing it so we advertised it and got it outsourced and we have been making profits 
since then (Chief Executive, KATH). 
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While these are speculative perspectives of senior managers, they could be a vital starting 
point to understanding and examining the issues PMMs experience not least because as 
identified above, management action creates the context within which professionals 
operate. In the section following I discuss the issues PMMs experience in this context. 
6.6 Issues Professional Middle Managers' experienced due to the conflicts. 
contradictions and tensions inherent in NPM 
PMMs experienced a number of issues and challenges, which could be traced to the 
conflicts, contradictions and tensions introduced by the NPM framework. These include 
the tensions between centralization and decentralization of power; conflicts between 
focusing on costs or quality; and tensions between emphasizing procedures or results. 
There are other issues experienced by professionals, which could be described as deriving 
from the organisational imperatives imposed on senior management and their concomitant 
actions, and could be described perhaps as necessary evils. These include the reduction in 
professional autonomy, a feeling among PMMs of being by-passed by senior management, 
and a perceived restriction on professionals' access to organizational resources and 
information. Finally, there are a number of unresolved conceptual issues relating to 
position of the professional middle manager [in the sense of a professional who is also a 
manager], which seem to constitute potential source of conflicts within professionals. 
6.6.1 Procedures versus results 
While committed to achieving results, senior managers have tended to focus in 
contradicting fashion on procedures, and less on results, which meant goal achievement 
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often gets sacrificed for procedural tenacity. The increased use of bureaucratic controls in 
regulating PMMs' activities and operation tended to reduce their degree of discretion, the 
cause of much of the tensions between the two levels of management. Paradoxically, this 
increased control [by senior manager] of PMMs tended to reduce, not accentuate senior 
managers' capacity to attain goals, thus confirming Smith and Walshe's (2004) earlier 
observation of how managerial control over professionals paradoxically reduced managers' 
ability to get things done. In this case, senior managers' anticipation to save costs would 
not only be dashed; they could end up paying higher than initially anticipated. In summary, 
while senior managers are required by the NPM framework to be results-focused, they are 
seen to be more procedures-focused as this seems to be the surest way to keep corruption 
at bay, with one significant outcome of losing track of results. Paradoxically, the increase in 
procedural regulations has been seen by some of the PMMs interrogated in this project as 
breeding corrupt practices; not keeping them at bay. The net effect of such anti-corruption 
approaches has been a reduced autonomy and discretion to middle managers whose 
capacity to operate effectively and efficiently as both professionals and managers became 
greatly inhibited. 
6.6.2 Cost-quality/ output-outcome conflict 
As shown in chapter five, striking the right balance between cost and quality remains one 
of the fundamental sources of conflict between managers and professionals. Although both 
senior and middle managers have a commitment to economic efficiency, they seemed to 
take conflicting perspectives on measuring success, with managers placing emphasis on 
cost-efficiency, while professionals tend to emphasise quality of service. These findings 
confirm earlier findings by Caron and Giaugue (2006), who reported that the increased 
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emphasis on cost has led to the overvaluing of quantifiable results (outputs) to the neglect 
of evaluation of less quantifiable results (outcomes). Arguably this emphasis on costs is a 
consequence of the surge in the accounting logic, which according to (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2002), involves the application of accounting technologies implicated in 
constructing resource flows used to price the outputs and create the ultimate visibility of 
the organization. Of course, the accounting logic is at the very heart of NPM, whose 
origins were `couched in the language of economic rationalism, and promoted by a new 
generation of econocrats and accountocrats in high public office' (Hood (1995: 94). Thus there 
is little doubt that cost-efficiency-and economic rationalism have taken a centre stage,. and 
seem to have triumphed over other such public sector values as quality, equity, and ethics 
in most NPM reforms as evident from the quote below: 
They'd always settle down for the lowest bidder and this has been a major source of 
conflicts.... Management and administrators are always aiming at minimising cost at any 
rate, not examining the possible effects of that on project quality (Estate Manager, KATH). 
Senior managers' excessive emphasis on cost issues seems to be informed by the thesis of 
the `accounting logic' (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2001), which places greater emphasis on 
explicit outcomes and outputs, makes linkages between them and connects them with 
financial flows as to reward performance. The application of the accounting logic would 
subject almost every process to costing, measuring performance principally in cost terms, 
and losing sight of other areas of public service not necessarily cost-based. Professionals 
studied in this context interpret this approach of being managed by senior managers as 
mechanization and mutinitiation of professional procedures, which they (professionals) resent. 
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6.6.3. Reduction in pmfesiional autonomy and discretion 
PMMs in this study are concerned about reduction in their professional autonomy, 
consequential to increased managerial hierarchical regulation of professional practice, 
which has left consistent corrosions in their collegial regulation that characterizes 
professional practice. The analysis in chapter 5 suggests that middle managers' concern 
over the fall in their autonomy relates to all or at least one of the following: their views on 
new initiatives are either not sought or ignored altogether; they are denied the free hand 
necessary to make simple decisions regarding the way they practice their profession; and 
they lack the level of financial autonomy which they require to perform effectively in their 
roles especially in emergency situations. PMMs interviewed felt they were restricted from 
making decisions on both strategic and operational issues. Essentially, there is a clash 
between managerial authority and professional autonomy but there also appears to be 
significant conceptual distortions between the two terms [I return to this point in the latter 
part of this chapter where I discuss the potentially conflictual role/position of professional 
managers]. In examining managerial-professional relationships in chapter 3, I discussed the 
subject of reduction in professional autonomy and concluded that there could be moral 
justification for senior managers to desire to exercise control over what professionals do 
(Exworthy and Halford, 1999). This is because the former play a proxy role of politicians in 
ensuring cost-efficient and effective public sector delivery; in that case control would be 
understood as simply a means to an end and not an end in itself. However, it does appear 
that senior managers have increased control unnecessarily, if perhaps unintentionally. This 
has triggered unhealthy reactions from PMMs, undermining the very attainment of 
organisational objectives as PMMs seemed to find comfort in identifying with their 
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professional peers and professional codes at the sacrifice of organizational goal attainment. 
As the following quotes from interview transcripts suggest: 
My first responsibility is to the sick people. I see this work as my personal 
ministry and I'm not going to `shut up' so that someone who wants to make money 
does their own thing (Poly Manager, KATH). 
Oh! It's been rough! But sometimes, you simply need to cooperate because you 
know the likely results ... at the end of the day it's about people's lives; it's about 
our profession (Technical Manager, KBu). 
Given the contradictions and tensions that are brought together in the NPM doctrines, 
such outcomes as reported in this project seem unavoidable as part and parcel of the power 
dynamics of NPM, as in other social system. 
6.6.4 By passing profesrionals' advice and relying on external consultants 
PMMs are concerned that senior managers have ignored their expertise, and advice, and 
since the latter arguably lack up-to-date practical professional knowledge, they have 
resorted to hiring external consultants, and this in turn creates a range of problems 
including increased costs. These views were expressed in the interviews: 
There has been a major setback in the sense that those who brainstorm for ideas are 
administrators, not managers or professionals able to determine the technical 
appropriateness of a given project document. But if the people are professionals in their 
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area, they don't need a consultant. So the question is why not involve the professionals and 
avoid the consultants, saving some cost? I don't see why you have a problem with your 
equipment, and you call an engineer, and the engineer is not allowed to take decision based 
on his competence but instead, a consensus is required from people who are not engineers 
to take decision relating to issues of engineering nature, or call consultants. This has been a 
major source of conflicts between us and the hospital administrators (Biomedic 
Engineering Manager, KBu). 
There's a limit to my authority over what I'm supposed to be doing. That's for somebody 
else to be bröught in, without it being discussed with you, and you haven't been able to 
assess what you can or can't do. I have not been given the chance to determine my limits 
because there is some of the equipment; I'm not permitted to touch. These relate to issues 
of autonomy. Until my limit is attained you can't make a decision to bring in someone to 
help. We're required to give out our best, so you must have the space to work yourself to 
your limit then you can look outside. They place impediments in your way to make the 
work difficult; then when you're unable to deliver results, they conclude you're incapable 
and inefficient, which is not true. This puts us off gear. We don't find ourselves in 
the right environment. There are a lot of things going wrong. Even if we're over- 
employing people, nobody knows (Biomedic Engineering Manager, KATH) 
From chapter five and above, a few observations can be made. First, increased reliance on 
external consultants means senior managers can easily by-pass PMMs in making crucial 
decisions. However, their capacity to effectively implement such decisions becomes 
reduced as they need the cooperation of PMMs. Second, according to some PMMs, 
increased reliance on external consultants tends to create technical problems because 
consultants are not always up- to-date with the complexity of the problems the hospital 
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faces. This is because according to Bio Manager (KBu) (chapter five), institutional practice 
is technology-based, and those not directly involved in day-to-day practice lack this 
technology; yet most consultants are strong on theory but weak on practice. Third, when 
consultants' prescriptions [decisions and initiatives] fail to deliver expected results and 
create problems such failures tend to be blamed on professionals' inefficiency and results in 
professionals' further alienation. Fourth, this use of consultants, professionals argued, not 
only resulted in failure to develop in-house capacity; it also tended to discourage the use of 
in-house expertise as it de-motivated professionals from using their knowledge and 
experience. Fifth, it has reinforced, rather than resolve, the syndrome of waste 
(necessitating outsourcing), where medical and other installed equipment and facilities 
could not be used. 
All these suggest that the use of consultants can deliver contradictory results. On the one 
hand, consultants are believed to possess relevant knowledge and experience that could 
guide organisational decisions and initiatives, and could for instance save the organisation 
substantially in cost terms. On the other, their prescription could create further problems 
for the organisation if, as it has been argued, these are out of touch with the realities of the 
organisation. Some professionals argue that the use of external consultants has a hidden 
agenda meant to enrich a cadre of private sector consultants at the expense of the state. 
The use of consultants perfectly epitomises NPM philosophy and ideology in terms of the 
crucial role consultants have played, as well as the centrality of consultancy advice to the 
formulation and popularisation of the NPM doctrine. Undoubtedly, NPM was described as 
having been `packaged as a body of doctrines and beliefs and promulgated by `econocrats and 
consultocrat3' (Hood and Jackson, 1991) in response to challenging fiscal crises. Whitfield 
(2001: 65) argues that large management consultancies had a vested interest in marketising 
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and privatising the state under NPM reforms, and a common interest became soon 
apparent between politicians and consultants, who justified outsourcing of public services. 
As chapter five speculates there could be a form of rent-seeking from using consultants, as 
there could be possibilities that senior managers or even government have close links with 
consultants, or perhaps financial interests in certain consulting firms. This is an issue that 
requires further research. 
6.6.5 Restricted access to organisational resources and information 
From the quotes above, denial or restriction of access to organisation's resources and 
information is another issue of concern to PMMs as chapter five demonstrates. One 
reason, speculated the PMMs might be to make them increasingly dispensable by keeping 
them out of the picture possibly to give way to corrupt practices and an attempt to de- 
empower them. But senior management explain from an angle that suggests that they are 
careful to be part of every process, unsure of how much PMMs could be trusted to handle 
things effectively and appropriately in their absence. As explained earlier: 
if we have that power and are able to delegate that power then well be able to get things 
done through others.. . 
but then because of... 'causing financial loss to the state' 
... everybody wants to 
be there to see that the right person does the work and that they do 
it properly before they sign. So I think there are certain things pushing them to the wall to 
adhere to some strict principles and procedures (Director of Administration, KBu). 
As shown above senior management on the contrary, justify their increased centralisation 
of bureaucratic control, which has undesirable consequences for professionals' autonomy, 
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on the need to keep corrupt practices at bay, and also suggests their low level of trust in 
professionals' managerial [not professional] competence. Finally, the interactions and 
relationships between senior managers and professionals in this study could be understood 
by reference to a range of practices possibly linked with the socio-cultural practices 
inherent in Ghana's context (I have briefly discussed these in chapters one and two). How 
senior managers relate to PMMs could be influenced by this context. 
6.7 How professionals responded: coping strategies 
In this section I address the second research question, which seeks to investigate and 
conceptualise the strategies professionals employ in responding to the issues they 
encounter. Whereas both senior managers and PMMs experienced a range of issues, in this 
section the focus is to understand how middle managers go about responding to such as 
those issues identified in the previous section by focusing on the coping devices or 
resistance strategies they have employed. Essentially these issues are wrapped up in 
questions regarding the dialectic between devolution of authority to managers and 
autonomy to professionals. These issues suggest that managerial control has often been 
achieved at the cost of reduced professional autonomy in such a way that the power of the 
professionals has more often than not, been subsumed in that of managers. 
From an organisation studies perspective PMMs' resistance strategies to the issues (which 
relate to power and control) could be conceptualised as mechanisms for reasserting power 
and control. Conceptual lenses of power, control and resistance could be employed in 
making sense of PMMs' resistance and coping strategies in this study. Various factors have 
influenced professionals' responses, explaining similarities and differences in their 
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resistance or coping strategies. Among the factors are: the peculiarity of professional 
resistance explainable on the basis of their access to expert power; discourses shaping 
contemporary public workplaces, as well as endemic and systemic challenges facing Ghana, 
including a range of socio-economic and cultural factors that shape social interactions in 
Ghana. 
With respect to coping strategies, although there is evidence of different (direct and 
indirect, overt and covert, confrontational and non-confrontational) resistance strategies it 
is clear as suggested by interview data that respondents employed techniques that tend to 
minimise open verbal confrontation, and maximise indirect and non-verbal forms of 
engagement. These strategies are simplified and presented on Fig 6.3 below. 
Fig 6.3 Professional Middle Managers' Coping Strategies 
Whereas such inherently indirect, non-confrontational, non-verbal and non-deviant 
resistance strategies as shown on Fig 6.3 might appear as ineffective, they seem to 
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represent engagement tools by which PMMs sought to reposition themselves and 
renegotiate their authority. Apart from offering suggestions; insisting the right thing be bone; and 
pointing out system shorfalls, all the other strategies employed are indirect and non- 
confrontational and appear unsuspicious. However, when critically scrutinised such coping 
strategies could be seen as effective in increasing PMMs' power and control in the 
organisation to the extent that they are able to use these to establish their power. Whereas 
such coping strategies might be normally interpreted as a form of `consent' to their 
(professionals) subordination, they seemed to be employed paradoxically to enhance, 
reinforce and accentuate their control over the organisation. This suggests that by simply 
complying, subordinates could actually be exercising their control albeit indirectly, 
especially when their compliance becomes capable of amplifying lapses and flaws in 
organisational regulations, decisions and processes. 
This form of resistance comes close to strategies employed by peasant farmers in Northern 
Malaysia, which Scott (1985) conceptualised into his famous theory of `the weapons of the 
weak' (see chapter three for a summary). While the context on which Scott's theory was 
based is partly different (in a non-professional blue collar environment) from the context 
of my study, the theory has relevance for this study for two reasons. First, it occurred in an 
LDC context; second, it focused on individual (micro), rather than group behaviour in 
response to control from the top. Its relevance also lay in the fact that it draws attention to 
other forms of resistance, which combine apparent consent with non confrontational 
resistance as evident in this (my) study. 
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6.8 Conceptualising Professionals' Coping Strategies 
Professionals, in the cases studied, strategically sought to resist managerial behaviour by 
means which are both similar to and also significantly different from conventional 
resistance strategies as found in the control and resistance literature (discussed in chapter). 
A summary of this literature is that, in response to attempts of managerial control, workers 
either display militancy through open confrontations such as industrial actions; or 
acquiescence, expressed through docility and haggard outlook. In this thesis project, 
however, modes of resistance reflect neither category in particular; at best they come close 
to the latter in the sense that they involve little engagement in open confrontation. This is 
no doubt unsurprising as the unit of analysis in my research is non-unionised professional 
workers who tend to respond to control, real or imagined, in more complex and less 
straight-forward ways than do unionised blue or white collar workers on whose reactions 
earlier accounts of resistance were based. Professionals' modes of resistance, which come 
close to compliance or consent as presented on Fig 6.3, could produce results that might 
be as effective as, and perhaps even more effective than those produced by traditional 
strategies of resistance. In this thesis project for instance, when professionals appeared to 
have colluded in what looks like their own exploitation, the space for resistance seemed 
rather increased, not reduced as in previous accounts. It suggests again that PMMs 
employed compliance as a means of resisting management. This observation both suggests 
compliance may not necessarily reduce the space for resistance and may counter earlier 
accounts of control holding that, `when workers are controlled their ability to resist is 
reduced (Case, 1995; du Gay, 1996; Barker, 1999; Carlone and Larson, 2006). The crucial 
question that remains to be answered with respect to this study however, is why PMMs 
employed the coping strategies they did. These modes of professionals' resistance suggest 
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there could be modes and strategies of resistance to control that might be uniquely 
professional, differentiated from non-professional workers and non-professional settings. 
Like other workers, subjected to senior management control in various ways, PMMs 
exhibited considerable variation and complexity in their mode of resistance, distinguished 
from [conventional] worker resistance strategies. Their resistance to managerial discourses 
and control tended to occur with minimal verbal confrontation, avoiding as much open 
confrontation as possible. Quotes from chapter five provide evidence, which suggests that 
PMMs felt dissatisfied with a range of actions taken by management concerning 
outsourcing enacted by senior management, including how and by who decisions are made, 
all impinging on their decision-making power and professional autonomy. In response 
PMMs devised means, which although might portray them as consenting to their own 
subjugation, might also be interpreted as means by which they sought to enhance their 
capacity to renegotiate their allocated space, reconstruct their identity and reposition 
themselves in the organisation. By these means they reassert their power and status in the 
organisation by comparing their knowledge to that of external consultants with whom 
senior managers tend to consult. Realizing their suggestions to senior managers receive 
little attention, professionals withdrew from verbal confrontation and adapted a variety of 
non-verbal strategies whereby they sought to engage senior management. 
Among such resistance strategies also was `withholding pmfessional expertise' in situations where 
this is most needed to salvage a situation. This possibly suggests PMMs may find comfort 
in using this tool when technical difficulties arise in the process of implementing an 
initiative prescribed by external consultants without their (PMMs') inputs. I suggest that 
withholding professional expertise was employed intentionally to draw attention to the 
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weaknesses of the system but also to draw attention to the important position PMMs 
occupy in the organisation due perhaps to their expert knowledge. When they did, system 
weaknesses became amply obvious, which they readily harnessed to their advantage. 
In summary, professionals sought to carry the message across without verbally engaging 
with management, showing their power [not weakness] through non-confrontational 
means, and contesting the situation non-verbally. In the sections following I re-examine 
these points with findings from authors from organisation studies literature. 
6.8.1 Disengagement and withdrawal 
In the cases studied for this project some professionals decided to discontinue any form of 
direct engagement with management over the encountered issues, suggesting a process of 
disengagement among professionals. Recently, Smith and Walshe (2004) had argued that 
professional middle managers' dissatisfaction with NPM reforms in healthcare is gradually 
resulting in a vicious circle of physician disempowerment, disengagement and 
disenchantment. Some (Regen, 2002) think this is similar to worker alienation, a viewpoint 
supported by Caron and Giauque's (2006) who found an evolving culture of fear and 
withdrawal among civil servants under NPM. Nonetheless, the problem with this 
conclusion is that there can hardly be said to be a complete disengagement as professionals, 
have through various indirect, subtle means, demonstrated their ability to engage without 
confrontation. There is thus some form of withdrawal but I argue this is restricted 
principally to overt, confrontational forms of engagement. While professionals' collusion in 
their own subordination might have reduced the space for verbal, overt resistance, it seems 
on the contrary, to increase their space for covert, subtle, fine-grained forms of resistance. 
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6.8.2 Control, resistance, compliance and consent 
Much of earlier literature on control and resistance suggested that control or domination is 
achieved at the expense of resistance (Ascraft and Mumby, 2004; Carlone and Larson, 
2006). This viewpoint however tends to mask the agency of humans with respect to their 
experience of contemporary life, inhibit responses that might help fight domination. It is 
suggested for example in this project that in giving their consent through subordinating to 
management, professionals might-be aiming to resist managerial control. Rather than 
becoming confrontational or disengaging as some did, other professionals in this study 
decided to take active hold of reforms in order to exert their influence, a scenario similar to 
what Sehested (2002) reported in her study of medical professionals' resistance to 
managerial control. Thus through various indirect means they seemed to consent to 
managerial definitions of what they (professionals) are allowed or not allowed to do. Surely 
professionals had scanned the system, noticing the flaws. However, rather than being 
confrontational, professionals decided to be non-confrontational, and non-vocal, yet taking 
active control of the reform process in ways that seem to amplify the weaknesses and flaws 
of the system. By these strategies [consenting to their own subordination], professionals 
sought to reassert control, thus supporting an earlier finding that management control 
strategies could become employee resource (Rosenthal, 2004) for both resisting 
management, and for reasserting control. 
Of course there are cases of non-confrontational resistance such as `making out' in the case 
of shop floor workers; (Burawoy, 1979); `playing up' within the UK Police (Butterfield et al, 
2004) or `circumventing the system' in a telephone banking establishment (Knights and 
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McCabe, 1998b) or even work-to-rule. But these all suffer one defect: their effective 
operation requires reliance on a close network of informal peer groups by collectively 
compromising certain standards to their selfish advantage (Butterfield et al, 2004). In that 
sense I describe these as deviant means of resistance, as those engaging them could risk facing 
disciplinary action if apprehended by management. Similarly, among professionals, the 
successful operation of such strategies requires a continuous reliance on the cooperation 
and support of fellow professionals (Kitchener, et al, 2000). These forms of resistance 
necessarily involve engaging in some form of unacceptable behaviours at work which can have 
serious implications for those who are exercised by them. Fig 6.3 presents examples of 
other indirect forms of resistance [such as doing as told; not bending rules, insisting the 
right thing be done], the exercise of which does not require any form of deviance. I argue 
that as their use does not involve the breaking of any rules these forms of resistance 
methods could be safer for those employing them than deviant forms to the extent that 
they provide a form of safety-net ; it instead makes those who employ them appear more 
compliant. A quote would help: 
`There is no need to talk; just make sure you do what you are expected to... if 
something goes wrong and you're sure that's not your responsibility, just don't 
worry ... 
keep doing as you are told... nobody is breaking any rules here-we're 
keeping every rule and we want to keep them well. If they think they need you, they 
would come to you (Estate Manager, KATH). 
Since these modes of resistance normally represent a display of consent and compliance, 
traditionally they would be associated with weak, docile, uncomplaining types of employees 
(Thomas and Davies, 2005; Rosenthal, 2004). However, the potency of such seemingly 
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unthreatening modes of resistance may lay in the fact, as suggested in this study, that they 
may turn out to amplify the shortcomings of the system and could reinforce professionals' 
position against senior management control. 
Such non-deviant resistance strategies employed by these PMMs could represent a 
perspective on control and resistance, and constitute one of the contributions of this thesis 
to the control and resistance literature. 
6.8.3 Individual action as against collective action: micro level resistance 
In the context of current personnel management strategies such as human resource 
management, believed by some to favour individualism over collectivism in the 
employment relationship, collective modes of resistance seem to be on the decline in 
preference for individualised modes. Additionally, the control strategies employed by 
management also seemed to have changed significantly following changes in the structure 
of employment in the age of the knowledge economy. Present modes of control, according 
to Barker (1993); and Carlone and Larson (2006), have tended to target the shaping of 
individual identities. Some scholars (Axtell, 2007) have described such modes of control as 
the `last frontier of control' (If there is indeed a `last frontier of control', then there must 
also be a corresponding balancing factor: last frontier of resistance, which I argue is 
epitomised by the styles of resistance evident in these cases studies). An important 
observation from the resistance strategies emerging from this study is that they occur at the 
micro (individual) level. Whether this is due to the existence of a strong organisational 
culture emphasising individualism and strong anti-union discourses this is an interesting 
point, and would constitute a subject of further inquiry. 
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6.8.4 Control attempted through resistance 
Most of the resistance strategies employed in these studies can be described as inherently 
subtle, perhaps too smart to be noticed. Another observation is that, when confronted with 
a dilemma professionals decided to be loyal to their profession by sticking to their 
professional standards. This form of professional allegiance seems to provide them with a sort 
of consolation as they struggle to negotiate imposed managerial frameworks. For PMMs 
resistance was actually a means to gain recognition as well as wield control over 
management; it was employed to re-enact, recast, and establish their positions in the 
organisation. As one interviewee remarked: 
... 
But when they run into difficulties I'm the first person to contact... this means they 
know I cannot be ignored at all times..... So now I see that no matter what, they will come 
to me.... So now the question is not whether they will come; it's when they will come 
because whether they like it or not they will come (Technical Manager, K'Bu). 
PMMs sought to exercise control by becoming actively involved in the organisation by 
keeping, not breaking the rules; this strategy is similar to `working to rule' (explained in 
next section). This appears one of the means by which they intended to draw 
management's attention to the shortcomings of the system. 
I do not intend to imply that there has been established in this thesis a direct causal link 
between professionals' chosen coping strategy and their organisation's performance. The 
accuracy of such a claim would be better established in a large scale quantitative research or 
longitudinal case studies; moreover, organisational performance would then also need to be 
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well defined in quantifiable, measurable terms. Nonetheless, as is typical of small scale 
qualitative research such as this, general conclusions can be drawn, based on critical 
analysis, about the potential of such indirect coping strategies on reform outcomes. It 
seemed as a response to a felt reduced discretion, professionals tend to find comfort in 
concentrating on their profession by drawing a conceptual distinction between their `job' 
and their `profession'. They decided to not allow conflicts arising from their jobs to affect 
their attitudes to their profession, which suggests their profession takes priority over their 
job. If such approach becomes the attitude professionals adapt to their job, its outcomes 
could be quite costly, if indirect; in fact it could be failure to attain organisational targets. 
6.9 Conceptualising the mode of resistance 
Evidence from this study suggests that professionals engaged in what could be described as 
self-reflection with regards to the space defined for them by senior management, and in the 
process, enacted their own space which became a site for engaging with senior 
management. Concerning this form of reflection, Collinson (2003: 529) observed: 
As reflexively monitoring and purposive creatures, we humans have the capacity to 
reflect upon ourselves, and to see ourselves as separate from [what we have been 
defined by] the natural and social world around us... we thus have the capacity to 
envisage alternative realities, and to reconstruct and change [ourselves and] our 
world (paraphrase, mine). 
What we think of ourselves is crucial to how we respond to the environment. This relates 
to the question of identity in the sense that our mode of reaction to stimuli depends 
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principally on our perception of our true selves. In these cases the types of reaction 
professionals demonstrated are suggestive of their perceptions about their true selves as 
either professionals or managers or both. In that sense Collinson's (2003) work provides an 
explanatory framework for these dynamics. Collinson identified three different (resistant, 
conformist and dramaturgical selves that emerged as workers, trying to react to managerial 
control, recast and reconstruct themselves (see chapter three). He contended that from a 
Foucauldian perspective, organisational [and workplace surveillance] systems produce and 
reproduce `disciplined or conformist selves'. Such self-disciplining modes, he observes, 
often tend to split individual selves between `competing and conflicting ends', where for 
instance, by ascribing primary significance to life outside work, employees can begin to 
divide their identity between the instrumental and indifferent me at work; and the mal me outside 
of work. 
In the data analysed here all three categories of selves discussed above are present. In his 
conceptualisation, Collinson presents these three selves as separate categories, implying, 
that given three employees A, B and C, each could be any of these selves; however, his 
theorising remains unclear whether employee A could possibly cast themselves into each of 
these selves at the same or different times. In this thesis there is evidence to support 
Collinson's conceptualisation of selves; there is also evidence suggesting that these three 
selves could be possibly combined in one and the same worker at different times and under 
different circumstances. The picture that emerged from this research therefore, is a 
complex, non-linear mode of resistance whereby individuals construct, recast and produce 
themselves into different selves. It became possible for the same individual to respond to a 
given situation in ways that depict them as compliant, resistant, and dramaturgical selves 
concurrently. We could then argue that the three selves are, and could possibly become 
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easily embodied in one subject (person). In this case the subject (self) is either putting on 
these different identities at different times under different conditions or demonstrate some 
simultaneity in exhibiting these shifting identities in the sense that they sought to achieve 
resistance through conformity, and through a process that could be described as 
dramatizing. 
Professionals begin by engaging means similar to compliance or colluding in their 
subordination in responding to the issues they encounter. Unsuspicious as these might 
seem, such strategies are meant to register their (professionals') disapproval and discontent 
with organisational initiatives, decisions and processes. Since they chose to employ indirect 
strategies, they have got to act it out in order not to be suspected as resisting; in other words, 
they pretend to be genuinely complying and consenting to organisational processes, senior 
management viewpoints and resources deployed to regulate their activities. In that sense 
they engage in dramatitizng by adopting these strategies, professionals come to occupy the 
position of actors-those dramatising. The drama comes to light when one tries to 
understand what seems to be a false-front, which represents a mismatch between their 
objective (resisting managerial control strategies), and vehicles and strategies (doing as told; 
just cooperate; don't bend rules as represented on Fig 6.3), which they employed in 
reaching this objective. In this case the same self, not different selves, is presented as 
conformist, dramaturgical, and resistant. In trying to resist management control 
professionals, perhaps conscious of the likely consequences of direct resistance, adopt 
strategies that depict them as conforming to or complying with management control. 
Since both management and professionals as categories have sought to exercise control 
over each other, one could argue that control is at the very core of the interactions between 
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management and professionals in this project. Surely, managers' tendency to be part of 
every organisational process is underlain by the desire to be in control of these processes. 
Similarly, from Foucauldian analysis professionals' demand on managers to make the 
processes more transparent could be informed by a clear desire to exercise control over the 
process, hence the struggle for transparency which typified managerial-professional 
relationships in these case studies is to some degree to be understood a struggle for 
dominance (Levay and Waks, 2005). The foregoing are conflict-oriented, yet confrontation- 
free, and non-deviant resistance strategies in the sense that they do not require breaking 
any rules; they require strict observation of organisational processes, procedures and rules 
but in ways that result in protecting the interest of PMMs not necessarily that of the 
organisation. 
In summary, PMMs: (i) sought to exercise control on the organisation without strikes, 
absenteeism, or many form of open confrontation characteristic of traditional worker 
resistance; (ii) engaged no deviant resistance strategies by engaging in unacceptable 
behaviours, which when caught could cost them their jobs; (iii) resisted in the comfort of 
their normal daily activities, by operating within [not outside of] the confines of 
organisational rules and regulations. It remains unclear however whether professionals have 
managed to exercise substantive control by their chosen modes of resistance. One thing 
remained clear that they have, by these drawn attention to the weaknesses and flaws in 
organisational decisions and initiatives of senior managers and external consultants. Such 
resistance strategies bear semblance with a popular unionised resistance strategy like 
`working to rule'. Additionally, the manner in which they employed this strategy can be 
explained by reference to the exercise of `expert power' among professionals. Their method 
of seeking control through compliance could be placed side by side peasants' forms of 
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resistance, which Scott (1985) theorised as the weapons of the weak (see Hanchard, 2004) 
(see chapter three for a detailed account). The following two subsections deal with work to 
rule, expert power and weapons of the weak, in turn. 
6.9.1 Work to rule 
`Working to rule' or `work to rule' is a strategic practice whereby employee groups engage 
in industrial action without losing pay by following their work's rules and regulations so 
strictly to the letter that. either nothing gets done at all or only little gets done. It is a 
disguised form of industrial action in which employees work strictly according to the terms 
of their contract of employment. This requires working to the rules of the jobs without 
cutting corners or taking short cuts with the view to slowing down production without 
engaging in any illegal behaviour that might warrant a disciplinary action. Doran (2007) 
calls this responsible rebellion typified by Irish nurses' industrial action which they embarked 
upon without losing public support and their wages. In a modern workplace almost every 
job is governed by a battery of rules, regulations, standing orders and procedures, many of 
them practically unworkable, which are often ignored and violated to facilitate the work 
process. By `working to rule', disgruntled employees pay attention to each of these 
unworkable regulations that eventually result in confusion and unnecessary delays. 
Professionals' mode of resistance as shown in this study can be conceptualised as a form of 
`work to rule' strategy. Unlike `work to rule', however which occurs collectively as 
organised, unionised activity, professionals' resistance in this thesis occurred at the micro 
level, and so are better conceptualised as `individualised version of work to rule'. It is 
unclear however why an apparently unionised strategy would be employed at the level of 
258 
the individual [in non-unionised fashion]. If indeed, a work-to-rule strategy has been 
consciously employed, then in finding an interpretation, one could speculate that unionised 
activity may not be very much welcomed in the context studied, although the research 
context provides little evidence for this argument. Should such a speculation be founded, it 
would only confirm the popularly held view that part of the task of management is to 
reduce professional autonomy and the power and influence of unions. 
6.9.2 Expert power 
The exercise of expert power has been a pervasive feature of most professions in 
organisation studies literature (see for example Reed, 1996). By their possession of 
cognitive and technical knowledge, professionals have been understood as having expert 
power, which in chapter three, I have explained (using Crozier, 1964 theorising) constitute 
a control resource by which they exert their power over those who benefit from the use of 
their expert knowledge. In this sense and as demonstrated by PMMs in this project, expert 
power constitutes a professional control resource. However, once professionals come to 
work in modem, especially public organisations, as in the cases for this project, how their 
expert power could be curbed by developing, fabricating and implementing control 
strategies and technologies to forestall abuse becomes one of the main goals of 
management. This ensuing power struggle typifies Crozier's (1964: 160-65) analysis of the 
dialectic between expert power and control within modern organisations, which I discussed 
in chapter three under managerial-professional relationships. The withholding of 
professional expertise, characteristic of professionals' subtle resistance strategy especially in 
the high-value/complex skills case in this project could be conceptualised as the exercise of 
expert power albeit in an individualised as opposed to unionised fashion. 
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6.9.3 Weapons of the Weak 
Scott's (1985) influential weapons of the weak is another useful framework within which 
the coping strategies adopted by PMMs in this research project can be located. According 
to Scott the peasant studied for his thesis, had a clear choice of being confrontational and 
violent in their response resistance to the injustices of exploitation and unfairness they 
encountered in the rural economy. However, the strategies they adopted fell entirely short 
. of any such confrontational approaches, relying more on compliance, through which they 
sought to resist. While they cognitively resisted the regime, their public compliance seemed 
to have completely masked any potential attempt to resist. This recourse to compliance-an 
attempt to avoid violence, Scott argued, was consistent with the culture of order and 
harmony, typical of peasants in most Eastern Asian countries at the time of his research. 
According to Scott (1985) and Hanchard (2004) while the cognitive resistance of the 
peasants contrasted very much with their public compliance, these were by no means 
conflicting; on the contrary, they sought to attain resistance through compliance, and could 
in fact be mutually reinforcing. Like the peasant farmers in the weapons of the weak, 
PMMs in this project resort to non-violence means of resistance. They clearly seek to 
achieve resistance through compliance, avoiding confrontation, and cooperating instead. 
Why did PMMs remain non-confrontational deviant? Surely, the demands imposed by a 
culture of order and harmony in a society of a clear power-distance could be responsible 
for PMMs' mode of resistance (I amplify this point in the next section). 
Clearly professionals have access to control resources, which they can exercise in various 
ways, but which in this project they exercised, using such non-deviant behaviour. The 
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uniqueness of the findings from this project lies in the fact that these professionals' 
resistance strategies are being engaged at the individual level, and largely through 
compliance, exercised in an environment of expert power. Yet there is another possible 
explanatory variable for understanding why PMMs responded the way they did in this 
project, which I discuss in the next section. 
6.10 Interpreting managerial-professional relationships with reference to Ghana's 
economic, political and socio-cultural context 
Precisely why professionals employed their chosen modes of resistance remains unclear 
however. In this section I attempt a set of possible explanations, based on features of 
Ghana's public sector, which could also be explained by reference to a range of socio- 
cultural and economic factors that tend to shape social interactions in Ghana in general, 
and in the public sector in specific. 
These include cultural practices relating to power distance, party politics and political 
differences; respect; chieftaincy and traditional authority; the concept and practice of 
democracy; high unemployment rate; trust/mistrust; and corruption. I have discussed these 
in detail in chapter one; in this section I examine how these could shape interactions 
between senior managers and PMMs studied for this project. 
6.10.1 Power distance 
Cultural practices related to power distance (Hofstede, 1981) (refer to chapter one for fuller 
analysis of power distance) could possibly find their way to managerial-professional 
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relations where, due to the powerful position of senior managers defined and conferred by 
their status in the organisation, criticising them or directly objecting to their viewpoints 
might be thought unacceptable. This conclusion is based on the fact that during interviews 
where respondents needed to offer their candid assessment of managerial initiatives several 
of them asked that their responses be not recorded especially if their assessment was a 
criticism rather than praise for the initiative. Others made statements that suggested they 
were afraid of freely speaking their minds. A quote illustrates this: 
Sometimes, you need to be careful... someone might think there's a personal interest 
somewhere or they might think you dislike someone, so it makes you become more careful. 
So many people prefer to keep quiet until things go wrong (Environmental Sanitation 
Manager KBu). 
One could thus argue from this perspective that the distance created by the unequal 
distribution of legitimate power in the organisation could possibly explain why there was 
little use of confrontational and direct forms of resistance. 
6.10.2 Age-and-status-based respect 
With respect to status politicians, spiritual leaders and the rich still command considerable 
respect in Ghana. This age-and-status-based respect culture does not seem to fade away in 
subordinate-boss relationships at the contemporary workplace as illustrated in the quote 
below: 
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Uuhh!!! Some of these issues.. .1 
do not want to talk about them... sometimes, it's very 
difficult 
... sometimes 
it's difficult because the politicians still have the power, and, who are 
you (Project Analyst, GHS, pilot interview-September 2004)? 
Thus although respect for one's boss has been generally believed as a universal law of 
human nature and behaviour (Danso, 2007), it appears to be less critically employed in 
Ghana at least at the visible or displayed level. In Ghana, it seems subordinates have 
substantial difficulty in directly criticising their superiors, which might not be a good sign 
(Egbue, 2006). Similarly, in a large part, superiors still have considerable difficulty in 
accepting criticism from their subordinates. 
6.10.3 Chieftaincy and traditional authority: 
Where formal channels for questioning authority are not open to everybody, gossip and 
backbiting thus tend to become the way subjects complain and criticise whenever the 
powerful go wrong. It is possible that such king-subject relationships could be cascaded 
down to boss-subordinate, managerial-professional at the workplace where criticism of the 
former by the latter is generally un-welcomed. Within this context, criticisms must take on 
new shapes; strategies employed by professionals in this study might thus be described as 
new forms of criticism as these seem to be embedded in such a cultural orientation and 
context. 
6.10.4 Absence or distortions of democracy in LDCs 
A strong democratic culture in a bureaucratic civil service is a foundation for both the 
successful implementation of NPM reforms (Olowu, 2002), and curbing corruption in the 
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context of LDCs (Agyeman-Duah, 2004). In a country like Ghana, democracy is still a 
growing concept. Democracy is required to provide the right type of leadership with 
respect to decision-making; however, in African context, most managers adopt autocratic 
style of leadership as opposed to democratic participatory, consultative decision-making 
style (Munene et al 2000). In my opinion, the dynamics of chieftaincy institution, age-and- 
status-based respect and true democratic or participatory decision making as it operates in 
the West do not sit comfortably with each other. These African cultural values define ways 
that the art of management is done either by those who manage or are managed. According 
to Schwartz's (1999) observation, re-echoed by Munene et al (2000: 340): 
cultural values underlie the rules that determine who is eligible to make decisions, what 
actions are allowed or constrained, what procedures must be followed, what information 
must or must not be provided, and what pay-offs are assigned to individuals. Within this 
framework, senior managers do not feel obliged to involve middle managers in 
taking crucial decisions, nor see the need to make organisational processes 
transparent enough. 
Part of these cultural values among African managers as Munene et al (2000) have noted 
earlier on is that they tend to prefer contacting their peers or superiors rather than 
subordinates when making decisions. In that sense subordinates would be viewed more as 
recipients of organisational decisions and less as initiators and interrogators of such. This 
could explain some of the concerns raised by PMMs over how and by whom organisational 
decisions are made. 
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6.10.5 Party Politics and political differences and party politicking 
I have, in chapter one made clear the influence of people's political persuasion and political 
affiliation on their lives and decisions, especially with respect to issues with considerable 
political underpinning. I have also observed that political meanings could be read into 
criticising one's boss at work; relating to one's superiors in this type of environment thus 
calls for `being careful' and `circumspect' about what one says and how they say it. This 
phenomenon could possibly explain why during interviews, there were several instances 
where respondents advised that certain responses be taken off record but also why less 
direct means were employed in responding to issues encountered under senior 
management. The above however remain speculations based on the nature of interactions 
from the interviews, and further research would be required to substantiate them. 
6.10.6 Outcomes of attempts to control corruption 
I have, in chapter one, discussed corruption and its devastating consequences for public 
sector reforms in LDCs in general, and in Ghana in particular. Interview transcripts from 
the case studies suggest that due to the fear of corruption, senior managers resorted to 
increased centralisation as opposed to decentralisation, crucially central to effective NPM 
reforms. However, as the analyses have suggested such increased centralisation has 
delivered paradoxical consequences. On the one hand (from senior managers), increased 
centralisation is believed to curb corrupt practices; on the other (from PMMs), it has 
actually acted as a motivator for corrupt practices as people, willing to avoid the associated 
long delays, tend to `pay their way through' or `grease officials' hands' [a common term 
used in Ghana for describing bribery]. Centralisation then produced two negative 
outcomes. First, it defeated a fundamental objective of NPM: to devolve power to middle 
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management (in this case, professionals). Second, it was believed to engender corrupt 
practices, and further reduce the level of trust. I must emphasise however that the 
challenge of corruption to outsourcing is a global problem, as I have made clear in chapter 
two (see also Greenaway, 1995). The magnitude of the challenge of corruption within the 
Ghanaian context however is that it tends to lead to very low levels of trust, producing 
management systems and strategies that result in procedural inertia, which ultimately 
undermine the very objectives underpinning NPM reform initiatives. I discuss the subject 
of trust in the next section. 
6.10.7 Trust/mistrust 
The contradictory relationship between corruption and outsourcing in plays the context of 
LDCs has already been discussed in chapter two. Whilst my analysis partly suggests that 
controlling corruption is one rationale for outsourcing, it also suggests paradoxically that 
outsourcing (especially the contract awarding process) has often tended to fuel corrupt 
practices. From a political viewpoint outsourcing was seen as a means of building public 
trust because it was believed to encourage transparency by inviting private organisations to 
be part of the delivery of public services. Yet professional managers are concerned about 
their not being involved in making outsourcing decisions, and the lack of transparency 
surrounding outsourcing contract process, which suggests the anticipated public trust could 
not be realised or guaranteed. Trust, as made clear in chapter one, is a rather slippery 
subject in Ghana because of peculiar features engrained in the Ghanaian culture which 
have the potential to further jeopardise the already low level of trust. Uncertainties create 
mistrust; and mistrust leads to little delegation. For instance, in this study, this could 
explain senior managers' resolve to be personally involved in most organisational processes 
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due also to fears of being penalised if things do not go well. Professionals' resentment that 
senior managers have resorted to increased centralisation of procedures rather than 
decentralisation, following NPM reforms could be explained on the basis of the fact that 
they interpreted such detailed procedures as mistrust. 
6.10.8 High unemployment rate 
I have discussed in chapter one how unemployment could influence workplace interactions 
as they affect this project. If PMMs' job could be on the line for directly criticising senior 
management, then it is likely the former would use more subtle, indirect means of 
resistance and criticism as happened in these case studies. Thus the way that PMMs 
responded to the issues they encountered would be best understood and appreciated by 
reference to these complex, intertwined socio-cultural factors that underpin the attitudes of 
Ghanaians. 
6.11 Summary of Factors determining the issues of concern to PMMs and their adoF end 
coping devices 
The relevant questions that this chapter has attempted to answer include: What issues 
generate conflicts between senior and professional middle managers? How did senior 
managers and PMMs respond to these issues? Why did they employ their chosen strategies? 
What lessons can we learn from all this? As the discussions suggest, the issues faced by 
PMMs as well as coping devices and resistance strategies they adopted could be jointly 
determined, or at least influenced by a number of factors, which might fall in at least four 
main categories: (i) The contradictory, tensional, conflictual and paradoxical nature of the 
267 
NPM model and the concomitant tensional relationships unleashed between managers and 
professionals by the conflicts between managerial objectives and professional values; (ii) 
the challenges presented by the collaboration (outsourcing agreements) between profit- 
making private outsourcing firms and non-for profit government health institution, now 
trying to operate as a private business entity (corporatised organisation) (iii) the challenges 
faced by LDCs with NPM reforms due to certain characteristic features; and (iv) particular 
local conditions defined by the political, socio-economic and cultural environment that 
define social interaction, and the workplace dynamics in Ghana, which provide the context 
in which this research is being conducted. These are illustrated in Fig 6.4 below. 
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Fig 6.4 Interactive Framework for Conceptualising Managerial Professional Relationships under NPM Reform in 
Ghana 
Secondary Factors 
Features of an LDC 
Primary Factors 
Public choice/managerialism 
Power distance Managerial/Professional Values 
Age/status-based respect Challenges of Entrepreneurial 
Traditional authority dynamics public management 
Concept/practice of democracy Tensions in public-private sector 
Party politicking collaboration 
Corruption/Trust/Mistrust 
Ghana's cultural and NPM reform ambiguities, 
workplace dynamics conflicts, tensions, 
Public sector ethos contradictions 
Professional practice 
Professional Identities 
Management style 
Managerial approach to 
contract management 
Managerial-Professional Relationships 
Issues and Challenges Encountered 
Coping Devices /Survival Strategies 
NPM Reform Outcomes 
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These different concepts interact in various ways to contribute to the issues encountered, 
the coping devices adopted, which altogether affect the NPM outcomes in Ghana. But first 
of all it is important to identify some primary factors, and some secondary factors, and how 
the former are mediated by and through the latter to provide the context for this research. 
The primary factors in Fig 6.4 are to the right and include the conceptual map of NPM, 
which then produce the inherent ambiguities, tensions and conflicts. The secondary factors 
to the left side of the diagram consist of features of LDCs combined with Ghana's 
traditional value system made of its political, cultural and socio-economic characteristics. 
These together define the cultural and workplace dynamics that shapes the ethos in 
Ghana's public service. These secondary factors then compound the tensions, ambiguities, 
conflicts and paradoxes inherent in NPM reforms in Ghana. Together, these primary and 
secondary factors interact to shape management style, contract management strategies, 
professional identities as well as professional practice. All these in turn influence and shape 
managerial-professional interactions and relationships; the issues PMMs encounter, as well 
as the coping devices and resistance strategies adopted in responding to them. It is within 
the management style and professional practice that the managerial-professional 
relationships and interactions, issues encountered as well as coping strategies investigated 
and identified in this study are all located. Together, these interact in a non-linear fashion 
to deliver NPM outcome in Ghana, as in many other developing countries. 
In an LDC (African) economy such as Ghana, the outcome of NPM reforms are 
influenced by a number of factors as outlined above. Whether and the extent to which 
NPM reforms would be successful would depend largely on the compatibility of the NPM 
model, its ambiguities, tensions, conflicts, contradictions and paradoxes, on the one hand 
with the local workplace dynamics, shaped and determined by the political, economic and 
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socio-culturally embedded local context, on the other (Fig 6.4 above clearly illustrates this). 
In light of Western influence on many traditional cultural values I am not laying claim to 
the fact that the foregoing features are necessarily present in every part of Ghana and in all 
workplaces. As Danso (2007) claimed, `modernity is taking a gradual but firm root in 
Ghana, and some of the cultural practices are giving way to modern Western-influenced 
values'. Globalisation and internationalisation are fast producing corrosive effects on so- 
called national cultures; moreover, even traditionally, Ghana is not a one-culture society. 
However, the forgoing observations are helpful in serving as a reference point for 
understanding some of the findings from this thesis project. While the non-compatibility of 
managerialism and its ideals with professionalism and its values system has been identified 
as one cause of the conflicts between managers and professionals studied in this project, 
interactions between senior managers and PMMs are also being mediated by the set of local 
factors identified above. The understanding gained from the impacts of such systemic 
factors on managerial-professional interactions under NPM [in outsourcing public services] 
would be a starting point for answering the third research question, which I turn to in the 
next section. 
6.12 What lessons can we learn from questions 1 and 2 above to move forward our 
understanding of the implication of the interaction between managerial authority 
and professional autonomy for NPM reform outcomes in a developing non- 
Western country context? 
This section addresses the major Research Question 3, which seeks to explore the lessons 
that can be learned from the analysis of Research Questions 1 and 2 above. The answers 
suggested to these questions can help move forward our understanding of the nature of 
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managerial-professional relationships under NPM, the specific nature and challenges of 
implementing NPM reforms in LDCs, and how these affect NPM-type reform outcomes 
in these countries. An interesting finding that emerged (chapter five) relates to the 
relationships between the level of skill involved in the function being outsourced on the 
one hand, and the nature of managerial-professional interactions and extent of managerial- 
professional conflicts on the other. There is some evidence to suggest that professionals 
engaged in areas of high-value skills are more likely to become the targets of managerial 
control [largely due to the complexity associated with managing the outsourcing contracts 
in this case] than those engaged in areas of low-value skills, where managing outsourcing 
contracts looks much simpler and straightforward. I have, on the basis of the above 
suggested that greater conflicts surround the management of high-value skills function 
contracts than those of low-value skills. 
This could be explained on the basis of professionals' inherent tendency to strive to 
exercise control over a territory over which they are believed to possess expert power 
(. Crozier, 1964). Evidence from the case studies suggests professionals attempted to 
protect their territories defined by their domain of expertise and authority, continuously 
redefined, negotiated and reconstructed by senior managers through their regular, 
systematic anxiety to look into what happens in those `seemingly professionally-colonised 
territories' as Reed's (1996) argument suggests. For instance, one can clearly see the 
conflictual and tensional character of managerial-professional relationships from the 
transcripts of managers from the high-value skills areas, especially managers from 
biomedical engineering and technical departments from both KATH and KBu (chapter 
five). It suggests both professionals and managers expect to see a greater level of 
transparency in processes and procedures. From this perspective, the threat presented by 
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professionals' exercise of control by virtue of their access to expert power, is resisted and 
managed by managers on the basis of their legitimate, positional power conferred on them 
by their organisation. In fact, management seemed to confront this threat of professionals' 
expert power by their increasing reliance on external consultants, who serve as a catalyst for 
`decoding' professionals' expert knowledge. Arguably, the shortfall in senior managers' 
knowledge, which constitutes professionals' power, is met through consultants' hire. 
One effect then of differences in skill level of functions outsourced is differences in 
complexity with respect to managing the outsourcing of the given function. Where skill 
required for managing outsourcing contract is complex, management would tend to view 
professionals' power as a threat, and seek to exercise control over the work process by 
hiring the services of external consultants. Therefore as well as mistrust in professionals, an 
underlining motivation of senior management's increased use of consultants is the need to 
render the complex interface managed by professionals more transparent. In the process, 
making decisions on crucial issues is transferred from PMMs and placed with consultants, 
which is one of the sources of the conflicts between senior managers and PMMs. This 
possibly explains why in relative terms, there is lesser degree of conflict between managers 
and professionals in the cleaning cases characterised by less complex and much more 
straightforward skills, where no complex decision making is required from PMMs, than in 
the installation and maintenance cases. 
6.13 Contribution to the NPM Model and its applicability to LD 
In this section I examine what happens when the public sector of LDCs encounter the 
NPM model due to its lack of internal consistency with respect to the three public 
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administration values (Hood, 1991) set out in chapter (Table 2.2). 1 argue that when 
applied to LDCs, NPM reforms not only deliver distorted and unintended consequences 
due to factors inherent in these countries, discussed fully elsewhere (see section 2.13, 
chapter two); the NPM variants implemented in most LDCs are arguably distorted 
versions. It is crucial to reiterate here the centrality of attaining economic efficiency 
[pursued through frugality and parsimony in public resource use (Hood, 1991)] to the 
NPM reform agenda. Moreover, the realisation of this agenda essentially requires greater 
political control of the public purse through relying effectively on a cadre of managers 
whose managerial competence and role are considered crucial in this endeavour (Aucoin, 
1990). It is this emphasis on cost efficiency, and the pivotal role of managers, and increased 
trust in their (managers') integrity and capacity to manage public services effectively and 
economically that partly distinguishes NPM from traditional public administration. I draw 
on Hood (1991), who argued that traditional public administration emphasises essentially 
three sets of values whereas the NPM model emphasises just one of these. To make this 
distinction a little clearer, readers are redirected to Table 2.3 (chapter two) reproduced from 
Hood (1991), in which three essential values upon which traditional public administration 
is premised are set out. 
These administrative values according to Hood and Jackson (1991), reproduced in Hood 
(1991) are special mechanisms built into the modelling of public services so as to ensure (i) 
cost efficiency and effectiveness; (ii) fairness and equity; and (iii) trust, reliability and 
stability in delivering such services. As shown on the table above sigma-type values-values 
NPM basically promotes-emphasise economy, parsimony and frugality; theta-type values 
emphasise honesty, openness and fairness; while lambda-type values stress security, resilience, 
and robustness in delivering public services. Hood (1991) had argued that the NPM model 
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essentially emphasises sigma-ype values to the neglect of many aspects of the other two 
values. Two decades on, these concerns still remain, and have been re-echoed recently 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 199; Whitfield, 2001; Hoque and Mills, 2001; Caron and 
Giaque, 2006). A common feature in these analyses is the criticism that NPM reforms 
overemphasize the economic dimension of public services, resulting in the neglect of other 
equally important values In that sense as Hood argues NPM reforms are largely sigma-type, 
targeted at achieving results by fixing resources to specific targets, and doing so at the least 
cost, aiming thus at purposefulness through leanness. 
However, when applied to a developing country context such as Ghana the NPM model is 
confronted with serious issues that question its very internal consistency. This raises 
legitimate questions about its compatibility with and applicability for LDCs against the 
backdrop of the economic, political and socio-cultural context of LDCs as evidenced from 
this project. The principal factor identified by foreign analysts as the cause of failure is the 
poorly developed public sectors in these countries (see chapter two), as a well-developed 
and functioning public sector and public service ethos is generally accepted as the 
foundation for effective NPM reforms (Hood, 1995; McCourt, 2001; Hope and Chikolu, 
2001). This absence of well-developed public service ethics is further compounded by the 
challenge of corruption, a mediating factor, which, I have argued in this thesis, has become 
a more endemic and systemic problem to LDCs than developed OECD countries, where 
the NPM model originated. 
Corruption, which in African context is a rather fluid subject, being inextricably intertwined 
with some of the daily cultural practices (Egbue, 2006) has, and continues to pose a 
substantial challenge, producing three significant effects on NPM reforms, which tend to 
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defeat the very reform objective in these countries. First, at the institutional level, [between 
politicians and senior public managers], the anticipated managerial devolution has remained 
largely a rhetoric (Christensen and Laegreid, 2002), where managerial devolution has 
occurred, this comes to be greatly subsumed in exogenously-predetermined political 
objectives and ambitions as these cases have vividly elucidated. Two, at the organisational 
level [between senior management and middle management, which in this study also largely 
constitutes professionals], the devolution, which also implies professional discretion and 
autonomy) remains to a large extent a mirage, and circumscribed in (senior) managerial 
agenda. Three, and as a result, NPM reforms have shown greater conceptual and practical 
shift away from sigma-type values towards theta-type values, tending to emphasise rectitude, 
fairness, mutuality, due process (procedures and processes), and a structured, rather than 
flexible approach to treating organisational information (Condrey et al, 2001; Awortwi, 
2002; Caron and Giaque, 2006). These have all become evident from this study. 
Essentially, these, often unintended consequences are largely due to fear of corruption, 
which could potentially result in some form of administrative catastrophe or negative 
externalities in delivering public services. Within the framework of traditional public 
administration such a catastrophe would represent a standard of failure (under lambda-type 
values) according to Jackson and Hood (1991). Indeed, in the context of LDCs such as 
Ghana the shortcoming of the NPM model lies in its failure to ensure the realisation of 
lambda-type values ['resilience' and `robustness']. In effect, theta-type values, which tend to 
emphasise `sticking to procedures' and increasing control from the centre, resulting from 
an obsession with the need to prevent corruption are unleashed. This is already occurring 
in both in politician-managerial relationships, where politicians are resorting to increased 
use of more complicated contracts, deployed through contractualism; and in managerial- 
professional relationships at the workplace, where PMMs face continuous subjection to the 
rigors of managerialism, with its concomitant emphasis on the `accounting logic', and cost 
containment philosophy as evidenced by the data presented in this thesis. Admittedly, in 
applying NPM reforms to a developing country-context such as Ghana, attention seems to 
be drifted away from sigma-type values [due to an obsession with the need to curtail 
corruption] and redirected to theta-type and lambda-type values. All this is meant to forestall a 
system breakdown, which corruption engenders. The net effect of this corruption-scare 
consciousness is a significantly reduced level of trust, one of the foundations on which the 
NPM model has been premised, and this has distorted the very model of NPM_ at least in 
the context of LDCs. 
Within this framework, when greater emphasis was put on theta-type values through 
increased bureaucratic centralisation, paradoxical outcomes were realised in that this 
neither ensured the materialisation of the anticipated lambda-type values in the form of 
controlled corruption, honesty and fairness nor the realisation of sigma-type values such as 
frugality and parsimony in resource use (cost efficiency and cost containment). On the 
contrary, it tended to deliver quite the opposite outcome of increased corruption resulting 
from delays associated with increased administrative barriers, with people bribing their way 
through, as evidenced from the interview analysis from these case studies. The result is a 
further diversion of senior managers' attention from core activities to a range of peripheral 
activities, demonstrated by their aspiration to be part of most organisational processes or 
hiring external consultants to manage this interface. There are associated costs either way. 
Mistrust seems an underlying element in these forms of senior-middle management 
interactions, and is resulting in the neglect of in-house expertise as illustrated from the 
installation and maintenance cases in this study. This has the eventual potential to reduce 
277 
internal [human] capacity development, as PMMs gradually get crowded-out from active 
involvement in organisational processes, thereby increasing public organisations' 
dependence on external consultants and service providers. An obvious net effect is a 
seriously jeopardised and reduced organisational knowledge and memory, which has 
serious cost implications for public organisations. This tends to defeat one of the 
fundamental objectives for outsourcing public services, which in the contexts studied was 
to address capacity shortage and cost-related issues. 
There are several lessons that can be learned from all this, a significant one being that the 
type of NPM practiced in most LDCs has been significantly distorted by the effects of the 
contextual factors noted above. Barely a decade after NPM had entered the public 
management equation, Hood (1995) after studying NPM reforms in a number of OECD 
countries concluded that, when applied to different country contexts, particularly non- 
Western developing countries, NPM is likely to deliver entirely different, varying outcomes, 
which would be interesting to observe. Indeed one obvious outcome is that when the global 
order (NPM model) encounters the local reordering (local conditions-produced by the factors 
identified in this thesis) what emerges is nothing more than a locally ordered NP M variant, a 
caricature of the Western model. It is here, in the application of NPM to a developing 
country context that my thesis especially seeks to contribute to our understanding with 
respect to the face of NPM reforms, or the `attire the emperor (NPM) is putting on' 
(Hood, 1995) in these countries. In spite of the now steadily growing, if still relatively 
scanty, literature on NPM in African context (Polidano, 1999; Olowu, 2003; Hope and 
Chikulo, 2002; Awortwi, 2003), only few (Munene et al, 2000; Egbue, 2006) attempt 
explaining reform failures from a non-Western perspective by examining the potential role 
played by particular African cultural practices in this interface. 
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The picture that emerges from pro-Western analysts' evaluation of NPM reforms in LDCs 
is one that portrays African public sectors as domains where the application of Western- 
type NPM models is still problematic, suggesting that Africans have still not got it [the 
Western model of reform-the ideal public service ethics which all nations must embrace]. 
Such a perspective blames African public management reform failures on the weaknesses 
of African public management systems rather than on the incompatibility between the 
Western-type Weberian public administration and its modified [NPMJ version on the one 
hand, and African cultural value systems, which provide the workplace dynamics that 
informs attitudes towards public management practice on the other. Although theoretically, 
I am not entirely opposed to such a perspective on the evaluation of NPM reforms in 
Africa, I do believe unnecessary emphasis on it has tended to mask a range of equally 
important factors, which cannot be explained simply by reference to the weaknesses of 
African public sectors. There is a growing body of academic analysis that is now beginning 
to interrogate the compatibility of current transplanted forms of public management 
imported to practiced in African countries with the culturally-based traditional practices of 
Africa (I shed more light on this in the final chapter). 
6.14. Contribution to managerial-professional relationships in the public sector 
Relating to managerial-professional relationships, the enactment of the position of the 
professional manager, which is in actual fact a coupling of two contradictory and tensional 
categories (managers and professionals) has introduced a range of issues with respect to 
managerial-professional relationships and identities. As the following argumentation 
suggests it appears both PMMs and senior managers do encounter conceptual difficulties in 
recognising the role and position of the former. There are possible confusions and 
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uncertainties as to whether the position of professional manager (Ph1M) helps develop [in 
the professional] new perspectives, attitudes and value systems that privilege and advance 
the claims of managerialism over professionalism or whether it helps reassert the position 
of professionals against managers. 
There are, as evidenced from this study, possible conflicts that the subordination of 
professionals to managerialism discourses in the process of implementing outsourcing 
initiatives is likely to generate in professional managers. There are internal contradictions 
and skirmishes likely to arise from such role conflicts as professional managers take stances 
which might identify them more with one category (management or professionals) and less 
with another. In this case, PMMs not only have conflicts with senior managers; they have 
conflicts within themselves with respect to their role. It appears from the interactions 
between senior managers and PMMs that they still see each other, to large extent as two 
distinct, often opposing categories although PMMs obviously crave to be involved in 
management decision-making. 
This study has little evidence to support claims by earlier analysts (Exworthy and Halford 
(1999) that there is a shift away from a conflictual perspective to a more collaborative 
perspective on managerial-professional relationships. There is however some evidence to 
suggest that under some circumstances, conflicts can still persist to a high degree especially 
to the extent that PMMs still experience conceptual difficulties in identifying themselves as 
a management category at one time, and a professional category at another, depending on 
the role they play. Due to a number of mediating factors within the socio-cultural context 
of the cases including mistrust resulting from corruption, professionals are increasingly 
endeavouring, through various means of resistance, to keep their professionalism and 
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professional identity from managerial control, while managers are increasingly usurping 
professionals' positions through curbing professionals' influence and autonomy over 
organisational decisions, processes, resources and information. To the extent that these 
mediating factors enumerated above are likely to persist, so too are the associated conflicts. 
Since these mediating factors are intertwined with the cultural fabric of Ghana (see chapter 
one) and of most African LDCs, it is fair to argue that conflicts are likely to remain a 
pervasive part of managerial-professional relationships under NPM. 
From the interactions between senior and middle management a range of conceptual issues 
seem to surround the role of the professional manager. It is unclear, for instance, whether 
PMMs are demanding greater autonomy to enhance their performance as professionals and 
reinforce their resistance to managerial control or they do so to enhance their capacity to 
perform as managers and contribute to overall organisational success or both. Additionally, 
it remains unclear whether the reported senior management's control of professionals is a 
culmination of an ideological battle between managers and professionals or whether it is 
underpinned by an authentic commitment to their proxy role in ensuring that public 
services are not affected by the social closure-building and rent-seeking behaviour of 
professionals. The dynamics of some of the issues discussed earlier on leaves one with the 
impression that both managers and professionals are still struggling to accept each other 
and collaborate effectively for organisational success. One could also speculate that senior 
management still struggles to accept the position of the professional manager, who is not 
just a professional but also a manager with similar objectives and goals although methods 
might differ. 
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6.15 Reflections and Conclusion 
A number of questions are raised in this, including whether and to what cxtcnt PMMs are 
being given the autonomy and discretion they require to operate cffcctuvch" in their position 
and capacity as managers (not just as professionals).. host of others include: To what 
extent have senior managers understood the professional manager's augmented role or 
position? Does PMMs' autonomy cover strategic or day-to-day issucs or both? Against the 
backdrop that when PMMs' autonomy is restricted to a small range of operational 
decisions this is unlikely to encourage in them a positive subjective response (Procter et al, 
1999), are senior managers willing to accept professional managers into their fraternity as 
those with relevant experience that the organisation can tap for goal attainment rather than 
self-seeking professionals whose demands must be resisted and curtailed? 
The role of the professional manager (PMM) thus appears to be surrounded by issues of 
conceptual complexity. Such complexities are brought to light when we address ourselves 
to the following sets of conceptual issues, with which I bring the chaptcr to a close: 
1. Does the role of professional manager (PMM) help offer the professional new 
perspectives, attitudes and value system that privilege and advance the claims of 
managerialism over professionalism (Clarke and Newman, 1994) and alienate the 
professional from their values? Does it contribute to breaking the front of 
professionals, creating corrosions in their professional solidarity as Schested (2002) 
claimed? There are, as evidenced from this study, possible conflicts that the 
subordinating of professionals under managerialism discourses t. " likely to unleash 
in professional managers. There are possible internal contradictions likely to arise 
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from such role conflicts as professional managers take stances which identify them 
either with managers or with professionals. Further research can be looking into 
this. Specifically in LDCs where resources are scarce, unearthing these conflicts, 
and helping professionals to have better understanding of the need to reconcile 
their expectations of professional standards with their managerial responsibilities 
can help reduce cost appreciably, especially in the contract administration process. 
2. Are senior managers struggling to make a conceptual decoupling of professionals' 
role into that which categorises them as professionals and that categorizing them as 
managers? There is need for such categorisation, which should relate to what 
professionals do rather than who they are known to be. It is possibly the absence of 
such conceptual decoupling of roles that make managers treat professionals as a 
self-seeking group committed to protecting their selfish interests. In effect, 
professionals' boundary-spanning roles do not seem to include boundary- panning authority 
required to perform in their position, not only as professionals but also as 
managers. 
3. When professionals express frustrations about the decline in their autonomy, are 
such references to autonomy restricted to only their professional territories or their 
managerial domains as well? What is implicit from such a fall in professional 
autonomy however, is that professionals' capacity to manage (as managers), has 
also been reduced. The data presented here indicate that PMMs tend to identify 
more with their profession and professional role than with management and 
managerial objectives. Are professionals themselves still struggling to make this 
conceptual break from the managerial-professional dichotomisation? 
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4. The increased use of consultants implies less use of PMi11s in making decisions 
regarding technical issues. The resultant effect is that organisational knowledge 
[tacit and embedded], which used to be stored in PNIMs, is being gradually 
removed from PMMs to be placed in consultants. This is an area of further 
research, and researchers would be looking at the effects of outsourcing in highly 
technical areas on the development or dwindling of the in-house capacity of public 
organisations in the Ghanaian context in particular and in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
generally. 
To conclude, it suffices to state that on this evidence of outsourcing in an LDC, NPM-type 
reforms are beset with a range of challenges, which, among other factors, can be traced to 
fairly antagonistic relations between managers and professionals at the institutional level. 
Therefore reforms could not be said to have been very successful. However, the picture 
should not be that gloomy; cooperation between and understanding of the role of each 
other (category) should produce more positive results. This cooperation would be 
substantially enhanced if senior managers and PMMs see and relate to each other as 
colleagues with different roles, working towards the same objective rather than as rivals 
struggling for organisational power and identity. A practical way to this end is for there to 
be proper coordination and openness in making decisions on subjects over which 
professionals have authority. It is important to seek their views on critical decisions 
especially with respect to areas or functions to be outsourced, organisations to provide 
outsourcing service, as well as practical ways to implement outsourcing decisions. 
Professionals need to equally understand the dynamics of the current new managerialism; 
they need to be aware of the necessities imposed on public organisations by the current 
global financial challenges. Such understanding should make them reconcile their 
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commitment to professional standards with the demands and realities of managing a cost 
efficiency-oriented public sector. Attitudinal and mindset change is thus required from 
PMMs as well as senior managers, whose joint cooperation could lead to more desirable 
reform outcomes. 
Such understanding of each other's role would tend to improve relationships and improve 
service delivery in public organisations in LDCs where similar dynamics as those found in 
these cases apply. When senior managers and PMMs begin to seek deeper understanding of 
each other's work, then PMMs would gain deeper understanding of-management-related 
issues while senior managers deepen their understanding of the professionals' work. 
Although achieving this form of cooperation would be helpful, it did not form part of this 
research; this could constitute a topic for further enquiry. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.0. Introduction 
This thesis has attempted to investigate the challenges faced by professional middle 
managers in two corporatised health institutions in Ghana in which some support 
functions are outsourced in line with the NPM framework. Five main tasks are 
accomplished in this thesis. First, recent public sector changes (NPM reforms) are traced 
and mapped along various parameters, including political, managerial, organisational and 
service delivery reforms, with associated practices and ethos clearly distinct from traditional 
public administration. Second, how these developments in the West are mirrored in LDCs 
especially Africa, and the range of challenges encountered as a result of peculiar features 
symptomatic of these countries are discussed. Third, the impacts of these changes on 
redefining and re-categorising managers and professional bureaucrats in the public sector 
with respect to changing roles, responsibilities and authority, and the implications of these 
for the relationships, interactions and co-options among the identified categories are 
drawn. Fourth, the research methodology, method, and findings are presented in the 
context of Ghana, where a range of systemic factors tend to moderate reform outcomes 
along particular lines. Fifth and finally, the findings are discussed in line with relevant 
literature and in the context of Ghana in particular, and LDCs in general. I recap these 
milestones in this chapter and conclude it with critical observations, and a call for a change 
in both the thinking about and research agenda on management systems in Africa and 
public management in LDCs. 
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7.1 Major Changes 
The NPM agenda is fundamentally a calculated attempt to alter how politicians do politics 
with respect to public management; how the public sector itself is administered; 
organisational designs established to support the administration of the public; and how the 
business of service delivery is pursued. To begin with, politicians have been endowed under 
NPM with increased powers to play a much more active and central role with respect to 
deciding, designing, and delivering public policies, in addition to determining the scope and 
reach of the public sector itself. Politicians determine the public space by deciding what 
should or should not constitute the public (Newman, 2005). Increasingly, politicians are 
being socialised into thinking more strategically like chief executives, and are through 
contracts and performance agreements increasingly contractualising their relationships with 
public managers (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; 2002). All these are grounded partly in 
public choice theory. 
Additionally, public administrators are being socialised into the prescriptions of 
managerialism, and are better referred to as managers to reflect managers' pivotal role in 
the NPM reform agenda and discourse. Senior public managers' position has been 
strengthened and their scope for discretionary behaviour extended, all in the belief that it 
would make them more effective in confronting the public sector inefficiency challenge. 
Indeed the ideal public servant is one who thinks strategically, provides visionary 
leadership; is proactive and results-focused, and guarantees value for public money. Surely 
the ideal manager epitomises Hood's (1991) description as 'a named person at the top 
(chief executive) with active, visible, discretionary control of organisational resources, free 
to manage', axiomatically supported by the claim that accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility for action, not diffusion of power. This is grounded in the 
288 
concept of managerialism or new managerialism, which I treat in detail in chapter two, and 
also in chapter three. To moderate this enhanced managerial authority, managers have to 
learn to operate in a highly contractual environment reflected in the increase in contracts 
and performance agreements, and coupled with the multiplicity of performance 
measurement initiatives, typified by regular performance monitoring reports. 
Furthermore, public organisations are being increasingly restructured, reconfigured and 
redesigned in ways, which Hood (1991) summarised as `breaking up of formerly monolithic 
units into corporatised units around products, and operating on decentralised one-line 
budgets' (chapter two). This form of organisational design both allows optimum exercise of 
augmented politicians' and managers' powers, and also paves the way for private 
involvement in delivering public services as a means to ensuring the competition necessary 
for attaining efficiency. 
Finally, public service provision no longer remains the preserve of public organisations, as 
greater private involvement in public provision is encouraged, pursued through a 
multiplicity of contractual arrangements including outsourcing; public-private partnerships; 
private finance initiatives; and franchises that bring the public and private together. Such 
arrangements are believed to both ensure greater transparency in service delivery and 
guarantee public institutions access to private capital and expertise. These reforms are 
meant to change citizens' contract with the state, alter the ethos and philosophy of public 
organisations, and change the provision of public services permanently. The commonest of 
such arrangements is outsourcing (chapter two), central to this thesis. 
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7.2 NPM Reforms in LDCs 
About two decades ago, Hood (1991) wondered what the form of NPM reforms would be 
in non-Western LDCs where [Western, Weberfan] public service ethos has not been 
developed. A decade ago, Polidano (1999) reported from a comprehensire research on 
LDCs, the growth in NPM reforms, relating the bizarre manner in which reform 
implementation occurs, and the associated challenges that negatively impact on reform 
outcomes. Quite recently, a growing number of studies (Condrey et al., 2(X)1; McCourt, 
2001; Hope, 200; Awortwi, 2002; Olowu, 2003; Caulfield, 2000) on NPM reforms in LDCs 
have drawn attention to a myriad of challenges responsible for NPMM reforms failure. These 
include inefficient bureaucratic systems; absence of realistic wages and remuneration 
systems resulting in shortage of qualified personnel to provide the required capacity; 
absence of effective regulatory, accountability and law enforcement frameworks; and an 
engrained political interference and patronage culture, seen as either caused by or leading to 
corruption (chapters one and two). 
Much more recently, a handful of researchers have suggested that Wcstcrn-type NPM 
reforms fail in LDCs especially African countries because they do not reflect the cultures of 
these countries (Dibie and Herron, 2002; Haruna, 2004; Economic Commission for Africa, 
2005), calling for a uniquely African management system that reflects and enables African 
cultures (Jackson, 2004; Egbue, 2006). These findings suggest that NPM reform failures are 
better understood as a function of incompatibility of reforms with the cultural practices 
and value system of the local context, pointing to a real need for a shift in both policy and 
research focus and agenda to address this challenge. It came to light in the course of this 
study that there are puzzles to be addressed with respect to NPM reforms especially in a 
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developing country like Ghana. NPM reforms raise a number of issues in LDCs as reforms 
elements encounter a range of local factors, producing very different results, many of 
which are highlighted throughout this thesis 
7.3 Redefinition and re-categorisation of public managers 
These global developments have led to the need to redefine and re-categorise public 
managers in terms of their roles, responsibilities and authority. Increasingly, the distinctions 
in the roles of top, middle and lower levels of management are becoming increasingly 
blurred (Causer and Exworthy, 1999). Moreover, the custodial regulation previously 
characteristic of public sector professionals' work is being gradually subsumed in 
bureaucratic regulation in line with managerialism (Kitchener et al, 2000; Clarke et al, 
2000). However, whereas corporatised organisations are believed to be largely autonomous, 
a great deal of this autonomy seems to be located in and restricted to top management. As 
Exworthy and Halford (1999) and Doolin ( 2001), have earlier observed, while an 
increasing number of public professionals are being offered managerial positions as a 
means of adding a touch of management to their professional practice the exercise of 
discretion in their capacity as both managers and professionals is being reduced, 
systematically subsumed in managers' authority. The findings from my research do support 
these assertions to some extent. 
Besides, the subject of professionals has itself become more complicated and 
problematised (Causer and Exworthy, 1999) not least because of recent developments in 
the public sector where professionals were integrated into managerial positions, rendering 
any dichotomous distinction between managers and professionals practicably 
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unsustainable. The classification of public managers should be based on their role and 
function rather than their distinct categories (as managers or professionals) if conflicts are 
to be minimised. This would reduce the managerial-professional distinction and the 
associated tension especially in circumstances where roles seem to stretch across managerial 
and professional domains. Examples are where professionals, by their managerial positions 
are authorised to make decisions, which might otherwise have been made by professionals, 
and vice versa. Among other things, it is the deliberate juxtaposition on professional values, 
of a managerialist framework, which defines professional effectiveness largely by reference 
to cost-efficiency that is- emerging as a continual source of conflicts between top managers 
and PMMs. The various ways that managers are being categorized, changes occurring 
especially in managing professionals and associated conflicts, co-options and collaborations 
between managers and professionals are treated in chapter three. 
7.4. Summary and Implications of Research Findings 
All the changes described above are vital to understanding this research thesis; the first two 
changes provide the conceptual framework while the last two provide the policy and 
institutional framework for the cases studied. The research framework and the research 
focus sections, in chapter four, provide further details. It is against this background that 
this thesis attempts to investigate and conceptualise the challenges of PMMs in the 
outsourcing of support services in corporatised health institutions in Ghana and the coping 
strategies they employ in responding to these. All these are investigated in the broader 
context of NPM in two corporatised teaching hospitals and two cases reflecting different 
skills level. The comparative element of this thesis research lies in the different skill level 
and is meant to investigate whether and to what extent differences in skills level of 
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functions outsourced has influence on managing outsourcing contracts and on 
relationships between senior managers and PMMs. I discuss the research questions in turn 
below. 
Before launching into the findings, it would be useful to have a recap of the main research 
questions that this study has attempted to address. The first question seeks to understand 
the issues managers encounter, and is subdivided into three to cover the rationale for 
outsourcing; the extent of PMMs' involvement in decision making, and the issues 
introduced by the problematic nature of NPM, compounded by the particular socio- 
cultural and political features of the research context. The second question attempts to 
explore the coping devices or resistance strategies employed by managers in response to 
the encountered issues. The third question draws implications of the responses to first and 
second major research questions for autonomy and role of PMMs, and NPM reforms in 
developing countries. These research questions are discussed in turn; however, since 
questions about 
decision making and autonomy are covered under issues encountered, 
these are not treated as separate 
items. Therefore, in question one, only the subsection on 
rationale for outsourcing is 
discussed. 
7.4.1 Rationale for outsourcing 
Two broad rationales for outsourcing have been identified: to 
have `less difficulty or 
trouble or headache' and to address capacity shortage for the 
low-value/simple skill and 
high-value/complex skill function respectively. The former includes addressing workers' 
attitudinal problems including laziness, absence and lateness to work, and disrespect for the 
employment contract; escape the extra cost and inconvenience associated with keeping a 
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large number of permanent employees; and reduce supervision time so as to concentrate 
on core responsibilities. The latter was underpinned by the need to avoid unnecessary 
spending due to purchasing wrong medical equipment; wrongly installing equipment; and 
lack of technicians to regularly maintain equipment. Evidence suggests that the differences 
in rationale and functional skill level also give rise to different approaches adopted by 
senior management to managing outsourcing contracts, which also produce differences in 
managerial-professional relationships. The complex skills functional area contract whose 
management is less straightforward and requires external consultants is characterised with a 
higher degree of conflicts between senior managers and PMMs than is the lower- 
value/simple skills function contract, more straightforward and managed without 
consultants. 
7.4.2 Major issues and challenges 
PMMs generally feel controlled by senior managers in various ways: two major issues were 
clearly articulated. The first relates to reduction in their autonomy and discretion to make 
decision over a range of issues. PMMs were concerned that in the complex skill function 
case external consultants were making decisions over issues in the former's domain. The 
second relates to a range of conflicts unleashed by the juxtaposition of managerialism over 
professional values. At least five issues are identified: 
(i) Conflicting emphasis on cost and quality. Senior managers' primary 
concern is cost-efficiency while PMMs primary emphasis is on cost- 
effectiveness. 
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(ii) Consistent with their cost-efficiency centeredness, senior managers are 
concerned about factors driving up costs, including complex 
contracting procedures, procurement irregularities, and the challenges 
of settling and compensating redundant employees. 
(üi) There have been instances of conflictual, bizarre emphasis on results 
and outputs as opposed to procedures and outcomes. On the one hand 
PMMs expressed concern over senior managers' disproportionate 
emphasis on results and output, making them to sacrifice procedural 
tenacity, equity and ethical considerations for cost-efficiency. On the 
other, PMMs expressed frustration in the increase in bureaucratic 
procedures, which they argue is both inconsistent with professional 
work, and leads to delays, inefficiency and corruption as people bribe 
their way through to by-pass the elaborate procedures. 
(iv) There are paradoxes and puzzles surrounding the issue of increased 
bureaucratic centralisation and its relationship with corruption, as 
PMMs seem to be saying they are both comfortable and uncomfortable 
with focusing immensely on procedures. These puzzles might be 
resolved by redefining or differentiating professionals' work into 
components that involve administrative/managerial procedures and 
those involving professional procedures. In the former, for instance 
endorsing documents for release of money and procuring materials 
needed in their everyday practice, professionals resent cumbersome 
procedures, while senior managers feel the absence of detailed 
procedures leads to corrupt practices for which they (senior managers) 
are answerable. In the latter case involving professionals' actual 
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technical practice, for instance, installing and maintaining medical 
equipment, they expect close attention to details and are not merely 
motivated by cost efficiency consideration to hasten the process 
although senior managers implied this is necessary to save cost. 
Professionals' frustration thus seems to lie in emphasis being placed on 
the wrong procedures. In other words, these are reflected in the relative 
weight senior managers and PMMs accord cost efficiency and cost 
effectiveness, with senior managers stressing economic efficiency while 
PMMs lay stronger emphasis on cost. effectiveness 
(v) With few exceptions senior managers and PMMs hold opposing 
perspectives on corruption. Senior managers see increased centralisation 
as a tool for fighting corruption while the latter sees it as a contributor 
to corruption as explained above. PMMs feel what causes corruption is 
the way senior managers restrict them access to the organisation's 
resources and information because it suggests they (senior managers) 
have something to hide. 
7.4.3 Pmfesrional Middle managers' coping devices 
While PMMs responded using various strategies, three of these are key findings: 
(i) With few exceptions PMMs responded to what they view as senior 
managers' attempt to control them, employing strategies likely to be 
interpreted as complying with or consenting to their own control or 
marginalisation. They were indirect, not straightforward, withdrawn in 
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their approach, sometimes simply watching senior management act. 
Such resistance resources with little verbal engagement are devoid of 
direct confrontation and openly expressed conflicts. 
(ii) Additionally resistance occurred at the micro level, employing non- 
deviant strategies that least required breaking organisational rules or 
engaging in industrial strikes; instead pursued through employing 
organisational control resources such as rules and regulations. Finding 
faults and flaws in organisational rules, professionals decided to go 
strictly by the rules. This resistance strategy I have conceptualised as .. 
individualised modes of work-to-rule. 
(iii) The few confrontational and verbal forms of resistance that occurred 
were restricted principally to the complex skills functional area. Even in 
these complex skills function cases, such forms of resistance tended to 
be restricted to the biomedical managers [professionals handling 
perhaps the most complex skill functional area] who expressed the 
greatest sense of frustration. Managing the complex skills function cases 
thus tends to be characterised with a greater degree of overt managerial- 
professional conflicts. This supports the assumption upon which the 
cases were selected, that high-value skills areas are more likely than low- 
value skills areas to constitute a domain of considerable conflicts 
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7.5. Implication of my research for NPM reforms in LDCs 
In this final section I summarise what the responses to the various questions posed in this 
research contribute to current literature with respect to NPM in LDCs, drawing their 
implications for policy and further research. 
7.5.1 What may inform the decision by public organisations to outsource? 
This thesis has established that depending on the level of skill required for handling and 
supervising functional area outsourced, decision to outsource would be underlain by two 
broad objectives: capacity-related issues; and attitude-related issues with respect to public 
employment. A range of attitudinal problems among public sector workers have been 
identified. Although the trend is changing considerably, such attitudes as laziness, lateness 
to work, absenteeism, and conscious attempt to use official working time for private 
business concerns are not uncommon among Ghana's public sector workplaces, thus 
corroborating a point made earlier by Danso (2007), and reflected in some of the 
interviews. These attitudes are however believed to exist only to a minimal degree among 
public sector employees, and could be treated as public sector-specific problems rather 
than generalised national problem. It is argued this challenge has a historical connotation, 
which could be traced to colonial legacy and the concomitant suppressive State, employed 
to serve foreign needs at the expense of local people. Admittedly, colonial states were set 
up to control and exploit local economies under which the development of local 
indigenous private sector was inhibited (Potter, 2000). Thus historically, the state was seen 
as an agent of suppression and exploitation towards foreign ends, to which patriotic 
indigenous citizens least dared to be loyal and committed. Sabotaging the state through 
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playing the system, withholding labour power, pilfering at work, destroying state property, 
and the like, one could argue, would be central to the definition of a patriotic citizen in that 
context. 
But the question that this argumentation raises is why these attitudes have remained even 
decades after political independence. Whereas answering this question falls beyond the 
scope of this thesis and could constitute a topic for further research, part of the answer is 
found in Potter (2000) who observed that African political class after independence eagerly 
seized upon the legacy of Statism by encouraging state-ownership in order to alter citizens' 
thinking about the state and guarantee their loyalty. However, by continuing to manage in 
an authoritative manner for their selfish benefit this class has heightened, rather than 
minimized, the ills of colonial Statism. Thus to most citizens, attaining political 
independence might mean little more than the changing of hands from a foreign 
oppressive group to a local cadre of dictators and exploiters (Egbue, 2006). It appears 
political leadership is central to this challenge, and so resolving it would require change in 
attitudes of political leaders (Mhone, 2003). This whole problem is grounded in 
neopatrimonialism, which began to evolve in many African countries in the years following 
political independence, and has persisted and remained until now in most cases (Soest, 
2006). Indeed, neopatrimonialism, in which informal, particularistic politics of the rulers 
pervade formal state institutions (Soest, 2006) has become the `distinctive institutional 
hallmark of African regimes' (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Indeed, neopatrimonialism 
does affect citizens' patriotism, loyalty and commitment to the State, and could result in 
legitimating unacceptable practices such as corruption, especially when acts of corruption 
would lead to a redistribution of wealth away from the affluent dominant political class to 
the poor, needy working class (Egbue, 2006) 
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It also appears public sector corruption is inextricably linked with this thinking. For 
instance, there is an extant literature (Anechiarico and Kuo, 1995; Egbue, 2006) suggesting 
that public sector corruption might be justified so long as it leads to a redistribution of state 
resources from the affluent and exploitative political elite to the mass middle and working 
class population. Further research should investigate the extent to which current work 
attitudes including public sector corruption are linked to colonial legacy, perpetuated by 
current local politicians. It is unclear whether the shortage of capacity, which warranted 
outsourcing in the complex skill function case, has something to do with the colonial 
hegemony but further research should help establish this too. 
But the picture should not be understood to be all gloom, as in principle, there seems to be 
no disagreement between senior and PPMs over whether or not outsource. Moreover, even 
with the disenchantment of PMMs with senior managers' approach to outsourcing contract 
administration, PMMs could not deny the fact that the outsourcing of both the 
Installation/Maintenance and Cleaning functions has surely produced some good results. 
For instance, the outsourcing of the Installation/Maintenance function has produced what 
I have described as a `one stop-shop solution', where a function previously handled by 
three separate departments (Biomedical Engineering, Estate and Maintenance) now comes 
to be exclusively managed by one provider. Some savings in cost terms has also been 
realised although the net figure is difficult to compute, external consultants hire fees 
eroding a great deal of this savings. There is a potential that if properly and prudently 
handled, with minimal consultant hire for instance, the outsourcing of this function could 
result in considerable cost savings while beefing up capacity to address the shortage of 
experts challenge. Similarly, the outsourcing of the Cleaning function has helped both 
hospitals to deal with unacceptable working habits of permanent employees; there is also 
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evidence to suggest the hospitals are now cleaner. Additionally, the substantial reduction in 
the number of permanent employees now replaced by contractors and casual workers has 
relived the PMMs of continual supervision, offering them the opportunity to focus on their 
core duties. Additionally, the outsourcing of the cleaning function was meant to effect a 
culture change in public institutions in terms of employees' attitude to public employment. 
There are of course, potentially serious social and economic costs resulting from such a 
flexible employment strategy. For instance, labour revolts and the economic survival of 
redundant staff are issues that can neither be avoided nor ignored. However, the fact that it 
was suggested outsourcing has led to cleaner. hospitals suggests that outsourcing public 
services might provide a partial solution to the public sector challenge in Ghana, and 
hopefully, other countries with similar contexts. 
Achieving this successfully would however call for conscious efforts to address the issues 
identified in this thesis. For instance, a united resolve to fight corruption, backed by strong 
political will, action and leadership, legitimated by legislation could make the benefits of 
outsourcing available to the nation. With respect to the policy arena in Ghana, the past 
political administration and the current NPP government have already established a strong 
framework for outsourcing some public services. It is expected that if subsequent 
governments could effectively build on what has already been achieved in this area, 
Ghana's public sector could be on track to dealing with much of the engrained inefficiency 
by which it has, for years been characterised and paralyzed. 
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7.5.2 Major issues encountered in managerial pmfessional relationships 
The challenges PMMs encountered can be linked to two broad themes in the NPM debate. 
First, the seldom-tested belief that private sector solutions will address public sector ills 
(Dixon, Kouzmin, and Korac-Kakabadse, 1998) and the concomitant juxtaposition of 
market-oriented managerialist frameworks on public sector values. At the organisational 
level, this means subordinating all other considerations including professional values to 
managerial objectives. Most issues which PMMs have, for instance, disagreements over 
cost and quality and results and procedures, can be traced to this fundamental 
incompatibility between managerialism and professional values. 
Second, the challenge of corruption in the public sectors of many LDCs, described as `soft 
states in which corruption runs riot' (Olowu, 2002), and a domain where public employees 
take plunder (Egbue, 2006) still lingers. The increased bureaucratic centralisation, which 
senior management adopted was justified as an attempt to prevent corruption. However, 
the causality between centralisation and corruption does appear rather non-linear and 
bizarre, as interview responses from this thesis suggest. For instance, PMMs argue 
increased centralisation has been a cause of corruption since it compels people, desiring to 
avoid delays to by-pass the procedures through bribing. Future researchers could be 
investigating whether and circumstances under which centralisation heightens or attenuates 
corruption. 
Moreover, by establishing that management is more likely to exert control over functional 
areas considered complex than those that are not, this thesis provides evidence to support 
Crozier's (1964) expert power theory. Where they feel incapable of achieving this, 
302 
managers tend to rely on external consultants to, as it were, `decode the embedded 
knowledge' to render that domain simpler to control. It explains why much more conflict 
surrounds the complex skills function outsourcing than the simple skills function 
outsourcing. It supports poststructuralists' analysis that complexity constitutes power; and 
to render something transparent is a necessary step to controlling it (Foucault, 1977). 
However, the use of external consultants could seriously jeopardise the ability of public 
organisations to develop in-house capacity, and actually undermine one of the central 
reasons for outsourcing: to both cope with lack of capacity and beef up in-house capacity 
(as outsourcing providers also provide some form of training for the client organisations as 
part of the contract), and could set in motion `a vicious cycle of in-house capacity shortage, 
outsourcing and consultants hire'. 
7.5.3 Professionals' coping strategies 
The resistance strategies PMMs employed suggest there remains a range of unresolved 
issues between managers and professionals. As interviews suggest, compromise remains the 
commonest means by which managers and professionals collaborate to attain 
organisational ends. For professionals, the need to protect their profession becomes 
paramount to any decision, and they seem to find comfort in concentrating on their 
profession in times of conflicts. The various means by which they seek to exercise control 
including consent and compliance, suggest there being other moderating factors that 
prevent them from being straightforward. I suggest it is partly the culturally embedded 
issues relating to the concept of power-distance and its associated traditional value system 
identified in chapter six which are moderating the mode of professionals' response (see Fig 
6.4 chapter six). Further research in this area would investigate which of the locally- 
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embedded cultural reframing identified as potentially valuable in my thesis would enhance 
modem public management; which would not; and how the former can be achieved. 
7.5.4 Implications 
Taking a cue from these cases, three main causes can be assigned to NPM reform failures 
in LDCs. Firstly, the internal inconsistency of the NPM model stemming from the 
opposite concepts (Hood, 1991; Aucoin, 1990) on which it has been grounded. This 
challenge remains a global one, and not limited to LDCs. Second, in LDCs, such reform 
prescriptions could be described as foreign, and nothing more than a process of retrofitting 
foreign prototypes rather than customising reforms to address local needs. This is often 
due to the nature of the public sectors of these countries, where compared to Western 
countries bureaucracy and public service ethos are not properly developed (Hood, 1995). 
However, it appears because such reforms are often donor-driven, the enticement of 
accompanying financial resources can be hardly resisted by politicians championing 
reforms. For instance, various authors (Paragon, 1995; ISSER, 1995; Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2003) have argued that Western-type public sector reforms in 
African contexts are not only unhelpful but tend to be detrimental in the long run due to 
systemic and structural difficulties. In spite of this, African countries continue to pursue 
various forms of public sector reforms, which are not necessarily appropriate to their 
particular circumstances. Third, in the case of Ghana, there are contextual [socio-cultural 
and economic factors] that may be inconsistent with Western forms of democratic 
governance and participatory decision-making whereupon a strong public service, which is 
a prerequisite to NPM reforms is established. Thus the failure of NPM in LDCs is partially 
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due to the existence within those cultures of a complex set of political, economic, religious 
and socio-cultural factors arguably incompatible with reforms. 
7.6. Conclusions, Recommendations and Future Research 
I conclude by briefly reviewing broad institutional shifts in management, and development 
thinking globally with respect to traditional cultures, and by pointing further research to 
designing public management systems that are uniquely local. Since it is culture that defines 
what is allowed or constrained, what is cherished or frowned at, and what is supported or 
resisted, the management system of any people, if it should be effective, needs to be 
intelligently grounded in and supported by their cultural values as became clear from the 
Ghanaian experience in this piece of research. It is the misunderstanding of this 
fundamental principle that both motivated and underpinned modernisation theories in the 
1960s, which among many things, attempted to blame the underdevelopment of the LDCs 
on their so-called backward cultures. For more than a decade, global development thinking 
and agenda was under-girded by this theory (Yousfi, 2007). The discovery of the fallacy in 
these theories triggered the postulation of dependency theories, which, coining the 
concepts of the centre and peripbery, showed how the centre (Western countries) was 
developed by depending on resources from the periphery (LDCs) and how the periphery 
was underdeveloped by the centre (Rodney, 1973). 
Influential and compelling as these latter theories were, they did little more than merely 
titillate the emotional and intellectual palates of leaders of LDCs because they provided 
little substance for grounding the management systems of LDCs in their cultures. 
Unsurprisingly, the neo-liberal market theories that followed in the 1980s out of which 
305 
NPM was budded, were quickly transposed to LDCs with no critical assessment as if `NPM 
is the way to do public management' for every country (Manning, 2001). The imputation of 
NPM with omnipotence features, clearly conveyed by such phrases as `NPM for all 
seasons'; (Hood, 1991); and with ubiquitous orientation, reflected in `NPM is everywhere 
supplanting' (Hood, 1995), and `NPM as a global corporate agenda' (Whitfield, 2001) all 
carry overtones of the managerial hegemony of the West and clearly articulate the strong 
ideological discourses that underpinned the promotion of NPM reforms to LDCs. 
Apparently, the NPM era was portrayed as the climax of public management, described by 
some as the time when the truth about public management has been discovered (Manning 
(2001: 300). 
From modernisation theories down to current neo-liberal theories underpinning NPM, the 
`the local and the cultural' seem to be intelligibly subsumed in the `global and the modem'. 
Nonetheless, as suggested in this thesis, the local and the cultural have often proved to be 
more potent in mediating the `global and the modern'. The findings from this research 
together with the many cases of NPM reform failures in LDCs point to potency of the 
`local and the cultural' in shaping the `global and the modem'. Additionally, their potency 
to reduce the capacity of the `global and the modern' to deliver desired results is indeed 
becoming increasingly evident. Quite recently, some analysts, donors and major 
stakeholders in African public management reform agenda such as the World Bank and 
IMF have begun to call for designing public management systems that reflect local cultures 
(Yousfi, 2007). The implication of all this, as Jones (1989) puts it is the necessity for 
`reconceptualising African management in which African managers develop their own 
indigenous ideas and techniques for their own socio-cultural, political and economic 
environments'. There is a need for policy makers, donors and research focus to be directed 
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at efforts to ground the public management systems of LDCs, for that matter, African 
countries, in their local culture: a management system that would support, be supported by, 
and enable local culture. 
The need for African academics, politicians and influential policy makers to begin to 
interrogate foreign management practices introduced to African public management system 
is now becoming ever more obvious. Moving in this direction would surely encourage the 
pursuit of selective implementation of reforms rather than the current uncritical wholesale 
implementation, which has seen little success. Researchers can begin to address the 
question, `how can we model management systems to support and be supported by local 
cultures? ' Admittedly, while such a suggestion for achieving congruence between local 
cultures and management systems sounds plausible and appealing, the road to achieving 
this appears lined with conceptual ambiguities and practical difficulties. Indeed, there are 
aspects of African cultural and traditional practices understood by some African academics 
as impeding development. Examples include extensive assistance and patronage; gifts and tips and 
some traditional forms of governance (Egbue, 2006), in addition to those already identified from 
the Ghanaian context, believed to possess elements that could promote corruption. The 
way to overcome this could in itself, constitute the content of future research whose 
agenda could be devoted to resolving ambiguities about what such system would look like, 
its form, and nature, by answering at least three possible questions: 
(i) Would such a management system be an adaptation of Western management to 
local contexts and what would be the best approach to achieving this? Jackson's 
(2004) work on `Management and Change in Africa: a Cross-Cultural 
Perspective can serve as a starting point. 
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(ii) Would it involve the harnessing, consolidating and strengthening of traditional 
institutions of governance, (for instance chieftaincy in Ghana's case) upon 
which modern public management would be based, and what would be some 
of the possible issues to address to make this effective? The Economic 
Commission for Africa (2004) has a substantially rich data and ongoing 
research on this, which can be helpful to this process. 
(iii) Would it mean discarding Western management paradigms entirely, replacing 
them with new models developed by local academics or a combination of the 
three (Western, indigenous institutions and new models)? This would no doubt 
call for African academics to commit to questioning existing pro-Western 
management systems, and designing, based on broad African value systems, 
management systems grounded almost entirely in African value systems. In 
politics and political economy, Nkrumah's (1969) African Socialism project, 
clearly articulated partly in his influential `Consciencism , provides a useful 
groundbreaking work for designing systems grounded in African ideologies 
while in political and social organisation and education, Julius Nyerere's `Ujama' 
project remains a useful framework. Although coming from different academic 
fields, much can be learnt from these rather unfortunately abandoned isolated 
projects, which can provide a focus and direction for the future of the 
development of African countries. 
7.7 Reflections 
NPM is a description for collections of remedies for perceived deficiencies of well 
developed and socially embedded public sectors in developed countries, and the application 
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of NPM approaches in LDCs raises very different concerns, which I have discussed in 
detail in chapter two and throughout this project, using the lessons from Ghana as an 
LDC. They generate puzzles, ambiguities and tensions, some of which I have identified, 
and proposed alternatives to resolving. In Fig 6.4 (section 6.10), for instance, I illustrated 
how different factors interact at different levels to shape NPM reforms in the context of 
LDCs. As Ghana was the earliest independent state in sub-Saharan Africa, the historical 
trajectory I have set out in this chapter is meant to bring to a sharper relief the range of 
challenges likely to be encountered under NPM reforms in other countries, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa that later became politically independent and chartered paths in public 
sector development and associated reforms similar to those of Ghana. While not oblivious 
of the possible effects that differences in the flavours of administration inherited from 
different colonial sources, and the models of developmental state that evolved from these 
could have on reform outcomes in these different countries, I am persuaded there are a 
range of challenges across Africa identical with those elucidated by this research. This 
makes it possible to apply some of the findings from this research to other contexts similar 
to the context of this research. 
Finally, the suggestions I offered and the range of issues I raised in this research, 
particularly those that interrogate the appropriateness of NPM in LDCs, both reflect and 
build upon the current shifts occurring in both management and donor thinking about 
ways of doing management in Africa. Besides, this study has a pioneering dimension in that 
it attempts to explain management practice on the basis of local culture. This is against the 
backdrop of the prescriptive, top-down pro-Western advice on reforms, and the 
institutional critiques that often follow reform failures. The impact of NPM at the 
organization level needs to be examined in order to gauge its impact and relevance in LDCs 
and this is the level at which my thesis partly seeks to contribute. 
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APPENDIX A 
Detailed Interview Guide 
Introduction 
The interview guide is set out in four sections. In section one, the objective is to 
understand where, when and how the initiative to outsource health services emerged. 
Section two is concerned with who is involved in the policy 
design/planning/implementation and the major relationship between these actors while 
section three concentrates on the major issues in outsourcing health provision. The final 
section explores the coping strategies managers adopted in responding to the identified 
issues, as well as lessons learnt to guide future direction on outsourcing initiatives. 
Outsourcing as a means of delivering public health services: objectives and arguments 
Can you tell me how this initiative first came about? (Probe) For how long has this been 
happening? 
  What were the reasons? (probe) Any other reasons? (The aim here is to 
understand the various reasons or objectives of outsourcing, the sort of 
arguments advanced in support of outsourcing, and from whose perspectives) 
  Were there any doubts, concerns or reservations about this initiative? (This 
question would help understand general reaction to the initiative, and what 
fears the people have about outsourcing of health services) 
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Policy decision. planning and implementation: major actors and relationships 
Who were involved in: 
  The initial decision to outsource this function? (this item would clarify who is 
or is not involved in taking new initiatives) 
  Designing the policy and planning implementation? (Help to know who are 
involved in implementing public policies, and also to see what sort of inputs 
public employees, other than politicians are able to make to the project 
implementation process. 
  Who else, in your view, should have been involved in the implementation? (to 
see whether decisions on implementation reflect the general views of the 
people) 
  How do the actors relate to each other? (Probe) who reports to who? Can you 
tell me the chain of command? Who has the final say in decisions regarding 
project implementation? (this is a critical and sensitive area that helps to bring 
out the power relations, politics and general relationships among the actors, and 
what these relationships reflect or suggest about contradictions, dilemmas and 
conflicts in NPM) 
Main issues and assessment: successes and challenges 
How has this outsourcing initiative actually gone? 
  What has actually happened so far? (Probe) tell me a bit about the project (this 
is simply to prompt respondents to tell a story of one of the outsourcing 
projects they have experienced. Areas of success and /or failures could be 
suggested from these stories). 
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  What worked well and what didn't? (This is actually a probe into the previous 
question. If the previous question gets answered fully, this one becomes 
irrelevant) 
  What challenges have you personally encountered? (would help understand 
some of the challenges/conflicts respondents have had with this initiative- 
emphasis on the personal challenges managers have faced) 
  How have you managed them (would help give an indication of respondents' 
(especially, managers') ability to manage conflictual situations) 
  What challenges were encountered by the various actors? 
  How have they managed these challenges? (This question would help 
understand the coping abilities but especially various ways that respondents 
(managers especially) try to manage or cope in the face of conflicts and 
difficulties? 
  In light of these challenges do you think outsourcing should be encouraged? 
(This is meant to ascertain the attitude of respondents to conflicts: do they see 
conflicts as unusual and something to be avoided or as a normal part of 
organisation? 
Lessons learned: future directions 
What have you personally learned from this project that can serve as a guide for future 
projects (probe) what would work and what may not work under what circumstances? (To 
understand how organisations (managers) learn and how their present experiences guide 
their future actions? 
  What have you learned about what someone in your role should do differently? 
(probe) Do you think you were allowed to play your role as effectively as you 
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wished? (To see whether respondents (managers, especially) think they have 
been given to the power and autonomy in making their decisions regarding 
policy implementation) 
  What do you think others should do differently? 
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Pilot Study Interview Guide 
Section one: Changes in public management and service delivery 
1. Do you think the public sector has witnessed any changes over the past decade? 
2. What has been the nature and content of these changes? 
3. Have you been personally involved in any specific government outsourcing 
projects? 
4. What has changed in managing public establishments in relation to: 
" Their power and ability to take decisions 
" Politicians' control over public managers 
" The size of permanent government employees 
" The size of temporary staff 
" The use of private expertise to deliver public services? 
8. What impacts have these changes had on the: 
" The power of politicians? 
" The power of managers? 
" The power relations between politicians and public managers 
Section two: rationale for NPM strategy-outsourcing 
1. What, in your view, are the major drivers and objectives of government outsourcing 
projects? 
2. Are you aware of any economic argument for such initiatives? 
3. Do you have any idea how such initiatives emerge? If yes, who are the major brains 
behind them? 
4. Are you aware of any special documents that can provide details on such issues? 
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5. Which other external contributors whose views might influence such public policy 
initiatives? 
6. Do you know of the nature and extent of public managers' involvement in this process? 
7. In your view, do public managers have any degree of autonomy in making decisions 
regarding the implementation of public policies? 
Section three: Relationships and level of negotiation 
1. How are you able to perform in your position/role as a professional and a public 
manager? 
2. Have there ever been instances where your position on a specific policy 
implementation based on your professional expertise seems to be at variance with 
those of politicians and other managers? 
3. What is the degree to which you are able to maintain your professionalism and 
professional standpoint under such situations? 
4. Has there been any visible sign of conflicts between you and: 
" politicians 
" Public managers? 
5. Do you take instructions directly from: 
" politicians , or 
" Public managers? 
6. What do you see the public manager's role to be in this relationship? 
7. How would you describe the position of public managers in this relationship? 
8. In your view, do public managers have enough power to take decisions regarding 
the delivery of services which you are involved in providing? 
9. How often do they (managers) have to contact politicians before making decisions 
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Section Four: Effects of relationships on the work of public managers 
1. How would you describe the relationship between you, managers and politicians? 
2. Do you see conflicts arising between you, managers and politicians? 
3. How have you attempted to resolve these conflicts, paradoxes and ambiguities? 
4. What strategies or resources do you employ in getting around these conflicts? 
5. What impacts do you think (your) employing these strategies have or would have 
on the quality of public service delivery? 
Section Five: Impact on quality of service delivery 
1. With your experience with past policy implementation issues, what would you say 
about the outcomes of managerial negotiation over policies? 
2. Have you personally been involved with politicians or managers over negotiation of 
policies? 
3. What conclusions can you draw regarding the effects of negotiation over public 
policies? 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT EXTRACTS 
(Chief Executive-KATH) 
Sam: I would be glad if you could either select one case and let's run through it or refer to 
various cases 
Chief Executive (CE): I think I like to select cleaning, which has been one of the success 
stories. 
Sam: How did the initiative to outsource come? 
CE: From KATH 
Sam: From which department in KATH? From the various heads of department or from 
where, I'd be glad if you could elaborate 
CE: From my office 
Sam: Why outsource? 
CE: I made the decision to outsource because I looked at the cost/benefit analysis as well 
as what is core and non-core to us. The question is `is it our core business? If it's not our 
core business, can somebody do it better? Then I looked at all the numerous problems we 
have faced. So I looked at quality of work, and also the affordability and availability of the 
service 
Sam: So the quality of service is one of the drivers? 
CE: Yes, it is 
Sam: Can't your staff deliver the quality you expect? 
354 
CE: They have some expertise to deliver but they don't. There's an attitudinal problem 
facing government work, which explains why they fail to deliver the quality we require but 
I'll return to that in a moment. 
Sam: Were there any doubts or reservations about this initiative? 
CE: Yes, you know it's a change, and in every change situation, people would doubt if it'll 
work, and if it works, what about the people who are already doing the job? What are they 
going to do, and what would people say, and stuff... I remember the first thing we did was 
outsourcing of cleaning in some of our departments. I would 
have wished we would 
outsource everything. 
Sam: Why? 
CE: It'd be better but the first question I had from my own management was where would 
the people go and work? And secondly from the union, `what are you going to do to our 
people? So what we did was redeploy them, put them to other use and outsource 
them... and immediately we did that the same people, who have very poor working habit, 
said `we can do it, and do it better'. So we outsourced cleaning of Oncology, Polyclinic and 
Physiotherapy units. When we started talking about outsourcing some of them thought we 
were going to sack them and they came complaining but I talked to my management and 
we sat them down and talked to them. They were formed into a company and we 
outsourced our cleaning and potter services (now security) to them. 
Another example was our staff canteen where our own staffs in the kitchen department 
were handling. A committee was formed to overlook their operations. For a year there 
were lots of problems; they were running at a loss, so at a point I decided to outsource it. 
Immediately we said we wanted to outsource, that month, we started making profits. But 
we said we were bent on outsourcing it so we advertised it and got it outsourced and have 
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been making profits since then. The same management took it up but was making profits. 
We did so because we needed our peace of mind. We renew the contract every year when 
we are satisfied with evaluation. The cleaning is not different. Now we have two different 
committees responsible for our cleaning. I had wanted to get all departments' cleaning 
outsourced but then later decided that for any new department built the cleaning would be 
outsourced. We are hoping one day we'll outsource the cleaning of the entire hospital; I 
think that's the way forward: no strike, no industrial action; work would always be done. 
Sam: Who were involved in planning the contract? 
CE: Luckily for us we have a very strong supply chain management team, so they plan the 
contracts, once the agreement has been made to get the function outsourced. They follow 
all the procedures and get the contract awarded. 
Sam: Do you involve those whose departments are affected by these projects in planning 
the contracts? 
CE: Yes, we involve them, and they even have to evaluate the quality of work done before 
endorsing the certificates of payment for work done. 
Sam: Are you satisfied with those involved; are there others who should have been 
involved as well? 
CE: I think I've been satisfied so far; we have involved environmental sanitation, public 
health, and all relevant departments. In relation to canteen and feeding we involve the 
dieticians 
Sam: Could you tell me a little about how the project has gone so far? What has worked or 
has not worked? 
CE: What has worked well is the cleaning; we now have cleaner environments. We have 
also freed ourselves from all the problems of supervision, people not doing their jobs, 
pilfering of materials, etc. Once in a while a problem crops up but it's brought for redress, 
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and the people know if they don't work properly, they stand the chance to lose their jobs 
so they work really hard. With the catering we have seen some improvement in food 
quality and wide choice of food. Just as in cleaning, their contract can't be renewed unless 
management and the relevant head of department are satisfied with the outcomes of their 
performance review. 
Sam: What problems did you encounter in the process? 
CE: Not really, no problem so far 
Sam: How would you rate the success level of the projects? 
About 80% successful! Success in these areas is giving more weight to outsourcing as a 
means of delivering public sector jobs. Now we are thinking of outsourcing the entire 
security function; I'm thinking seriously about doing that and I'm considering the costs and 
benefits. 
Sam: What is the criterion for measuring success: output and attainment of goals or the 
extent to which people follow rules and regulations? 
CE: We focus on both 
Sam: Doesn't this delay the processes unduly? 
CE: Sometimes, it does, but you know we have got to put these structures there to prevent 
corrupt practices. Much as we want to attain results, we want people doing things right. 
Sam: How autonomous is Komfo Anokye in terms of directives from Ministry of Health, 
etc? 
CE: We are semi-autonomous; this is autonomy with central control because we have a 
substantial amount of our budget coming from government, so anything we do we have to 
seek approval from government first. We are hoping to attain financial autonomy status 
soon under privatisation but luckily we also have what we call internally generated funds, 
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which we generate ourselves, and use them although we still have, as a matter of formality, 
to seek approval first. 
Sam: Was there anything that could have been done differently by you or by someone else? 
CE: If we attain full autonomy, we hope in the near future we can outsource a lot of jobs 
even including some of our core business, leaving only the sensitive ones to our in-house 
staff. We can then cut down the size of non-core staff and increase the size of core staff 
ultimately. 
Sam: What personal lessons have you learnt? 
CE: There are lots of things the private people do which we can also do. What's crucial is a 
change of mindset. I have always said the first thing that everybody should ask themselves 
at the end of the working day is `what have we done for the day, but people just come to 
while away the time and off they go and at the end of the month they get paid. So I believe 
outsourcing can be the way forward in improving the negative working habits in the public 
sector. 
Sam: Any special advice for me as a management student? 
CE: It's very difficult to go purely private so I think what we now have - autonomy with 
central control is about the best but I'm looking for a day when I'll have my financial 
autonomy which empowers me to hire and fire. If you fail to work for one day, you don't 
get paid for one day, but now, at the end of the month salaries come in mass not taking 
into account who has, and who hasn't, worked. 
Sam: Thank you very much for your time. 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT EXTRACTS 
(Manager, Biomedical Engineering-KBu) 
Sam: Could you please tell me your role at Korle Bu? 
Bio: Project: Acquisition of medical equipment 
Sam: What does this involve and how does it work? 
Bio: There is the cost of acquisition and the cost of application. The application cost is 
made up of the various services some of which will include other responsibilities of the 
supplier of the equipment. If the supplier can't deliver they have the option to subcontract 
but such subcontractor must first be approved by the client. These applications can be 
decided on just a yearly basis during the warranty period or one year post warranty period. 
But depending on the complexity of the equipment you can decide to extend it. In 
biological engineering, if you combine the cost of acquisition plus the cost of application 
this equals the cost of ownership and the cost of ownership can be spread over several 
years. It's like you want a health care service in a particular location in Ghana. The service 
requires you to own certain pieces of equipment. The reason why the cost of acquisition is 
important is because the people who are going use the equipment are often not rich 
enough to even bear the cost of acquisition, and consequently the cost of ownership, which 
involves the personnel to operate equipment daily consumables in relation to the use of the 
equipment including maintenance of the equipment. So we decided that once you work 
with us for one year, if you want the service to last for several years, assuming the health 
care service is free you can decide that you'd run that particular service for say ten years 
then you must be ready to bear that particular cost of ownership for ten years. However if 
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that health care service is not free you may decide to bear the cost of ownership for 5 years. 
During this period the hospital would be generating some funds known as internally 
generated funds (IGF). This IGF becomes the seed money for the hospital 
foot the 
expenditure of the ownership of the equipment for the rest of the ten years after you've 
withdrawn the initial support. But it also depends on the complexity of the equipment. 
The 
MRI is like that. First of all it was bought by government for Korle Bu. 
Sam: Would you mind explaining a bit further? I know very little about health and medical 
terminologies. 
Bio: What I meant to say is that the cost of maintaining that MRI is higher than Korle Bu 
can bear. The yearly maintenance cost is roughly 10% of the cost of the equipment for a 
year. So this 10% plus the cost of the equipment equals the cost of ownership for a year. 
With the MRI the government is to contain the cost of ownership for 5 years, which is a 
grace period for Korle Bu to generate enough resources to be able to take care of the cost 
of ownership for the rest of the period. Hospital equipment is classified depending on their 
degree of complexity. The more complex the equipment the more likely you are to engage 
the services of the supplier for the provision of the related technical services, which include 
the preparation of the site, installing the equipment, maintaining the equipment, etc. 
Another factor is the risk level of the equipment. The higher the risk level the more likely 
they are to be given out on contract. In this you have two options: develop an in-house 
capacity to maintain the equipment or outsource it to external providers. One other reason 
is that there's a very limited market for medical equipment in Ghana, so it's not viable for 
the supplier to train people to man technical equipment, so if you outsource it to these 
providers you're helping to sustain the market and keep the supplier in business. 
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So if you don't allow the supplier to participate in this process then it is not likely you can 
keep them in business and in this case it's not possible to get the equipment you want from 
a local source. So there are a number of factors responsible for our decision to outsource. 
About 99% of the technology we use here is produced abroad, and so without this 
arrangement, it'll be practically impossible to source our equipment. This situation is 
completely different from developed countries, which have a wide range of suppliers to 
choose from. 
Apart from technology even sometimes we have to import expertise, and this has forced to 
now engage in training our own staff, and sending others to be trained abroad. Some 
suppliers do not have the capacity to train so they are just simply men. This is one source 
of conflict between us and those who make decisions on who to supply given medical 
equipment. If we're brought into the process we are able to assess and advice which 
organizations are competent to train and which are not, but we are often left out of this 
process. This has resulted in certain equipment just lying idle because there are no experts 
to handle them and the supplier does not have the capacity to train the staff. Somehow we 
managed to come an agreement to set up a training school here in Korle Bu where the 
suppliers come down to train our staff as they set up the equipment for use. This has 
proved very helpful though it initially met with a lot opposition. Sometimes a few of our 
staff who have the know-how help in training others staff. We are encouraging this type of 
cooperation, with the ultimate aim of broadening the expertise base of healthcare staff here 
as well as in other health institutions throughout the country. We're also targeting training 
of those who could maintain the equipment to come and train here. 
Sam: What challenges have you had so far? What didn't work well? 
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Bio: We've tried to do our best. There's no reason why a project should fail, with proper 
planning. 
Sam: Are you completely autonomous in taking decisions? 
Bio: To a very large extent although we still have to account to government. We are 
supposed to take decisions together to involve the professionals whose departments would 
be directly affected by such decisions, and this should be by means of consensus building 
via brainstorming. After this a document is prepared to be submitted by government for 
approval. But then at this stage, depending on the source of funding, the consultants would 
need to approve that document before it is accepted for implementation. While we have 
done well by building consensus, there has been a major setback in the sense that those 
who brainstorm for ideas are administrators, not managers or professionals who are able to 
determine the technical appropriateness of a given project document. But if the people are 
professionals in their area, they don't need a consultant. So the question is why not involve 
the professionals and avoid the consultants, saving some cost? This is the big question. 
Traditionally the hospital authorities normally present a list of medical equipment they 
think might be needed in any given year or period but as professionals we feel we, rather 
than hospital authorities, should decide what we need. And this has been a major source of 
conflicts between us and the hospital administrators, who think we are arrogating to 
ourselves too much authority but this not the case! It's been the central issue of debate for 
some time now. Is there any arrogation to professional work? That's what we have been 
trained to do; for me I don't see any arrogation in this case! I don't see why you have a 
problem with your equipment, and you call an engineer, and the engineer is not allowed to 
take decision based on his competence but instead, a consensus is required from people 
who are not engineers to take decision relating to issues of engineering nature, or call 
consultants. 
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If engineer has a problem, it should be discussed with other fellow engineers, not with a 
consultant who knows little about engineering. If a medical officer has a problem, they call 
other professionals of like mind not hospital administrator, as indicated by the direction we 
are going in Korle Bu. Again when it comes to deciding on which equipment to use, I 
would like to sit down with other technical men in the profession not with administrators 
who have nothing to contribute to the process. 
Sam: Why do you think this has been so? 
Bio: They always want to identify themselves with whatever is going on but they don't 
need to because at the end of the day well give them a report. So the professional element 
(failing to leave the professionals with little interference to do their work) has always been 
the central issue of concern. I was the first person to introduce biomedical engineering 
into the health sector it has not even been recognized as a profession in the civil service 
yet. So we're still struggling to gain recognition as professionals. But the central issue is that 
we want to be left alone to work as professionals and be held accountable for the outcome 
of our decision. As biomedical engineers we base our choice of equipment on the type of 
service we wish to render, not simply because you (hospital administration) have brought 
us a list of equipment you think might be good for us. It's difficult for me to assign specific 
reasons for this behaviour; if we were not to know what to do, then this line of action 
would be welcome but the type and level of service we are required to provide have all 
been specified and so it's not like someone would just get up and do what they want. So I 
don't see why they fail to leave us to operate as professionals. Every hospital has certain 
services to be provided and the type of service required determines the resources (physical 
and human) needed, and all these would determine the sort of financing a hospital may 
require at any give time. But that, in practical terms, is not the case here; this is the source 
of conflict between the professionals and administrators. 
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There are often conflicts between service providers and service managers. Service 
providers are those at the institutional level: hospital professionals, heads of department, 
etc. Then service managers are those who are directors and not in the institutions such 
chief executives, etc. Some of them who have been brought in are not in tune with up to 
date day-to-day issues confronting the hospitals. The service providers at the institutional 
levels are those who have this bit of information. Service manager's appointment is 
political. They don't even have to be medical officers. The institutional managers must be 
health professionals: doctors. So the main cause of conflicts is the difference in knowledge 
between service managers and service providers. Institutional practice is technology; those 
who do not practice at this level lack that technology, yet they wish to dictate what should 
be done at the hospitals at any given time. They sometimes appoint someone from among 
service managers to manage a health institution and they create a lot of mess. How can you 
effectively manage something you have been out of touch with for a long time? If it 
happens that way, they tend to engage a number of professionals as consultants, which all 
increase the costs they purport to be saving. 
To tell the truth there are 1001 health centres across the country that lack facilities and 
even expertise just because the decision to cite them was made without the health 
professionals. These are some of the problems. But me as a biomedical engineer, if there 
are no hindrances, I'll try to make the best out of the situation. Sometimes, they bring their 
own consultants simply because they always want to benefit from the project. If the 
professionals are allowed to manage these projects, the money will go to them and they 
(politicians) will not like that to happen. One of the biggest problems we have now is the 
distinction between service provision and policy formulation. MoH is for policy 
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formulation and the GHS and agencies are for service provision. The policy makers can't 
effectively determine where a specific facility should be located. 
Sam: Is there anything that might have been done differently? 
Bio: I think I've already made my points. 
Sam: Thank you for your time. 
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